Collective bargaining legislation provides employees the right to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment with their employer as a group through a chosen representative. It also requires the employer to negotiate with this representative. Sixty-four percent of all state and local government employees in the United States have the legal authority to bargain collectively with their employers (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 a). West Virginia's state and local government employees are among the remaining 36 percent who do not have this authority. West Virginia is also one of just 10 states in the country which does not give any of its public employees the authority to collectively bargain with their employer.

Collective bargaining "rights" for state and local government employees is a highly charged political, social, and economic issue in West Virginia. Although legislation to provide West Virginia's state and local government employees with these rights has not been enacted, the issue has been debated vigorously in the state legislature almost every year since the early 1970s.

Occasionally, collective bargaining legislation has passed in the House of Delegates or in the state Senate, such as in 1983 and 1984, but never in both. Its advocates tried once again in the 1992 legislative session to secure the adoption of a bargaining bill, but they failed. They are expected to continue their efforts in the 1993 legislative session.

One outcome of the 1992 legislative session was the creation of the Blue Ribbon Personnel Commission, charged by Governor Caperton to examine, among other things, the issue of collective bargaining for public employees. The 16 member commission, composed of both supporters and opponents of collective bargaining, is expected to produce its findings before the 1993 legislative session convenes.

This article is designed to help state and local government policyrnakers reach a fuller understanding of what collective bargaining legislation entails and whether collective bargaining legislation should be adopted in West Virginia. Specifically, it examines the role of unionism and organization among state and local government employees in West Virginia, analyzes how and where collective bargaining legislation has been implemented in other states discusses the purposes of various provisions in collectiv~ bargaining legislation, assesses the arguments of those who favor and of those who oppose collective bargaining, and makes a policy recommendation based on the evidence.

Government Employment and Fiscal Stress

About 17 percent of all employed people in West Virginia worked for state and local government in 1990 (WV Bureau of Employment Programs 1991). This proportion is about the same as it was in 1970, indicating that the relative size of the public sector workforce in West Virginia has not changed significantly over the past two decades.

There are currently about 102,000 state and local government employees in West Virginia (WV Bureau of Employment Programs 1991). Approximately two-thirds of these employees (68,000) work for various local govemments and approximately one-third (33,000) work for West Virginia's state government. As Table 1 shows, the state's 55 school districts are the largest government employer with 47,131 employees. West Virginia's state government is the second largest government employer with 39,408 employees, followed by the 230 municipal governments with 11,308 employees, the 55 county governments with 6,880 employees, and the 287 various special districts with 1,659 employees (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 a).

State and local government employees produce a wide range of services, but most of these can be grouped into eight major functions. Table 2 provides a list of these functions andthe numberof state and local governmentfulltime employees in each in 1987 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 a). As the table shows, the largest number of state government employees are employed as educational support staff, primarily in higher education (6,873). They make up 21.8 percent of the state government's work force. State highway employees are a close second with 18 percent. The largest number of local government employees are teachers (28,552). They account for nearly half of all local government employees (49.5 percent). Education as a whole dominates all f orms of government employment, with a total full-time work force of 51,658, or 58 percent of the total.

These services are paid for by taxes and fees, either directly through state and local government taxes and fees or indirectly through intergovernmental grants-in-aid. Unfortunately, state and local governments throughout the country, including West Virginia, have come under increased fiscal stress over the past few years. The recent national recession and the continuing weakness of the economic recovery have adversely affected state and local government revenues as many people have decided to defer major purchases (causing state and local government sales tax revenue to fall below expectations), not received raises or have been laid-off (causing state and local government income tax revenue to fall below expectations), and have seen their property values fall or stagnate (causing property tax revenue to fall below expectations). Also, falling profits and tax concessions offered to keep or to attract businesses to their areas have depressed business tax revenues. In addition, once Medicaid expenditures are discounted, the federal government has cut back substantially on its financial assistance to state and local governments since the early 1980s.

Despite the public's distaste for tax increases (Connecticut's governor was recently hung in eff igy for instigating that state's first income tax law), many state and local government off icials, including those in West Virginia, have been forced by the aforementioned economic constraints to raise taxes and to increase fees to maintain and, in some instances, to expand current levels of state and local government services. However, in recognition of the public's opposition to tax increases, they have also aggressively sought ways to reduce expenses to keep tax and fee increases to a minimum. Since public services are by their nature labo r- intensive, with employee compensation accounting for between 60 percent and 80 percent of municipal operating budgets throughout the nation, state and local government officials have sought ways to reduce the numberof state and local government employees (eitherthrough governmental reorganization or privatization efforts) and reexamined their wage and benefit packages to make certain that they are not "out of line" with those in the private sector (Kearney 1984; Henig 1990; Katz 1991). It is against this background of fiscal stress that collective bargaining in West Virginia is examined.

Unionism and Organization Among Public Employees in West Virginia

The right of public employees to organize and belong to unions, unlike the right to bargain collectively, is protected byfederal law and by various decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1987, 31 percent of full-time state and local government employees in West Virginia were organized into unions orassociations (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 a). This percentage has remained fairly steady over the years, up slightly from 27.8 percent in 1977 and 27 percent in 1982. Nationally, this level of organization is fairly low. Approximately 45 percent of all state and local govemment employees in the United States are organized into unions or associations. West Virginia is 32nd in the nation in this regard (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 a).

As far as West Virginia's neighbors are concerned, Maryland (54 percent), Ohio (43 percent) and Pennsylvania (61 percent) are more organized than West Virginia, while Kentucky (20 percent) and Virginia (23 percent) are less organized.  In West Virginia, about one in five state employees and
one in three local employees are organized (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 a). The extent of employee organization by type of government in the state. Currently, school district employees in West Virginia are more than twice as likely to be organized than those employed by other types of government, with 45.6 percent of their full-time employees belonging to associations or unions. Municipal government (21.2 percent), special district (21 percent) and state government employees (19.9 percent) fall far behind, with less than half the proportion of organized employees as school districts. County governments (2.1 percent) barely have any organized employees.
  All of them fall below the equivalent national average. School districts in West Virginia are closest, being 6.9 percent less organized than the national average. Special districts are 13.1 percent less organized, state government is 19.8 percent less organized, municipal governments are 29.8 percent less organized, and county governments are 31.9 percent less organized than the national average.

Very few of West Virginia's part-time public employees are organized into unions or associations. The highest percentage of organization exists among part-time state government employees (3.5 percent).

The extent of employee organization also varies enormously according to the services they produce. Hospitals have the most organized labor force (36 percent), followed by state police employees (31.9 percent), highway employees (24.5 percent), public welfare employees (21.1 percent), educational support staff (20.1 percent) and, lastly, teachers and faculty (18.1 percent). All state government services are less organized than the equivalent national figure. The biggest differences are to be found among public welfare (31 percent less) and highway employees (28 percent less). Police, teachers, hospital employees and educational support staff are also less organized, but not to the same degree.

That teachers (48 percent) are the most organized labor force within West Virginia's local governments, followed by fire protection employees (46.4 percent), school support staff (40.5 percent), sanitation employees (23.2 percent), highway employees (21.2 percent), police (20.3 percent), public welfare employees (16.7 percent) and, finally, hospital employees (13.9 percent). School support staff are slightly more organized than in the nation as a whole. All remaining employees are less organized than their national equivalents, with police (34.2 percent less), public welfare employees (29.3 percent less) and sanitation employees (27 percent less) furthest from the norm. Fire protection employees, highway employees, hospital employees and teachers are also less organized than the national norm, but not to the same degree.

Collective Bargaining In The U.S.

The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, and its more comprehensive successor, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, gave most private sector employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through a union representative (Herman and Kuhn 1981). By the end of World War 11, collective bargaining had become institutionalized as an accepted labor relations policy in the private sector (Moody 1988). Most employers, especially in the mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy, accepted unions as the sole representatives of their employees and agreed to their proposals for consistent wage improvements during contract negotiations. In return, the unions were expected to guarantee corresponding improvements in productivity and to ensure labor peace and stability. Employers also benefited from the rising wages because the increased earnings of their employees contributed substantially to the growing consumer demand necessary to maintain industry profitability. The system worked very well forthe three parties concerned; employers, unions, and employees, until the 1970s. At that time a dramatic increase in global competition rapidly undermined the arrangement. The market power of American corporations was reduced, and the union's demands for increased wages could no longer be supported. Overthe past20years employers'threats to disinvest or relocate jobs overseas or to other states have forced unions to accept major concessions to the point where their influence as the collective representative of many industrial employees is now marginal.

In 1959 Wisconsin became the first state to adopt collective bargaining legislation for the public sector (Kearney 1984). Since then, 25 more states have adopted a comprehensive collective bargaining labor relations policy for all public employees. Ten other states have adopted collective bargaining policies which cover only some public employees. Four more states have established an alternative meet and confer policy, which is a weaker form of collective bargaining. It places no obligation on the employer to either negotiate orsign a contract. Finally, there are only 10 states, including West Virginia, which currently do not have any legislation whatsoever giving collective bargaining rights to their employees.

The adoption of collective bargaining legislation by state and local government employers can be seen as an attempt to replicate collective bargaining's initial success in the private sector (Moody 1988). Many states adopted collective bargaining legislation during the mid-1 960s. At that time state government responsibilities, budgets, and workforces were increasing rapidly. Government employers viewed collective bargaining as a way to ensure work peace and stability at a time when their work forces were not only growing, but growing during a period of great civil unrest. The pace of adoption then slowed down at the end of the 1970s, and only a few states have passed collective bargaining legislation duringthe 1980s and 1090s. Three of the most recent to do so were Ohio in the mid-1980s, Indiana in the late 1980s, and New Mexico in 1992.

The 10 states that have not adopted collective bargaining for any of their employees are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia. West Virginia is bordered by states with comprehensive legislation to the north (Ohio and Pennsylvania), by states with partial legislation to the west and east (Kentucky and Maryland), and by a state without any collective bargaining legislation to the south (Virginia).

The right to bargain collectively does not necessarily mean that collective bargaining takes place. Employees may or may not choose to take advantage of that right. In fact, as Table 5 shows, only 50 percent of state government employees and 55 percent of local government employees in those states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation are actually represented by bargaining units (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991a). In other words, only slightly more than half of those employees who have been given the right to bargain collectively actually exercise that right, Even in states like West Virginia, that lack enabling legislation, some employees can exercise the right to bargain collectively if their employer, generally local government, agrees to honorthis right. In states without any legislation, 1 percent of state government employees and 12 percent of local government employees are represented by bargaining units. States with partial coverage, not surprisingly, fall in between in terms of the percentage of employees represented by bargaining units. In conclusion, while giving government employees the right to be represented collectively obviously raises the number of employees who belong to bargaining organizations, this by no means implies that the public sector work force will become overwhelmingly organized if given the right. The data indicate that, on average, only about half are represented by an organization.

Collective Bargaining Legislation

Collective bargaining legislation for public employees generally contains 10 major provisions (Kearney 1984). The f irst provision usually concerns the rights of employees

to organize, form, join, or assist labor organizations and to engage in collective bargaining through an elected representative. It also gives employees the right not to engage in the above activities if they so choose. The second provision usually concerns employer rights, which generally relate to matters that may be excluded from negotiation. Examples include the employer's right to determine the nature of work and to hire, promote, and dismiss employees. In some states, existing regulations, such as those relating to civil service and merit systems, supersede negotiated settlements.

A third provision establishes an agency or employment relations board to administer the legislation. The most effective form appears to be a state board that is appointed by the governor and is independent of existing state agencies. This board typically is charged with resolving disputes, determining bargaining units, and ensuring that the state's labor relations policies are implemented. Of the 26 states that currently have comprehensive collective bargaining legislation, 18 have independent administrative agencies for all employees, six have independent administrative agencies for some of their employees, and two do not have an independent agency.

A fourth provision outlines the criteria for establishing bargaining units. These criteria vary among states, but generally they are designed to create relatively homogenous groups of employees with common interests and working conditions. A fifth provision details the procedures for electing union representation. Typically, elections are by secret ballot and the right to represent a unit is awarded exclusively to one representative on the basis of a majority vote. A sixth provision identif ieswhat can be bargained. The most common issues that can be bargained are wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Twenty-three of the 26 states with comprehensive legislation allow all of the above to be bargained.

A seventh provision sets union membership requirements. All but three of the states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation permit the agency shop, which does not require employees to become union members, butdoes; requirethemto paythe union asumof money equivalent to union dues to cover union expenses in the collective bargaining process. The agency shop provision provides unions with greatersecurity in its role as employee representative by guaranteeing the union incomefrom all of the employees in the unit being represented. It has been argued that the agency shop provision may also benefit employers because stable union representation has been found to lead to greater labor peace and stability (Kearney 1984).

An eighth provision relates to unfair labor practices, and specif ies both employer and union practices which are prohibited. This provision, such as refusing to bargain in good faith, is fairly standard in collective bargaining legislation. The responsibility for ruling on an unfair practice claim is usually given to the agency created to administer collective bargaining.

The ninth provision concerns procedures for resolving impasses during the negotiation process. There are three types of procedures: mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. Mediation procedures involve the relatively informal use of a neutral third party to help an employer and employee representative reach a settlement. Fact-f inding is a more formal procedure in which a neutral third party collects facts relating to the negotiations in a hearing and issues a recommendation regarding a solution to the impasse. Arbitration takes the fact-finding procedure one step further by allowing the arbitrator's recommendation to become binding on both parties. Arbitration procedures can be mandated by law or voluntarily agreed to by both parties. Virtually all states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation provide for all three impasse procedures. M ediation and fact-finding procedures tend to be uniform among these states. Arbitration procedures vary, however, primarily with regard to whether it is voluntary or compulsory. Furthermore, in some states certain types of employees may be requ ired to follow alternative arbitration procedures. For example, so-called essential employees, the definition of which varies among states, are often required to abide by compulsory binding arbitration, while others are not.

Finally, the tenth provision usually specifies if public employees have the right to strike. Of the 26 states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation, 15 do not allow any of their public employees to strike and the remaining 11 (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin) have a provision that details which public employees are allowed to strike and which ones are not allowed to strike. The list of public employees that are not allowed to strike varies, but generally includes police, fire fighters, and other so-called essential employees. None of the 10 states with partial collective bargaining legislation and noneof the four states with meet and confer procedures allow any of their public employees to strike.

Collective Bargaining In West Virginia

The most active supporters of public employee collective bargaining legislation in West Virginia have always been public sector unions. On the one hand, these unions see themselves as the guardians of the interests of public employees. On the other hand, they also have a selfinterest in expanding their own organizations. They stand to benefit the most from the establishment of collective bargaining in West Virginia, and they have been largely responsible for pushing collective bargaining legislation inthestate legislature.

There are, however, some differences of opinion on this issue among labor leaders in the public sector. The great majority of these leaders in West Virginia fully support the effort to establish collective bargaining. Some do not. For example, the president of a small union representing some government workers in the state and with ties to state government, voted against a proposal to support collective bargaining at a recent West Virginia AFL-CIO regional labor council meeting. Also, until fairly recently industrial unions have not been very enthusiastic supporters of collective bargaining legislation forgovernment workers (Moody 1988). However, in the last few years, they have been more supportive asthey have seentheirown membership dwindle. In many states, including West Virginia, industrial unions now take a much more active role in promoting collective bargaining for public employees. This is illustrated by the recent formation of the West Virginia State Employees Union, a coalition of several industrial and public sector

unions whose main goal is to enact collective bargaining legislation in West Virginia.

The most vocal opponents of collective bargaining have been local government employers and private businesses and organizations closely associated with them. Some of the most vigorous opponents of public employee collective bargaining are the West Virginia League of Municipalities, the West Virginia County Officials Association, the West Virginia School Boards Association, and state and local Chambers of Commerce (see, for example, West Virginia House Judiciary Committee 1991). Whenever collective bargaining legislation is proposed, these groups mount vigorous lobbying campaigns to defeat it. Union leaders claim that one reason that they have such great diff iculty in convincing the state legislature to pass collective bargaining legislation is the fact that West Virginia is a rural state where legislators are signif icantly beholden to local government officials fortheir success orfailu re atthe polls (AFSCM E/ VVV Memo 1991). However, three of the four most rural states in the country have comprehensive collective bargaining legislation and five of the eight most rural states have collective bargaining for some or all of their employees. Therefore, West Virginia is the exception and not the rule in this case.

State government employers tend to be lessvocal intheir opposition to collective bargaining. However, state government workers who express their opinions, for example at collective bargaining legislative hearings before the state legislature, generally claim that their employer appears to be both anti-union and opposed to collective bargaining (West Virginia House Judiciary Committee 1991). Higher education administrators also appear to be opposed to collective bargaining according to recent interviews with senior administrators at West Virginia University (Logan 1992).

Supporters and opponents of collective bargaining in West Virginia have used many different arguments to make their case. To simplify matters, these arguments can be grouped into four main categories involving costs, productivity and the quality of public service provision, the general business climate, and legal and moral issues. Each of these are examined in the following section.

The Opposition's Arguments

Opponents of public employee collective bargaining legislation in West Virginia argue that it will force public employment and wages to rise far more rapidly than otherwise would be the case. This, in turn, will increase state and local government operating expenses and force state and local government off icials to increase taxes and fees.

Unfortunately, although there have been several studies of the influence of collective bargaining on wages in the public sector, the results have been mixed and sometimes contradictory. Some studies have concluded that collective bargaining has led to increased public sector wages while others have concluded thatcollective bargaining has not led to increased public sector wages (Burton 1979; Garbarino 1986; Kearney 1984; Krueger 1988; and Lewis 1988).

One way to test the hypothesis that collective bargaining legislation leads to increased costs is to compare the average payroll costs per capita for public employees in states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees with the average payroll costs per capita for public employees in those states that do not have collective bargaining legislation for public employees. The average payroll costs for states with comprehensive collective bargaining is currently $101 per capita. The average payroll costs f or states without collective bargaining legislation is currently $91 per capita (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991b). In other words, payroll costs are $10 per person, or approximately 10 percent, higher in collective bargaining states. This would seem to support the claims of collective bargaining's opponents. However, the cost of living in those states that have collective bargaining legislation for public employees is 9 percent higher than in those states that do not have collective bargaining legislation (U.S. Department of Labor 1989). This suggests that the 10 percent payroll cost diff erence in those stateswith collective bargaining legislation is largely due to the overall difference in cost of living and riot to the existence of collective bargaining.

Collective bargaining's opponents in West Virginia also argue that it will increase public employment levels which, inturn, will leadto increased operating costs and, ultimately, force state and local government off icials to raise taxes and fees. However, the average number of state and local employees on a percapita basis is lower in those states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees than in those states without collective bargaining. On average, states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees have 49 state and local government employees for every 1,000 people. States without collective bargaining legislation for public employees have, on average, 52 state and local government employees for every 1,000 people. Therefore, the evidence suggests that collective bargaining does not necessarily increase state and local government employment rates (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991 b).

Collective bargaining's opponents also argue that it will force state and local government off icials to increase state and local taxes and fees. However, the average change in percapita real (inflation adjusted) state and local taxes over the period 1978 to 1988 was almost exactly the same for states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees and for states without collective bargaining legislation (U.S Department of Commerce, various years). States with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees increased their state and local taxes an average of 3.9 percent per year between 1978 and 1988. States without collective bargaining legislation increased theirstate and localtaxes an average of 3.7 percent a year over this same period. The diff erence is not significant, which leadsto the conclusionthat a public sector collective bargaining labor relations policy is not likely to have a significant effect on taxes.

In summary, a comparison of the two groups of states shows that a policy of comprehensive collective bargaining for public employees is not necessarily associated with higher costs. Collective bargaining does not make a significant difference with respect to payroll costs or to taxes, and it seems to result in slightly lower rates of public employment. These results appear to substantiate the claims of supporters rather than opponents.

The second most common criticism of collective bargaining for public employees in West Virginia is that it will lead to a reduction in productivity and the quality of governmental services. In the most extreme case, it is argued that this policy will lead to more strikes. Supporters counter this argument by suggesting that collective bargaining will increase productivity and the quality of governmental services by promoting a stronger and better relationship between government employees and their employers.

Overtheyears agreatdealof research has beencarried out on the productivity of labor in the private sector. Overwhelmingly, that research supports the view that unionized labor is more likely to be using productivity-enhancing innovations in the workplace than non-unionized labor, and that unionized workplaces are more efficient than nonunionized ones (see, for example, Eaton and Voos 1991). However, there has been relatively little research conducted on the productivity of public sector employees. Studies which have dealt with this issue have concluded that public employee unions promote efficiency in the management of personnel, that unionized public sector employees are likely to be more productive than nonunionized ones, and that unionized school systems tend to be associated with better student performance than nonunionized schools (Sulzner 1983; Kearney 1984; Eberts and Stone 1984; Freeman 1988).

Since there has been relatively little research on the productivity issue, this author devised an index of state and local government employee productivity for each state. The index was created by dividing the value of each state's governmental output by the number of full-time state and local government employees in that state. Governmental output was measured as that portion of gross state product resulting from the activities of state and local governments (U.S. Department of Commerce 1988). The average productivily index score for states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation was 15 percent higher than in those states without collective bargaining legislation. This suggests that, far from having a negative impact on public employee productivity, collective bargaining actually improves it.

Collective bargaining's advocates argue that it would discourage labor turnover and promote peace and stability in the workplace. This, in turn, would improve eff iciency and quality of service. Opponents claim that collective bargaining creates divisiveness, discord, and conflict in the workplace, ultimately leading to inefficiency and poorer service quality. Research on this subject indicates that states with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees have lower employee quit rates and more stable work forces than states without collective bargaining (Allen 1988). Also, it shows that during economic downturns, public employee unions are more likely to agree to wage concessions, to retain jobs and maintain levels of services than are their private sector counterparts (Allen 1988).

Finally, what about strikes? Opponents claim that collective bargaining in West Virginia would encourage strikes. Supporters disagree and argue that, if anything, collective bargaining will promote labor peace and reduce the possibility of strikes. They also claim that labor unrest and strikes are more likely when employees are trying to gain collective bargaining rights, and that after they have been given the authority to bargain collectively the threat of strikes will diminish.

There are two difficulties with evaluating the merits of these contested claims. First, consistent data on public employee work stoppages across the country have not been collected for more than 10 years, which means that the evidence is either old or currently limited. Second, what anecdotal evidence there is is so conflicting that it can be used to confirm both sides of the argument. Having said that, several conclusions can be drawn from existing research. First, it is generally true that collective bargaining ligislation promotes labor peace and morale, and that it reduces the incidence of labor unrest and strikes. Second, studies of public worker strike activity prior to the 1980s (when consistent data were available) showed that strikes were generally unrelated to public employee unionism and collective bargaining (Burton and Krider 1975; Burton 1979; Kearney 1984; Partridge 1991). Of course, if collective bargaining legislation prohibits strikes by public employees, then there is really no need for this to become an issue.

In summary, the evidence strongly suggests that productivityand servicequality are not likelyto bediminished bythe adoption of collective bargaining legislation. In fact, the evidence suggests that both may be improved if collective bargaining legislation were adopted.

Opponents of collective bargaining argue that it will have a negative impact on the general business climate and will restrict economicgrowth anddevelopment. This claimoften stems from the assumption that collective bargaining will force state and local governments to raise taxes. However, as demonstrated earlier, the evidence indicates that this is not necessarily the case. It is possible, however, to still argue that collective bargaining could have a negative impact on business'perception of West Virginia's business climate and hinder the state's economic development efforts.

One way to address this issue is to compare the average rate of change in capital investment rates in manufacturing, one of the best indicators of economic growth, in states that have comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for public employees with those states that do not have collective bargaining legislation. Between 1982 and 1987 capital investment declined an average of 7.6 percent in states without collective bargaining for any public employees. It increased 0.2 percent in those states with collective bargaining. Obviously, the evidence suggests that collective bargaining for public employees does not necessarily harm a state's business climate. In fact, the evidence indicates quitethe reverse. A state'strue business climate is reflected in its actual performance, and in the 1980s, a period in which manufacturing was undergoing a restructuring of historical significance throughoutthe country, industry leaderschose to cut back in states with weaker public sectors and to maintain their investment rates in states with stronger ones (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990).

In summary, instead of hurting a state's economy and its business climate, collective bargaining legislation tends to have a positive impact on business investment.

Prior to the 1960s, collective bargaining's opponents argued that collective bargaining for public employees was immoral because it involved an illegal delegation of the people's sovereign power to determine the employment

8

conditions for government employees (Schneider 1979; Herman and Kuhn 1981; Kearney 1984). The legal basis for this argument was dismissed in a series of court cases before the U.S. Supreme Court in the late 1960s. The court ruled that the First Amendment's right to freely associate outweighed government sovereignty claims. Public employees therefore had the right to organize and join unions. However, this did not give employees the right to bargain collectively unless enabling legislation was also in place.

Collective bargaining's opponents may have lost the court cases but many of them continue to perceive unions and organized labor as special interest groups that should not be involved in government decision-making. These arguments are commonly made notonlybythose organizations that represent local government employers (counties, municipalities, school districts, and so on), but also bythose organizations that represent business interests. Others have argued that this argument is undercut by the fact that governments frequently negotiate contracts and makedeals with businesses. It follows that businesses should also be regarded as special interest groups to which governments routinely delegate power without directly involvingthe people they represent (Kearney 1984). Supporters of collective bargaining argue that it is inequitable forgovernmentto deal with one special interest group (i.e. business) but riot another (publicemployee unions). Both groups lobby strenuously to influence public policy and government decisionmaking, but only business has the right to negotiate contracts with state and local governments in West Virginia. Supporters of collective bargaining argue that it would be equitable for unions to have that same right.

Opponents claim that collective bargaining would give unionstoo much power in determining government budgets and tax policy. However, this argument should become irrelevant if a provision is included in collective bargaining legislationthat makes negotiated contracts conditional upon the availability of funds. Recent collective bargaining bills submitted to the West Virginia state legislature have contained such provisions. This kind of provision gives appropriations veto power to the state legislature and to local government governing bodies concerning any cost item in a collective bargaining agreement (Henkel and Wood 1982). Supporters of collective bargaining argue that this kind of government veto power disproves the claim that unions would have too much influence on government budgets through the collective bargaining process.

The Advocates' Arguments

Collective bargaining's advocates argue that it is unfair for public employees riot to be given the same right as other employees (see, for example, West Virginia House Judiciary Committee 1991). Manufacturing and mine employees, for example, have had the right to bargain collectively for almost 60 years. They also argue that government employers should be especially sensitive to the equity issue for another reason. A disproportionate number of government employees are women. For example, 55 percent of state and local government employees in West Virginia are women, compared to 22 percent for manufacturing and 5 percent for mining (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1990). Some have argued that to deny a largely female labor force the same right that is available to male employees in manufacturing and mining sectors is a formof gender discrimination. Moreover, becausethereare widespread problems involving job segregation, comparable worth and pay equity for women in the public sector, some critics have suggested that collective bargaining is needed to resolve these gender issues (Bell 1985).

Collective bargaining's advocates also claim that collective bargaining policy is a more objective way of handling employer-employee relations, and is one that makes both parties openly and legally responsible for their actions. Supporters often maintain, for example, that the present system is plagued by favoritism, secrecy and patronage (see, for example, West Virginia House Judiciary Committee 1991). The current public employee grievance policy is just one example of the present system that is heavily criticized. Critics claim, for example, that the grievance procedure is heavily biased in favor of government employers, because they alone have the power to appoint hearing examiners and because they have at their disposal the immense resources of government, including a permanent staff of lawyers, to defend their interests (West Virginia House Judiciary Committee 1991). The great majority of public employees have to defend their interests by themselves and have negligible resources to do so. Supporters of collective bargaining claim that this labor relations policy would result in a fairer, more equitable grievance procedure (West Virginia House Judiciary Committee 1991).

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The conclusion to be drawn from this study is quite simple. Far from being a liability, a collective bargaining labor relations policy for West Virginia's public employees would most likely be a positive force in the state.

Collective bargaining states do not necessarily have higher payroll costs than other states after factoring out cost-of-living differences; they do not raise taxes significantly more than other states; they have slightly lower state and local government employment rates than other states; they have higher public sector productivity and efficiency rates than other states; they produce better quality services than other states; and they have more stable and peaceful work forces than other states.

As Herman and Kuhn (1981) observe, incorporating unions in the labor relations process helps to maintain labor discipline, keep up worker morale, and ensure peace and stability in the workplace. Moreover, it is now becoming increasingly recognized that what distinguishes the United States today from its more successful economic competitors, such as Germany and Japan, is that they have stronger public sectors and have a much stronger partnership between their public and private sectors than we do in the United States (Thurow 1992). It is also no accident that America's more successful competitors have labor relations policies which incorporate a greater role for organized labor than is the case in this country. Many commentators on state and local economic development in the United States now argue that organized labor must be brought into the process far more than they have been in the recent past. Brock (1987), for example, argues that cooperative industrial relations practices are a key to an organization's economic viability, employment security, competitiveness, productivity, stability, and growth, and that this cooperation should be grounded in the mutual respect for collective bargaining. Kochan (1987) likewise argues that innovative
workplace practices cannot be sustained where employers are committed to a strategy of union avoidance because of the adversarial environment in which they have to be adopted. Cooperative labor relations policies which incorporate organized labor are more likely to foster innovation.
Hobgood and Gross (1987) make the important link between a strong public sector and local economic development by pointing out that since most capital investment and newjobs are created f rorn the local industrial base, it follo * ws that efforts to develop the public infrastructure that supports that industrial base are most likely to lead to sustained economic growth. They also argue that an improved labor relations policy should play an important role in that strategy. Marshall (1987) also argues that a collective bargaining labor relations policy promotes efficiency by forcing
managers to adopt more productive systems rather than adjusting to economic change by reducing wages and working conditions.

Collective bargaining promotes equity because it gives public employees the same right as industrial employees to have a say in the quality of their jobs and working environments. It does not delegate power to unions through the process of negotiating contracts any more so than is the case when governments negotiate contracts with other special interest groups such as state and local businesses. Moreover, collective bargaining legislation can contain provisionswhich outlaw strikes and give state and local govemments effective veto power over any cost item. In general, it is a more objective way of handling employer-employee relations which removes a lot of the subjectivity, bias, and patronage that currently exists.

Forallthe above reasons, West, Virginia should establish a public employee collective bargaining labor relations policy. The evidence indicates that collective bargainingwill not harm the state's business climate and, in an era of state and local government fiscal stress, the public sector needs to remain strong, or become even stronger, to help promote economic development. Under these circumstances, government must improve its efficiency and productivity, become more innovative, and produce better-quality services. All the evidence seems to suggest that this can be more easily accomplished by enlisting the help of public employees. The success of state and local government managers is increasingly going to depend on their relations with their employees and one of the best ways to improve those relations would be to enact collective bargaining legislation for public employees.

When President Bush signed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) into law on December 18, 1991 he emphasized its importance as a source of "jobs, jobs, jobs." However, its significance for American federalism in general and for transportation policy in particular is much broader. It is a landmark piece of legislation that makes wholesale revisions in the federal government's role in transportation policy, providing state and, especially, local policymakers with an unprecedented opportunity to determine the future direction of the nation's transportation system. It created a major new transportation block grant, established a new 155,000-mile National Highway System, provided state and local government officials with added flexibility to transfer funds from one transportation program to another, and significantly strengthened the role of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) in project selection. However, at the same time ISTEA strengthened the role of state and local government officials in the selection of federally funded surface transportation projects it weakened their authority in other surface transportation areas. Specifically, state laws concerning the weight and length of trucks operating on interstate highways were frozen, preventing the spread of double- and triple-trailercombinations beyond the 20 states that currently allow them. Also, states that fail to adopt mandatory motorcycle helmet and automotive seat-belt laws by October 1, 1993 must spend 1.5 percent of their highway construction funds on highway
safety projects. That percentage increases to 3 percent for states that fail to enact mandatory motorcycle helmet and automotive seat-beft laws by October 1, 1994 (Dilger 1992).

The federal government's effort to encourage states to enact mandatory seat-beft laws is particularly relevant for West Virginia because it is one of the eight states that currently does not have a mandatory seat belt law (see Table 1). An attempt to enact legislation that would have required motorists in West Virginia to wear seat-belts or face a possible $25 fine failed during the 1992 legislative session. Another effort to enact a mandatory seat-beft law in West Virginia is expected during the 1993 session (Kabler 1992; Owens 1992).

This article examines the pros and cons of adopting a mandatory seat-belt law in West Virginia. Given the federal government's effort to encourage states to enact a mandatory seat-belt law and theongoing legislative efforlsto enact a mandatory seat-belt law in West Virginia, the examination of the pros and cons of adopting a mandatory seat-belt law in West Virginia is both appropriate and timely.

The Pros and Cons

The debate over the enactment of mandatory seat-belt laws has focused on their impact on seat-belt use and highway safety, their role in reducing expenses for both individuals and government, the federal government's 3 percent sanction, enforcement practices, and their impact on individual liberty. Although the empirical evidence that is currently available concerning the impact that mandatory seat-belt laws have on individual and government expenses is somewhat questionable, the f irst f our issues in the debate over mandatory seat-belt laws are based on empirical evidence that can be tested and verified for accuracy. This article will present that evidence. The final issue, however, is based on subjective value judgments that cannot be tested or verified. As a result, an impartial observer can use the empirical evidence from the first four issues in the debate to guide their decision concerning whether West Virginia should enact a mandatory seat-belt law, but their final decision will also have to take into consideration subjective value judgments concerning the appropriate role of government in American society.

The Safety Issue

Those who f avorthe enactment of mandatory state seatbelt laws stress first and foremost the safety issue. They point out that nearly 45,000 people are killed and another 3.1 million people are injured in traffic accidents on the nation's highways every year. Traffic accidents are the number one killer in the United States for people between the age of 5 and 35. By the time you finish reading this sentence a motoristwill have been killed or severely injured in a traffic accident somewhere in the United States (DOT 1990).

Three hundred and seventy-nine West Virginians were killed in automotive traffic accidents in 1991, averaging more than one death every day. Advocates of a mandatory seat-belt law in West Virginia are not surprised that of the 379 West Virginians killed in automotive traff ic accidents in 1991, only 70 of them were wearing seat-belts (Turley 1992). They point out that the vast majority (78 percent) of motorists killed in automotive traffic accidents throughout the United States in 1991 were not wearing seat-belts (DOT 1992). Advocates argue that many of those who were killed in West Virginia last year would be alive today if they had been wearing their seat-belts. They also argue that many of those killed would have been wearing their seat-belts and would be alive today if West Virginia had a mandatory state seat-belt law in effect.

Advocates support their claims by pointing to numerous studies conducted or sponsored by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration which have indicated that the use of seat-belts reduces the risk of death or serious injury to front seat passengers in a traffic accident by about 50 percent. When combined with air bags (which are effective in reducing injuries during a front-end collision), seat-belts reduce the risk of death or serious injury to front seat passengers by 55 to 60 percent. Based on local police reports, it has been estimated that seat-belts save approximately 4,800 lives and prevent 125,000 moderate to critical injuries each year in the United States (DOT 1992). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has estimated that if all front seat passengers used seat-belts an additional 15,275 lives would be saved and more than 350,000 moderate to serious injuries would be avoided each year (DOT 1992).

Advocates of mandatory seat-belt laws also point to U.S Department of Transportation statistics which indicate that when a state enacts mandatory seat-beft laws the use of seat-belts in that state goes up and the number of deaths and the incidence and severity of injuries to people involved in motor vehicle accidents in that state goes down (Lund, Zador, and Pollner 1987; Lestina et al. 1991; DOT 1992). For example, since Pennsylvania adopted its mandatory seat-belt law in 1987 the percentage of motorists using seat belts in Pennsylvania has risen from approximately 47 percent to 60 percent (DOT 1992). Moreover, the number of highway fatalities in Pennsylvania has fallen from 2.2 to 1.9 per 100 million vehicle miles since the enactment of their mandatory seat-belt law and the nu mber of injuries has also been reduced, f rom 181.68 to 166.18 per 100 million vehicle miles. In absolute numbers, the Pennsylvania Department of Highways claims that its state's mandatory seat-belt law saved 552 lives in 1990 and resulted in 1,790 fewer major injuries, 3,915 fewer moderate injuries, 2,882 fewer minor injuries, and prevented 9,144 injuries all together. The Pennsylvania Department of Highways also estimated that seat-belts reduced health care costs in the state of Pennsylvania by approximately $3.5 billion, or $299 per person, in 1990 (Uravik 1992).

Those who favor mandatory seat-belt laws also note that West Virginia currently has the highest rate of automotive traff ic deaths per 100 million miles driven in the M id-Atlantic region. Kentucky, the only other state in the region without a mandatory seat-belt law, has the second highest rate of traff ic deaths per 100 million miles driven in the region (see Table 2). They argue that West Virginia's and Kentucky's relatively high death rates in automotive traff ic accidents is, at least in part, due to the lack of a mandatory state seat-belt law.

Nationally, the percentage of motorists using seat-belts has increased f rom 11 percent in 1980 to 60 percent today. Most of this increase in seat-belt usage has been attributed to the enactment of mandatory seat-belt laws and to increased education and enforcement efforts (DOT 1992). Approximately 65 percent of motorists residing in statesthat mandate seat-belt usage "buckle up", compared to only 41 percent in states without a mandatory seat-belt law. West Virginia and Kentucky, the only states in the mid-Atlantic region which do not require seatbelt use, have the lowest percentage of motorists who use seat-belts in the region, with Kentucky (48 percent) next to last and West Virginia (43 percent) last.

Although some opponents of mandatory seat-belt laws point out that seat-belt use may increase the dangerof injury or death when the traff ic accident involves being submerged in water or engulfed in flames, they concede that these accidents account for less than one-half of one percentof alltraff icfatalities. Mostopponents acknowledge that seat-belts are effective in most traffic accidents, that seat-belts save lives, and that, under most circumstances, seat-belts reduce the incidence and severity of injury.

Moreover, most opponents of mandatory seat-beft laws want people to use seat-belts. In many instances, they not only use seat-befts themselves, but require passengers in their cars to buckle up and strongly encourage other drivers to wear seat-belts as well. However, they oppose a mandatory law requiring people to use seat-belts because they view it as an improper infringement on personal liberty.

Economics

Another argument for mandatory state seat-belt laws is that they save motorists money by reducing automotive insurance premiums. Since mandatory seat-belt laws increase seat-beft use and seat-beft use reduces medical expenses associated with traff icaccidents, mandatoryseatbelt laws reduce the amount automotive insurance companies haveto payout in accidentclaims. This, inturn, enables automotive insurance companies to pass some, if not all, of this savings back to their customers through lower automotive insurance premiums.

The precise amount of savings to motorists, however, is difficult to calculate. Many factors besides seat-belt use affect the cost of automotive insurance premiums. Representatives of several of the nation's largest automotive insurance companies and analysts at several national research centers that specialize in insurance-related issues indicated that it was impossible to calculate the precise savings, but a best guess was a savings of between 5 and 10 percent of the cost of insuring the automobile for medical payments coverage and some savings for bodily injury

coverage. This is similar, but somewhat less, than the discounts offered for automobiles having automatic seatbelt systems and driver-side airbags (Burdette 1992; Myers 1992; Phillips 1992). Although the cost of medical payments and bodily injury coverages vary from driver to driver depending upon their past driving record, location, and type of automobile, the savings would be in the general range of $10 to $20 per year for each automotive insurance policy.

Mandatory state seat-beft laws also reduce the cost of health insurance premiums. Since mandatory seat-belt laws increase seat-belt use and seat-belt use reduces medical expenses associated with traffic accidents, mandatory seat-belt laws reduce the amount health insurance companies have to pay out in health insurance claims resulting from traff ic accidents. This, in turn, enables health insurance companies to pass some, if not all, of this savings back to their customers through lower health insurance premiums. Moreover, health insurance premium costs are also reduced because many health care providers pass the cost of providing health care services to those without health insurance onto those with insurance by setting their fees higher than would otherwise be the case. Since mandatory seat-belt laws reduce both the severity and incidence of injuries among both the insured and non-insured populations, the cost of providing health care to both of these groups is reduced. Since the cost of providing medical services to those without health insurance is reduced, health care providers have less expenses to pass onto those with insurance and reduce their fees. Insurance companies also pass some, if not all, of these savings back to policyholders through lower premium costs.

Again, the amount of savings to those who purchase health care insurance is difficult to calculate in a precise way. However, as mentioned previously, the Pennsylvania Department of Highways has estimated that its state's mandatory seat-belt law reduced total health care expenses in Pennsylvania by approximately $3.5 billion in 1990, or approximately $299 per person. These savings were shared by health insurance companies that kept a portion as additional profit, by those who saw their health insurance premiums reduced or raised less than would have otherwise been the case, by those who lacked health care insurance and paid for their health care themselves, and bythe taxpayers who paidforthe health care expenses of traffic accident victims who were enrolled in taxpayersupported programs such as Medicare and Medicaid and for those who received their health care at taxpayer expense at public hospitals.

It is impossible to accurately measure the precise savings generated to each of these groups. However, advocates point out that states considering the implementation of a universal health care system, whether funded directly by the state's taxpayers, by a fee imposed on the state's businesses, or a combination of both, should recognizethat by preventing deaths and injuries the implementation of a mandatory seat-beft law will reduce the cost of putting such a system into operation.

Advocates of mandatory seat-belt laws also argue that mandatory seat-belt laws promote economic growth. They point out that motor vehicle injuries are the number one cause of lost worktime in the United States (DOT 1992). As a result, by preventing deaths and injuries, mandatory seat belt laws contribute to a more productive and competitive workforce by reducingthe amount of time employees are off the job due to an injury suffered in a traffic accident. Also, the savings generated from lower expenditures on Medicaid, Medicare, and the poor at public hospitals can be used to provide additional revenue for economic development projects or to reduce taxes.

Opponents of mandatory seat-belt laws concede that mandatory seat-belt laws probably do reduce automotive and health insurance premium costs and that they probably generate at least some savings to taxpayers. However, they still oppose a mandatory law requiring people to use seat-belts because they view it as an improper infringement on personal liberty.

The Federal Sanction

A new argument for adopting a mandatory seat-beft law is the federal government's 3 percent sanction. As mentioned previously, states that fail to enact a mandatory automotive seat-belt law by FY 1994 must spend 3 percent of their federal ISTEA highway construction funds on highway safety projects. At that time, West Virginia is expected to receive approximately $171 million annually in federal ISTEA highway construction funds. If West Virginia refuses to enact a mandatory seat-belt law it will have to transfer 3 percent of that amount (approximately $5.1 million) each year from its highway construction fund to traff ic safety and enforcement programs. West Virginia currently spends between $400,000 and $500,000 on those programs (Kelly 1992; Owens 1992).

Opponents of mandatory seat-belt laws strongly object to the federal government's use of fiscal sanctions to "encourage" states to enact a mandatory seat-belt law. They argue that the federal government should allow states to make this decision based on the merits of the arguments, without having to worry about losing federal highway construction funds. For example, West Virginia Senate President Keith Burdette, who is philosophically opposed to a mandatory seat-belt law but is concerned about the financial implications of the federal government's 3 percent sanction, indicated after the defeat of the mandatory seatbelt bill in 1992 that: "It's only natural for the Legislature to bristle at mandates handed down from Washington. Each timethefeds have sent us alawthat says'Eitheryou dothis, or we do this,' there has been immediate resistance, whether it is seat belts or raising the drinking age" (Burdefte 1992; Kabler 1992).

Enforcement Practices

Opponents of mandatory state seat-belt laws argue that they are diff icult to enforce because it is difficult to tell from a distance if someone is using a seat-belt. Moreover, although there is little empirical evidence to support the following claim, opponents also argue that laws that are not enforced tend to build a disrespect for the law itself which, in turn, fosters an attitude of contempt that, in the long term, presents a dangerto the stability of American society. They also insist that police have other, more important duties that deserve theirundivided attention. They are also concerned that when police do enforce the law the public's reaction is often negative, inhibiting the ability of law enforcement officials to either maintain or to enhance the quality of police-community relations (Leichter 1986).

Advocates of mandatory seat-belt laws counter these last objections by claiming that most people are law-abiding citizens and that, when combined with an effective educational outreach program, the law is to a great extent selfenforcing. Moreover, they off ertwo alternative enforcement procedures that are designed to minimize the time law enforcement officers must commit to enforcing the law.

The first procedure, called primary enforcement, holds the potential for requiring the most enforcement time and is used in 10 states (Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin). Ittreatsthe state's mandatory seat-belt law like any other traffic law. It empowers law enforcement off icers; to ticket motorists for failing to abide by the state's seat-belt law even if they are obeying all other traff ic laws. Most states using the primary enforcement procedure impose a fine of $25 on the motorist (the range is from no fine in Mississippi to $50 in New York and Oregon).

The second procedure, called secondary enforcement, is used in 32 states (including Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia). It significantly reduces potential enforcement costs by allowing law enforcement officers to ticket a motorist for violating the state's mandatory seat-belt law only if the motorist has been stopped for another traffic violation. Most states using the secondary enforcement procedure impose a fine of $20 or $25 on the motorist (the range is from $5 in Idaho to $25 in 12 states) (DOT 1992).

Personal Liberty

Opponents of mandatory seat-belt laws ask, where do you draw the line? They fear that if government is allowed to replace its wisdom for that of the individual on this issue, it makes it easier, and perhaps more likely, that government will do so again and again on other issues. They accept what they perceive as paternalistic public policies for those, like children, who are deemed to be incapable of making responsible social choices. However, they reject such paternalism when it comes to the decisions of responsible adults (Leichter 1986). As a result, they support child passenger restraint laws but oppose mandatory seat-belt lawsforadults (a1150 states, the Districtof Columbia andthe territories have adopted mandatory child passenger restraint laws).

Advocates counter this argument by notingthatthere are literally hundreds of safety regulations, standards, and conditions governing motorists and their vehicles. Each of these regulations, standards, and conditions infringe, at least to a certain extent, on the motorist's personal liberties (Leichter 1986). Mandating seat-beft use is just another "minor" infringement that is justified by the good that it accomplishes for the driver of the vehicle, the passengers in the vehicle, and forthe public who ultimately pays, either through public programs like Medicaid or Medicare or through higher automobile and health care insurance premiums, for the foolishness of those who refuse to use their seat-belts.

The question of when is it appropriate for government to interfere with individual liberty has been debated by political theorists and others both in the United States and in other countries throughout the world for hundreds of years. For example, John Stuart Mill wrote in England over 125 years ago that the only justification for government interference with individual liberty was the prevention of harm to others. The individual's own good, either physical or moral, was not a sufficient warrant for governmental action. Mill labeled acts in which the individual brings harm to themselves but not to others as "self -regarding" and beyond the bounds of governmental action. Acts that brought harmto others were labeled "other-regarding" and were within the bounds of governmental action (Mill 1865; Leichter 1986).

Mills "other-regarding"test has, untilfairly recently, served as the guiding principle for determining the boundary for governmental action inthe United States. In referencetothe seat-belt debate, opponents of mandatory seat-belt laws view the use of seat-belts as a self-regarding issue that is beyond the boundary of governmental action. They argue thatthefailureto use a seat-belt does not harm anyone else. As an opponent in another state has stated: "Let me alone; let me make my own decisions. When I'm going to do something that's going to hurt someone else, then enact your laws; but when it's only me at stake, then forget about it" (Leichter 1986).

Advocates of mandatory seat-belt laws view the use of seat-belts as an other-regarding issue that is within the boundary of governmental action. They point out that drivers that use seat-belts are less likely than those who do not use seat-befts to lose control of their vehicle during an accident and involve other motorists and pedestrians (Leichter 1986). Also, others are forced to pay, either through higher taxes or higher private insurance premiums, for the individual's failure to use their seat-belt. As one Illinois legislator stated during his state's debate on a mandatory seat-belt law, "We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills" (Leichter 1986).

The importance of Mills' self-regarding/other-regarding test for determining the scope of government activity has been eroded in recent years by developments in economic theory. Forthe most part, these developments have created more room for governmental activity than Mill's test. For example, economists now generally agree that it is appropriate for government to take actions to correct "ineff iciencies" in the marketplace caused by what is referred to as economic externalities orspillovers. An externality or spillover occurs when someone or some group (such as a business) is able to pass a portion of the cost of their economic activity onto others without their consent (ACIR 1981). For example, if, in the course of its activities, a manufacturing plant discharges pollutants into the airthose pollutants adversely affect people downwind. In this instance, economists would argue that government has a right to either require the manufacturing plant to stop polluting the air orforce it to pay a fee to compensate the people downwind. It is the government's responsibility to decide howthe revenue from the fee should be used. For example, it could be used to enable those downwind to move elsewhere or it could be used to reimburse them for any medical costs associated with the negative impacts of the air pollution.

In reference to the seat-belt debate, opponents admit thatthe failureto use seat-befts may cause some economic harm to others. However, they are not convinced that the best course of action to remedy this situation is to have

government mandate that people use their seat-belts. Instead, they argue that there are other alternatives available that will encourage people to use their seat-belts. For example, instead of enacting laws that mandate personal behavior, states should encourage private insurance companies to write contracts that reduce payouts, permit cancellation, or impose some other cost on an insured person who does not use their seat-beft (Leichter 1986). Also, since the legal definition of negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable person would do under like circumstances and reasonable persons should use their seat-belt, states should adopt statutes that allow their courts to find that the failure to wear a seat-belt constitutes negligence when apportioning blame and awarding damages in traff ic accident cases (for a discussion of these legal issues see: Lafond 1987; Schwartz 1988; Druby 1990).

Opponents of mandatory seat-belt laws argue that these actions would increase seat-belt use dramatically. They are convinced that as people became aware that they will have to pay higher insurance premiums and bear the cost of any injury they may cause by failing to use their seat-belts, they will voluntarily buckle up.

Finally, opponents of mandatory seat-beft laws argue that states should follow the example set by the federal government's support of anti-smoking and drinking and driving advertising campaigns by setting aside revenue to support an advertising campaign to encourage motoriststo voluntarily use their seat-belts. In this way, the use of seatbelts is likely to increase and state government can stay out of the private lives of its people.

Conclusion

Advocates of mandatory seat-beft laws counter the opponents'arguments concerning personal liberty by insisting that relying on the private sector and advertising campaigns to encourage seat-belt laws is unthinkable given the number of lives and the amount of money at stake. Although these actions are likely to encourage seat-belt use and should be considered, in their view and, in the view of the authors, the benefits of enacting a mandatory seat-beft law far outweigh the cost of having government interfere in the individual's decision to use a seat-belt.