By the late nineteenth century the juvenile justice system in the United States had assumed the power to control youngsters "for their own good." Activities once tolerated among unruly youth were criminalized and handled as serious legal violations. But because all this was being done by allegedly wise parental figures said to be acting always "in the best interests of the child," little thought was given to due process of law.

In time, most of what came to be known as "juvenile delinquency" consisted of either the unsupervised activity of youth who were "neglected or dependent" or a variety of 11 status offenses" that were not violations of the criminal code at all but rather defiant behavior such as running away, truancy or "incorrigibility." Although processed under such bureaucratic acronyms as CHINS (children in need of supervision), FINS (families in need of supervision), JINS (juveniles in need of supervision) and PINS (persons in need of supervision), the juveniles affected were all labeled "delinquents." Policy results included both denial of basic civil rights to young people and generation of further "delinquency" through self-fulfilling prophecies that treated those labeled "delinquents" in such a way as to force everyone involved, including the juveniles themselves, to accept the label and act accordingly.

Beginning in the late 1960s, juvenile justice policy in the U.S. began to undergo a series of shifts. First came afocus on the rights of juveniles and an emphasis on getting youth out of the jails and handling status offenders less as hardened "delinquents" than as troubled youngsters. Seen by some as "siding with the delinquents," this approach was followed by something of a "backlash" in which policy rhetoric shifted toward a so-called "hard logic" strategy emphasizing delinquency prevention, tighter control of violent and chronic delinquents, and management improvement through increased coordination among agencies of the juvenile justice system. As the U.S. moved further into the 1980s, the emphasis shifted once again, this time toward a so-called "justice model" which rejected rehabilitation ideals, stressed proper penalties, and eventually resurrected the old "lock lern up" theme.

Richard A. Ball is a Professor of Sociology at West Virginia Uni--i+,

West Virginia has always been a few years behind the curve in its reaction to these national fluctuations. Yet nowhere have the results of the shifts in juvenile justice policy been more dramatic than in this state. This article outlines the evolution of West Virginia's juvenile justice policies, examines some of the current issues facing West Virginia's juvenile justice system and considers their implications for the state.

THE COMING OF THE "4 Ds"

In line with the growing disillusionment with the traditional juvenile justice policy of treating troubled youth as delinquents, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice set forth a series of reform recommendations in 1967 that were soon tagged the "4 Ds"due process, decriminalization, diversion, and deinstitutionalization (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 1967). In that same year, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the first of several major due process rulings extending juveniles many of the same rights available to adults in criminal court, including the right to notice of charges, the right to counsel, the rightto confrontation of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination (In re Gault, 38 U.S. 1 1967).

In 1974, Congress followed the U.S. Supreme Court and executive branch's lead with the passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP). It created guidelines aimed not only at protecting juvenile due process rights but also at decriminalization of status offenses, development of diversion programs that would provide alternatives to formal proceedings, and deinstitutionalization that could keep many adjudicated delinquents out of closed institutions. Importantly, it also made available to the states funds for implementing its guidelines.

In 1976, guidelines for implementing the "4 Ds" were provided in a more detailed set of standards and goals by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 1976). The Committee's "goals" set forth clear policy objectives for the Act while the Committee's 11 standards" provided more objective definitions of the Act's

INITIAL REACTION IN WEST VIRGINIA

Prior to the enactment of the JJDP Act, West Virginia had been as traditional as most states in its treatment of troublesomejuveniles. Forexample, West Virginia defined a child as "delinquent" if he or she were truant, ran away "without just cause," associated with persons regarded as "immoral or vicious," frequented a place "the existence of which is in violation of law," or happened to be deemed "incorrigible," 11 ungovernable," or "habitually disobedient." Itwas not uncommon for such "juvenile delinquents" to be taken into custody by the police and incarcerated in secure facilities, including county jails, where they might be held with hardened adult offenders before being sent off to what was referred to as an "industrial school."

Following the adoption of the JJDP Act, the Commissioner of Welfare, the Director of Youth Services of the Department of Welfare and the Director of Family and Children's Services all urged the state legislature to create legislation authorizing them to seek federal funds to meet the new national policy guidelines. But three years passed before West Virginia moved to take advantage of the federal funds. Behind the scenes, local representatives of the National Council of Jewish Women, the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund, and the West Virginia League of Women Voters were particularly active in mobilizing support to change the direction of the state's juvenile justice system.

In 1977 West Virginia's legislature adopted Senate Bill 200. It led to an unparalleled revolution in West Virginia's approach to juvenile justice. At that time, West Virginia was ranked prorninently among those states with tendencies to lock up their youngsters. By 1982, only Massachusetts (which had taken action to abolish completely its training schools for juveniles) had a lower rate of juveniles institutionalized in its "training schools" than West Virginia and only South Carolina had a lower rate of juvenile detention admissions.

SENATE BILL 200

Senate Bill 200 defined the due process rights of juveniles held by the state and required that such due process be maintained in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's Gault decision. It also advanced decriminalization, diversion and cleinstitutionalization policies. In effect, SB 200 "decriminalized" offenses involving association with shady characters, presence in undesirable locations, dangerous behavior and the like, leaving "delinquency" to be defined in terms of violation of criminal law but still including ungovernability or truancy. It required the (then) Commissioner of Welfare to update and disseminate each year a directory of available alternatives to incarceration. SB 200 also encouraged diversion by requiring that the "least restrictive" alternative be applied at each stage once the juvenile had been taken into custody. In this regard, it provided for an "improvement period" prior to the disposition of a case, allowing the juvenile time to demonstrate positive change and for the authorities to reflect before acting with unnecessary harshness.

Major emphasis at the national level had been placed on removing youth from adult jails. The JJDP Act required the monitoring of all jailsand correctional facilitiesto insurethat states receiving federal funds underthe Act were in compliance with its guidelines. Studies showed that nearly onefourth of all youth jailed nationwide were dependent, neglected orabused children, with another one-fourth classified as status offenders. Although their offenses were so minor that 70% were only in jail for two days or less, many of them were being brutalized, sodomized, and generally demoralized by the experience. Jailing of youth was opposed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National

Sheriff's Association, the U.S. Children's Bureau, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, and the National Coalition for Jail Reform.

SB 200followed the JJDP cleinstitutionalization guidelines by severely restricting the practice of using county jails for the detention of juveniles. It also mandated that status offenders be separated from juveniles who had actually broken the criminal law. Finally, it moved to put some teeth into the law by requiring the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to maintain a special panel of attorneys which wasto inspect all facilities holding juveniles and report its findings to the Court. However, two years passed before the Court created its Juvenile Facilities Review Panel, usually referred to as the "Juvenile Justice Committee."

KEY COURT ACTION

While SB 200's adoption in 1977 had a significant deinstitutionalization effect on West Virginia's juvenile justice system, an even more important event in that same year was a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruling that all status offenders had to be removed from State correctional facilities and that they no longer could be held in any secure facility unless they were amenable to nothing short of secure custody (State of West Virginia ex rel. Harris v. Calendine 1977). Because West Virginia had one of the highest institutionalization rates in the nation, the impact of this single change in judicial policy was dramatic. At the time, status offenders comprised 50% of all institutionalized girls across the U.S. Yet, when West Virginia's status offenders were removed from the Industrial Home for Girls in Salem, a facility holding the most "hardened" delinquent girls in West Virginia, its population dropped from a total of 70 inmates to only 9 (Warner 1986).

ACTIONS OF THE STATE ADVISORY GROUP

Because the receipt of federal funds was contingent upon the creation of a State Advisory Group for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (SAG), West Virginia created one in 1977. Officially, West Virginia's SAG was organized as a subcommittee of the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Corrections, which was the State Planning Agency (SPA) designated to administer federal funds for dealing with adult crime under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Initially, SAG operated with considerable independence, partly because the guiding philosophies of the two national Acts were somewhat different, one dealing with serious adult crime and the other with a variety of juvenile infractions.

In the beginning, SAG primarily provided funding for projects that were aimed at guaranteeing juveniles due process and developing alternative programs which would facilitate decriminalization, diversion and cleinstitutionalization. For approximately four years, SAG provided significant support to Juvenile Advocates, Inc., a group which took an "activist" position with respect to juvenile rights. Juvenile Advocates focused its efforts on assisting juveniles and attorneys representing juveniles, and on reducing the number of juveniles held in detention unnecessarily. It developed detention criteria for the state's consideration that would lead to lower rates of youth incarceration, argued and won several habeas corpus cases before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, provided legal counsel forjuveniles requesting assistance in the state's correctional facilities, and conducted jail inspections. With SAG's financial assistance, Juvenile Advocates became a major force in reducing the number of juveniles incarcerated in West Virginia.

SAG also provided financial support foralternative schools, community education and training programs and treatmentoriented foster homes. Later, SAG's funding patterns shifted toward emergency shelters, community-based youth crisis centers, long-term shelters, treatment aftercare and restitution programs.

POLICY SHIFTS IN WEST VIRGINIA

Because of the delay in qualifying for JJDP funds, West Virginia wasfaced almost immediately with the policy "backlash" against juvenile rights that occurred during the early 1980s. The state legislature reacted fairly quickly to this new atmosphere of ambivalence toward juvenile rights, but SAG continued to implement the national government's JJDP's guidelines which were formulated, at least in part, to expand and protect those rights. In addition, West Virginia's courts issued a series of important juvenile justice decisions in the early 1980sthatalso supported the policyclirection underlying the 4 Ds and the rights of juveniles.

STATE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The growing ambivalence toward the rights of juvenile offenders was reflected in the state legislature as early as 1978. House Bill 1484 continued the decriminalization thrust of the mid-1970s by distinguishing between status offenders and "criminal-type" offenders, making it clear that the two categories of juvenile offenders were to be handled in significantly different ways. ltdirected the (then) Department of Welfare to develop one ortwo small rehabilitation facilities for status offenders, something that was accomplished with help from the JJDP guidelines. The Department of Welfare was also given authority to establish juvenile delinquency prevention programs and diversion programs, such as youth advocacy projects, to establish a state-wide program aimed

at discouraging the use of secure detention or incarceration in lieu of less restrictive alternatives, and to establish a youth service bureau. However, in the same session, the state legislature also passed Senate Bill 364. It reflected a "get tough" policy with respect to those juveniles who defied the legal system.

SB 364 broadened the definition of "delinquency" to include juvenile probation violators and juveniles held in contemptof court, expanded custodycontrol overrunaways, and allowed juvenile cases involving certain repeat offenders to be transferred to adult criminal court. Going against the cleinstitutionalization tide, it lowered the age at which some juveniles could be held in a county jail from 16 to. 14 years of age.

West Virginia's effort to reduce the age at which some juveniles could be held in a countyjail was blocked in 1980 by the national government when it amended the JJDP Act to require states to cease sending youth to adult jails by 1985 or face a cutoff of federal funds. Although this deadline was later extended to 1987, the amendment achieved its desired effect. The U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported that by late 1982 more than half of the states had achieved "substantial compliance" with the requirement to reduce the number of youth held in adult jails.

SOME SIGNIFICANT
WEST VIRGINIA COURT DECISIONS

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a series of far-reaching West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rulings affecting juvenile justice in the state. In 1978, the Court ruled in K, W. and C. W. v. Werner that correctional facilities were to cease the use of physical punishment and in E.D. v. Aldredge that authorities were to seek all reasonable prospects for rehabilitation before transferring a juvenile case to criminal court (State of West Virginia ex rel. K. W. and C. W. v. Werner 1978-1 State of West Virginia ex rel. E. D. v. Aldredge 1978). In 1979, the Court ruled in C.A.H. v. Strickler, West Virginia v. Peterman and in R. C.F. v. Wilt that those involved in juvenile cases were required to seek the "least restrictive alternative" with reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, indicated that absence of an appropriate facility does not justify violation of a juvenile's constitutional rights, charged the state with the burden of proving the juvenile's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and required that any jailed child be held there only under a court order for no more than 96 hours and be separated from adults (State of West Virginia exrel. C.A.H. v. Strickler 1979; State of West Virginia v. Peterman 1979; and State of West Virginia ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt 1979). These rulings stressed the due process and the rehabilitation themes. Together they also contributed to the movement toward diversion and deinstitutionalization.

In 1980, the Court went further, ruling in S.J.C. v. Foxthat the lower court must establish a finding that a less restrictive alternative would not accomplish rehabilitation before sending a juvenile to a correctional institution (State of West Virginia ex rel. S.J.C. v. Fox 1980). It also ruled in D.D.H. v. Dostert that evidence admitted into juvenile court must be governed bythesame rules as those governing criminal trials (State of West Virginia ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert 1980).

The Court continued to expand the rights of juveniles in three other landmark cases: R.S. v. Trent in 1982; State of West Virginia v. D.D. in 1983; and M.C.H. andS.A.H. v. Kinder in 1984 (State of West Virginia ex rel. R.S. v. Trent 1982; State of West Virginia v. D.D. 1983; and State of West Virginia exrel. M. C. H. and S.A. H. v. Kinder 1984).

Trent put additional force behind the rehabilitation theme and the deinstitutionalization movement by allowing the superintendent of a correctional facility to return an offender to the court when convinced that the juvenile will not benefit from the institutional programs. State v. D.D. ruled that the courts must take a "holistic approach," recognizing that delinquency arises in large part out of poverty, broken homes, and educational problems, and seeking means of rehabilitation ratherthan stressing punitive measures. Kinder, on the other hand, showed that even after almost a decade of reform, not everyone had embraced the 'A Ds."

The Kinder case involved two small boys, a 7-year-old and a 9-year-old, who had been locked up in a detention center for breaking into an elementary school and stealing $12.00. Here, the court ruled that certain standards, such as the seriousness of the offense, the juveniles' prior record, the degree of danger they represented to the community if not incarcerated, and the availability of alternatives to secure detention, should be considered before locking up a child, Kinder designated the minimum age for secure detention for boys at 10 years of age and at 12 years of age for girls. It also restated an assumption against criminal culpability for children under 14 years old.

POLICY RESULTS

By 1982, diversion policies had been so successful in West Virginia that there were only 40% as many cases referred to thejuvenile courts of West Virginia as had been broughtthere in 1978. During the same four-year period, the number of accused status offenders and non-status offenders detained in jails or detention centers for more than 24 hours declined from a total of 544 to only one case and the number of adjudicated juveniles held declined from 83 cases to only 6 cases.The number of juveniles not properly separated from adult offenders while under detention also declined from almost 1,000 cases to only 12 cases. By 1985, this number dropped to zero and the number of juveniles held in state correctional institutions declined almost 85%.

In 1977, West Virginia had been supporting five different juvenile correctional facilities. The effort toward cleinstitutionalization had been so successful that in early 1983 the Industrial School for Boys at Pruntytown was closed, the girls'facility at Salem was redesignated The Industrial Home for Youth, and the few remaining boys were sent there. By 1983, the only juvenile correctional institutions remaining 'in the state were the Salem facility and the Davis Center. At present, the former holds an average of about 50 juveniles at any given time while the average juvenile population at the latter runs a little under its rated capacity of 50 juveniles.

FURTHER POLICY SHIFTS

Coinciding with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the tide of public opinion began to turn away from the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders toward a "justice model" that stressed the imposition of proper penalties. These changes were felt in West Virginia with the usual delayed-reaction time of three to four years. The Reagan administration moved quickly to reduce the JJDP Act's funding and to dismantle the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).

Although the OJJDP survived, its funding and political support declined dramatically as a new, "get tough" policy emerged. This new policy led to a trend toward criminalizing juvenile behavior by: (1 ) requiring juvenile courts to lock up some juvenile offenders for longer terms-, (2) lowering the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction from age 18 to age 16; and (3) transferring more youth to adult court. As a result of these changes, many juvenile status offenders across the nation were relabeled criminal offenders or were relabeled "neglected," "dependent" or even psychiatrically disturbed to justify court control.

FURTHER POLICY SHIFTS IN WEST VIRGINIA

As of 1982, West Virginia was still largely in step with the thrust of the JJDP Act, but the new ambivalence toward juvenile rights that was sweeping the national government was at least partly reflected in West Virginia with the passage of House Bill 1010. On the one hand, HB 1010 recommended the use of fines, restitution, and the restriction of driving privileges as an alternativeto youth incarceration. In addition, the (then) Commissioner of Welfare was directed to develop a comprehensive plan for a unified state system of predispositional detention (i.e., holding prior to dispositional hearing) for juveniles. Home shelters and foster homes were to be employed for temporary detention, Moreover, the Commissioner was directed to designate youth services coordinators in each judicial district.

On the other hand, some of the provisions of HB 1010 extended legal intervention into the lives of youngerjuveniles. For example, the age at which certain statements could be used against juveniles in court was lowered from 16 to 14. Yet, at the same time, HB 1010 also established a Legislative Commission on Juvenile Law to review the juvenile code, submit appropriate recommendations for change on a continuing basis, inspect juvenile detention facilities and submit recommendations with respect to their operations.

During this period, the influence of Juvenile Advocates on the juvenile justice system declined rapidly. Its director resigned in 1983, and both its political and financial support had diminished markedly by 1984. SAG was also affected by the changing political climate. By 1985 its autonomy was restricted and its functions integrated more closely with the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Corrections. Moreover, SAG shifted its funding emphasis from the "4 Ds" toward more politically popular DUI prevention and education projects, home detention projects, intensive treatment interventions, and programs for dealing with the sexual exploitation of children. Along these lines, the legislature adopted in 1984 the West Virginia Child Protection Services Act, which was intended to provide a comprehensive system of child welfare throughout the state. As part of the Act, the legislature created theWest Virginia Commission on Children and Youth and set up a "Children's Trust Fund" to be used for prevention of child abuse and neglect. Aimed in part at delinquency prevention, the Act approached the problem in terms of defending the child and strengthening the family. At the same time, House Bill 1187 mandated a Juvenile Referee System and required that a state plan be developed for predispositional detention of juveniles.

CURRENT POLICIES

At the present time, private organizations are playing an increasingly important role in providing services for juvenile offenders. The Appalachian Research and Defense Fund provides advocacy and legal services in Raleigh, Fayette, Lincoln, Logan, Wyoming, McDowell, Mercer and Mingo counties. Youth in Preston, Tucker, Monongalia, Marion, Barbour and Taylorcounties are served by the North Central West Virginia Legal Aid Society. West Virginia Legal Services Plan serves Randolph, Lewis, Upshur, Gilmer, Doddridge and Harrison counties. Located in Wheeling, theWestVirginia Youth Advocacy Program aims at providing comprehensive community-based residential and nonresidential services as an alternative to institutionalization. West Virginia Advocates for the Developmentally Disabled strives to provide protection and advocacy of the rights of those youth defined as "developmentally disabled." Unique in several respects, Monongalia County has developed a Coalition for Justice which works with volunteers and agency professionals in an effort to assess needs, develop solutions, and coordinate resources.  Residential services are scattered across the state, as are counseling services, mental health services, medical and health-related services and vocational/career services for low income and youth offenders to help with job training and career orientation and referrals. Organizations such as the West Virginia Child Care Association assist in locating appropriate group homes, specialized foster care facilities and other services for youth, provides workshops, training programs, and public education efforts, advocates improvements in the residential child care system and the development of standards for residential care, and aims at improving the placement process.

Facilities for status offenders include the Pressley Ridge School at Laurel Park and the Russell L. Daugherty Status Offender Facility in Ona. Detention facilities exist at the Cabell County Youth Center in Ona, the Eastern Regional Juvenile Detention Center in Martinsburg, the Kanawha Home for Children in Dunbar, the Northern Regional Detention Center in Wheeling, the Southern Regional Detention Center in Princeton and the West Central Regional Detention Center in Parkersburg.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

A more adequate system of juvenilejustice in West Virginia may demand renewed attention to the 'A Ds." It almost certainly demands development of a continuum of care for juveniles, including provision for alternative education and aftercare services, as well as coordination of agencies serving youth, more adequate reimbursement for services, and further professional ization of those working with youthful offenders.

DUE PROCESS AND DECRIMINALIZATION

Many feel that, despite the dramatic progress of the late 1970s and early 1980s, West Virginia is currently being caught up in the movement aimed at gaining greater control overjuveniles and that this could possibly result in a reversal of the trend toward the "4 Ds." Policy questions still center around these issues. Should juveniles be extended all constitutional rights available to adults? In view of their limited experience and high vulnerability, should they be extended a special nonwaivable right to counsel with assurance of more adequately prepared attorneys?

Nonwaivable counsel may be especially important in view of the factthat nearly 25 years afterthe Gau/tdecision, 50% of juveniles coming before the courts are still not represented by counsel, perhaps because it is known that in many states youth insisting on counsel tend to be dealt with more harshly. Realistically, of course, the outcome of such a policy would depend in large part on a procedure for providing these attorneys with better training in juvenile law. It would also depend on the extent to which they were accorded a more genuine welcome.

West Virginia is fortunate in that it has not tended to segregate the juvenile court intoa legal "ghetto." Studentsof juvenile proceedings agree that juvenile courtshould be part of a state's general trial court system with mandatory rotation of judges hearing juvenile cases, so as to raise the stature of juvenile judges and provide for an atmosphere supportive of due process for youths. In West Virginia, most circuits already rotate case assignments randomly so that thejuvenile load is evenly spread, and there is increasing pressure for statewide adoption of this practice.

As for decriminalization, several states have already responded to the recommendation contained in the reauthorization of the JJDP Act in 1984 by removing status offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. These youth are now handled by other agencies, and limited court resources

can be focused on the more serious offenses comprising the remaining I . uvenile court referrals across the U.S. Such a policy can be expected to succeed, of course, only if nonjudicial alternative services are available which the courts are obligated to monitor for adequacy.

NEED FOR A CARE CONTINUUM WITH
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION/AFTERCARE

The development of a care continuum would make it possible to provide appropriate services forthe wide range of juvenile cases coming to the attention of authorities. For example, alternative learning centers now exist to serve Monongalia, Ohio, Brooke, Upshur, Kanawha, Marion, Lewis, and Berkeley counties, with the Windy Mountain Learning Center serving Mercer, Monroe and McDowell counties. However, despite early SAG financial support, this movement has not made the progress envisioned. The organization of 11 youth crisis centers" or "youth service centers," on the other hand, has meant that at least some juveniles who require protective shelter for a few days in something more than a private home no longer need to be lodged inthecountyjail or transported great distances to a detention center.

Use of state detention centers still poses some problems. In early 1990 Chief Judge Larry Starcher of the 17th Judicial Circuit was appointed Special Master of a panel charged with the responsibility to investigate the need for standardized juvenile detention guidelines across the state (Facilities Review Panel v. Juanita Coe and the Honorable Arthur Gustke 1989). As part of this investigation, the panel provided the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals a review of detention rates for all counties in West Virginia and a review of the state's detention centers to determine problems of overcrowding, along with possible recommendations for objective, legally binding criteria forthe detention of juveniles in West Virginia. If such recommended standards are in fact adopted by the Court, pressures on certain detention centers should be reduced significantly and cleinstitutionalization will have moved another step forward. At the same time, there is a real need for programs that can give the courts a choice between detention and release of the youth without appreciable supervision.

Of all the care continuum issues, perhaps the most serious is the fact that West Virginia still cannot handle basic residential care for itsjuveniles, much less adequate aftercare. As a result, many juveniles must be sent to out-of-state facilities. This not only results in considerable expense for the state but also causes many troubled juveniles to be transported far from their homes and communities.

NEED FOR COORDINATION
AND ADEQUATE REIMBURSEMENT

One of the chief problems of the "juvenile justice system" is that it is not really a "system" at all but rather a collection of overlapping agencies with distinct missions and different interests and orientations. Four different departments in West Virginia provide services for troubled youth, and they differ in their philosophies and approaches. In 1984, the legislature employed A.D. Little, Inc., to conduct for the Legislative Commission on Juvenile Law a study aimed at pinpointing inefficiencies in the delivery of juvenile services. Partly on the basis of this report the Commission moved toward development of interagency agreements, but much remains to be done.

Major responsibility for juvenile offenders falls on the Division of Human Resources (formerly the Department of Human Services and before that the Department of Welfare), now part of the Department of Health and Human Resources.  However, probation services are split in several ways. Pro bation officers employed by the Division of Human Resources include both child care workers with probation responsibilities and probation officers without related service responsibilities. Although adult probation is the responsibility of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the Court has under its supervision more juvenile probation officers than does the Division of Human Resources. During the 1980s there was a movement to consolidate probation services under the supervision of the Court, but despite the introduction of several bills in the legislature the situation remains unchanged.

Theservice reimbursement problem springsfrom acombination of rising costsand ashift in clientele. Forexample, the costs of operating small group homes have been rising while reimbursement from the state has lagged. At the same time, cleinstitutionalization through the "least restrictive alternative" policy has generated increased pressure on these homes. Coming in one doorare more troublesome juveniles formerly placed in tighter custody while going out another are the least troublesome youth, who are being released to their own homes or to foster care homes. Yet, despite the savings generated from cleinstitutionalization, no additional funds were provided to group homes for the increased staff and augmented training necessary to deal with the more unruly population. This "cost crunch" has forced many of these homes to choose between closing or (1) reducing already minimal services; (2) admitting more juveniles than the home was designed to handle to meet expenses-, or (3) an unfortunate combination of both practices.

NEED FOR
FURTHER PROFESSIONALIZATION

Thecomplexityof the problemsfaced byyouthful offenders, combined with the need for a rethinking of current policy, requires moreeducation than ever before on the part of those working with juveniles. Despite obstacles including everything from insufficient funding to lack of cooperation among the institutions of highereducation in the state, much can be accomplished. For example, in 1985 a committee of West Virginia University administrators, probation officers, and representatives of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals formed to explore the possibility of creating an M.A. program for probation officers. At that time, there were no M.A. programs for probation officers anywhere in the U.S., no state funds were available to develop such a program, and there was some resistance on the part of older probation officers. Yet, institutional cooperation and some limited national government financial assistance made it possible to develop an M.A. program for probation officers. The first courses in the program were offered early in 1988, through the West Virginia College of Graduate Studies at Institute.

SUMMARY

Manyserious problems facejuvenile justice in WestVirginia, from the highly publicized fiscal limitations to persistent geographic and political obstacles. At the same time, this state can be proud of the fact that once it decided to act it accomplished in five years a virtual revolution in the way it treated juvenile offenders. The youth of this state are now accorded legal respect denied to them only a decade ago. Juvenilesareout of thejails, and many alternatives nowexist for diversion of troubled young people. Only two institutions for long-term incarceration remain operational, and the institutionalized juvenile population has shrunk to some 100 residents.

It would appear that many of the due process guarantees extended to youth in West Virginia are irreversible, at least in

the short run. The decriminalization and cleinstitutionalization movements have certainly been blunted, and there may be a tendency toward locking up more young people, butthis may beforestalled in partthrough the adoption of stricter detention standards. Coordination and reimbursement problems seem less amenable to solution at the present time, but further professional ization of those working with juveniles holds a great deal of promise for those willing to try creative options.

It is obvious that juvenile justice in West Virginia stands once again at a crossroads. Even with the aforementioned obstacles, the possibilities for effective policy development can be seized by those willing to invest the time and energy.

REFERENCES

Facilities Review Panel v. Juanita Coe and the Honorable Arthur Guske. 1989. Civil Action No. 19123. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.

In re Gault. 1967. 38 U.S. 1.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. 1976. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. 1967. Task Force Report:Juvenile Delinquencyand Youth Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

State of West Virginia ex rel. Harris v. Calendine. 1977. 233 S.E.2d 318. 160 W.V. 172.

State of West Virginia ex rel. K.W. and C.W. v. Werner. 1978. 242 S.E.2d 907.161 W.V. 192.

State of West Virginia ex rel. E.D. v. Aldredge. 1978. 245 S.E.2d 849. 162 W.V. 20.

State of West Virginia ex rei. C.A.H. v. Strickler. 1979. 251 S.E.2d 222. 162 W.V.535.

State of West Virginia v. Peterman. 1979. 260 S.E.2d 728.164 W,V. 75.

State of West Virginia ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt. 1979. 252 S.E.2d 168. 162 W.V. 424.

State of West Virginia ex rel. S.J.C. v. Fox. 1980. 268 S.E.2d 56. 165 W.V. 314.

State of West Virginia ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert. 1980. 269 S.E.2d 401. 165 W.V.448.

State of West Virginia ex rel. R.S. v. Trent. 1982. 289 S.E.2d 166. 169 W.V. 493.

State of West Virginia v. D.D. 1983. 310 S.E.2d 858. W.V.

State of West Virginia ex rel. M.C.H. and S.A.H. v. Kinder. 1984.317 S.E.2d 150 W.V.

Warner, John R. 1986. "The Revolution in Juvenile Justice in West Virginia." unpublished paper. Buckhannon, W.Va.: West Virginia Wesleyan College Library.