The West Virginia State Budget Process
Christopher Z. Mooney

A state's budget describes in detail its planned expenditures for a given fiscal year. As such, the budget is the most explicit expression of a state's policy priorities. If politics can be defined as "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell 1936), then the budgetary process is the epitome of politics.

While the development and execution of a state's budget may seem to some as the arcane machinations of a small number of political insiders with little relation to state governance, these insiders know well that, to paraphrase Vince Lombardi, while "the state budget isn't everything it sometimes comes close to being the only thing" (Boiarsky 1977). Without a legislatively ap-
proved budget, the state cannot spend money. The patterns of state spending that the budget authorizes determine what policies will be pursued throughout the fiscal year. Therefore, in order to understand the public policy process in West Virginia, you must understand the budget and the process by which it is put together.

The adequacy of revenue to meet the demand for state services is the primary determinant of the behavior of the actors in the budget process (Wildavsky 1975). The level of budgetary "slack" varies greatly from one state to another. Some states have more flexible revenue sources than others, and some states have less service commitment than others. While West Virginia has never been a wealthy state, since the early 1980s two factors have converged to produce an especially bleak fiscal situation in West Virginia. First, the out-migration of productive citizens and high-paying jobs from the state has decreased and/or greatly slowed the growth in both the state's per capita income (in constant dollars) and gross state product. With less income and economic activity to tax, West Virginia simply generates less revenue. Second, federal assistance to the state, which had been increasing both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the state's total budget since 1951, has decreased steadily since the mid-1970s. The average annual increase in federal aid to West Virginia between 1951 and 1978 was $8.8 million (in 1967 constant dollars); since 1979, there has been an average annual decrease of $5.9 million. These two factors have contributed greatly to the flattening of state revenue growth throughout the 1980s. The average annual increase in revenue between 1951 and 1978 of $26 million has shrunk to only an average increase of $5.9 million since 1979.

Demand for government services, on the other hand, has not declined in parallel fashion. Instead, demand has remained stable or increased, especially with the aging of the state's population and continuing federal mandates. This has led to a budgeting system in which the central strategy for all participants is to guard their previous allocation closely while searching desperately for a few extra dollars to meet new demands. Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky calls this "revenue budgeting," where the allocation of funds is based not on the perceived level of need, but on the amount of resources that are received in a given period (Wildavsky 1975). The results of revenue budgeting can be seen clearly in West Virginia's budget process: an emphasis on controlling expenditures, a focus on uncovering new revenue sources, and gubernatorial dominance.

Perhaps surprisingly, when income determines outgo over an extended period, as in West Virginia, high levels of conflict are not necessarily the result. If all actors in the budget process accept that there is very little to go around, and if the level of resources does not drop dramatically from year to year, they may adopt routine strategies that allow them to predict what other actors will do, thus enabling the process to work smoothly. While this 'Pax austeritus" has the advantage of reducing uncertainty in the process, it causes at least two problems to arise. First, scrambling for small revenue sources wears away at the fabric of government, as officials' stress levels are raised and redundant "rainy

day" funds are routinely ferreted out and spent. Second, the budget may not reflect changes in service demands (Schick 1988). If agencies protect their previous budgets, shifts in service priorities are made more difficult because of the zero-sum nature of the process. When revenue is rising, it is possible to enhance one agency's budget without taking away from another agency. However, revenue budgeting makes it much more difficult to shift priorities, which in turn makes it more- difficult to meet the changing desires and needs of a state's citizens in the budget.

This article explores the effects of revenue budgeting in West Virginia. The history of West Virginia's state budget process is also examined, and the current budget process is described step by step, as are the actors involved, their goals for the process, and their strategies for meeting these goals.

A Brief History of the Budget Process

There are two important attributes of the evolution of West Virginia's budget process. First, in this century there has been a steady consolidation of decision-making power in the primary elected officials involved: the governor and the state legislature (Davis, et al. 1962; Mertins and Williams 1971). This bodes well for the responsiveness of the budget process to the needs and demands of West Virginians, and reflects the national trend of elected officials wrestling power from bureaucrats (Gormley 1989). Second, West Virginia has a tradition of embedding much of its budget process in its constitution. Since the constitution is difficult to amend, change in the budget process has come slowly. For example, between 1918 and 1968, a constitutional amendment to give the governor sole responsibility to prepare the budget was defeated four times in referenda.

Budgeting under the Constitutions of 1863 and 1872 was a fragmented process, like that found at that time in Virginia and most other states. "The budget" was really many budgets, as the executive branch agencies were responsible for preparing their expenditure requests and submitting them individually to the appropriate legislative committees. The governor had no central coordinating role, and no power to veto any appropriations that passed the legislature. Neither was there any formal coordination in the legislature, with agencies' budgets being voted upon piecemeal with no thought to overall state expenditure, either in terms of priorities or levels. Reflective of this, there was no central responsibility and no formal requirement that the overall state budget be balanced,

When state government was a small operation, this lack of coordination was not generally a problem. But as the state began to provide more and more services to a larger and larger population as the 19th century progressed, the problems of waste, fraud and overspend ing became apparent. The proposed remedy for this state of affairs in West Virginia was the same one that was proposed for the other states and the federal government facing this problem at the time: an executive budget (Schick 1971). The idea was that if someone or some group in the executive branch was given responsibility to screen and consolidate all executive agency requests before they were presented to the legislature, legal propriety and fiscal control would be easier to attain.

To this end, West Virginia became one of the first states to set up an executive budget system, with ratification of the 1918 Budget Amendment. This amendment created the Board of Public Works, which was composed of the seven constitutional executive branch officers: the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Auditor, the State Superintendent of Schools, the Treasurer, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Agriculture. The Board was charged with the responsibility of making sure that the state did not spend more money than it received. To accomplish this, it was given the power to collect executive agency budget requests, modify them, and present a comprehensive budget to the legislature. In order to control what were seen as spendthrift tendencies in executive agencies and the easy acquiescence of the legislature to agency requests, the legislature was prohibited from increasing the Board's requests on any line item. Further, the Board was empowered to estimate revenue for the coming fiscal year and the legislature was required to abide
by that estimate when passing a balanced, comprehensive budget.

This period was the low ebb of gubernatorial and legislative control over the budget. While a member of the Board of Public Works, the governor had no special budgetary powers; he was merely one among seven equals. Much of the legislature's control over the pursestrings of government was also usurped. From this point on, however, by small and large steps throughout the 20th century, the legislature and governor became more and more significant players in the process.

In 1935, the Office of Budget Director was created. The director was the first full-time budget officer in West Virginia and, as such, he quickly became important in both shaping and executing the budget. While officially a staff officer of the Board of Public Works, the budget director was appointed by and served at the governor's pleasure. Because of this, the director came to be seen as the governor's agent, giving the governor more leverage on the Board than the other members. In 1953, the Office of the Legislative Auditor was established to provide the legislature with similar staff assistance in performing its budgetary duties.

In 1955, West Virginia state government went from a system of biennial to annual budgeting with the implementation of a 30-day "budget session" for the legislature in even-numbered years. This gave both the Board and the legislature more control over agency spending because expenditure needs and revenue estimates were more accurately gauged, and agency performance could come under more frequent scrutiny. In 1957, the Department of Finance and Administration was created to consolidate financial management in the executive branch, including budget preparation and administration. The commissioner of this department was appointed by the governor for a six-year term, and reported to both the governor individually and the Board of Public Works as a group, further establishing the governor as the "most equal" member of the Board.

Each of these developments consolidated budget decision-making power in the hands of the governor and legislature. But in 1968, the ratification of the Modern Budget Amendment took a giant step toward this end, resulting in the basic structure of today's budget process. The governor's power was most noticeably increased by this amendment, but the legislature's role was also enhanced.

The Modern Budget Amendment stripped the Board of Public Works of its budgetary role, endowing the governor with the sole authority to prepare the budget proposal for the legislature, and to estimate future state revenue. The Department of Finance and Administration (today, the Department of Administration) was explicitly made a line agency directly responsible to the governor. The governor was also given new formal powers regarding the budget, including the item and reduction vetoes, and the power to amend his or her budget request and revenue estimate during the legislative session.

The Modern Budget Amendment allowed the legislature to treat the budget much like any other bill, without most of the numerous special restrictions that had previously applied to it. For example, the legislature could now increase the amount in a line item over what the governor had proposed. In fact, under the Modern Budget Amendment, the legislature could increase, decrease, or even strike any line items it wished to. The only restrictions on legislative action were that it could not raise the governor's revenue estimate, and it could not pass a budget with a projected deficit.

With the Modern Budget Amendment, the basic structure of the budget process in West Virginia became very similar to that of most states, with the governor preparing the budget request and the legislature treating the budget as it would any other bill, albeit a very important one. What distinguishes the budget process in West Virginia is how the actors involved use their powers and tools in the face of high demands and low resources. In the following sections the three phases of the budget process-preparation, adoption, and administration-are described to show how the actors behave in this environment of fiscal austerity.

Budget Preparation

Along with 31 other states, West Virginia has an annual budget cycle (Council of State Governments 1992) This means that the budget passed by the legislature and signed by the governor is the spending plan for a twelve-month period, a fiscal year running from July 1 to June 30. But to call this an "annual" budget cycle is somewhat misleading. In fact, the work on any fiscal year's budget takes place over the course of at least three calendar years. The geometric metaphor for this process might more appropriately be a triple helix than a circle. That is, the budget does not neatly cycle around from one year's plan to the next, but rather there 'is much overlap between various years' budgets. A crosssection of budget activity on any given day would reveal people working on the budgets of at least three different fiscal years. Some people would be planning next year's budget, some would be administering this year's budget, and some would be assessing the administration of last year's budget. Each phase of the process is thoroughly linked to the phases that precede and follow it, and to the budgets that have come before it and will follow it.

The following describes how the budget for a single fiscal year is created and executed. However, the reader should remain aware that there are at least two other years' budget helixes occurring at the same time which can greatly influence the progress of the one under study,

The budget process begins almost a year before the commencement of the fiscal year it covers, with the preparation of the governor's budget proposal. This phase of the process is largely the domain of nonelected, executive branch officials and officials in the Department of Administration. The governor has direct input into the process at the beginning and end of this phase, however, and has substantial indirect input through his or her agents throughout the proposal's preparation.

Executive agencies are those departments, divisions, and offices that do the jobs of state government, and therefore spend the bulk of the state's money. These agencies teach university students, enforce wild game and traffic laws, guard state prisoners, and so forth, They have traditionally been viewed in the role of the "expansive spender" in the governmental budgeting process (Schick 1971; Sharkansky 1968). Agency officials both believe deeply in the job they are doing for the state, and have the natural political desire to become more powerful and control more resources. Their goal is both to increase their agencies' respective budgets and to increase their discretion in spending that money.

The Department of Administration, on the other hand, is the state's "Finance Ministry," with the primary goal of matching spending with revenue (Wildavsky 1975). As the governor's agents, the secretary of the Department of Administration and the director of the Budget Office (a subordinate of the secretary) try to meet the governor's goals of compiling a balanced budget while conserving some flexibility to enable the governor to make an impact on the budget. While an executive agency is concerned with increasing only its own slice of the budgetary pie, the Department of Administration must consider the whole pie. If the agencies could request all the funds they wanted, the surn of their requests would undoubtedly be larger than the state's revenue, requiring the Department of Administration to determine where to cut agency requests. This sets up the tension that characterizes this phase of the budget process.

Constraints on the growth of West Virginia state revenue in the 1980s and 1990s have lead to a situation where the imperative to cut and control agency requests has superseded agencies' desires to expand. Tight controls from above, rigid budget request guidelines and a focus on maintaininq current levels of spending are the rule. In fact, the revenue constraint is so severe that agencies have altered their primary goal from that of expansion to one of merely protecting their "base," that is, their current spending level.

The formal process of budget preparation begins soon after agencies submit their expenditure schedules for the previous fiscal year to the Budget Office (a division of the Department of Administration). This is usually in early July, a full year before the budget under consideration is to take effect. Once the secretary of the Department of Administration knows what the agencies will be spending in the current year, he or she can prepare instructions that the agencies can use in preparing their requests for the following year.

At this time, all agencies are sent the Department of Administration's annual publication, Appropriation Request Instructions. This document emphasizes the control aspect of budgeting and the focus on previous expenditures as the basis for future expenditures. Each agency is supplied with forms that list its current budget, and the instructions require them to request only a very small change from that previous level of appropriation to maintain a "current-level budget," Not only are incremental changes mandated, but the size and direction of that incremental change is also often specified. For example, in the instructions for developing the FY 1993 budget, agencies were forbidden to submit a currentlevel request that exceeded their FY 1992 appropriation. Although agencies were allowed to submit a "Current Level Impact Statement" with this request, indicating how legislative, judicial or federal mandates would be left unfulfilled by the current-level request, the Department of Administration's desire to control requests for increased funding was clear.

An agency is not completely without recourse in its quest to expand its budget at this point in the process. The budget preparation instructions allow each division to specify a small number of "Improvement Packages." An improvement package is a request for an increase in funding for a specific project. Each request is made separately from all other improvements and from the current-level request. These improvements must be justified individually in a brief accompanying narrative, and clearly identified as an ongoing or single-year project. They are to be priority ranked within the division, and then within the department. Isolating requests for increased funding makes it much easier for the Department of Administration to select those few increases that the state can afford, and that fit in the governor's program.

Within the executive agencies themselves, the budget request preparation process is also a top-down procedure, with an emphasis on controlling expenditures and enhancing the governor's priorities. In addition to the Appropriation Request Instructions, the departments provide instructions to their divisions, and the divisions to their inferior spending units. These instructions are just as specific and focused on maintaining current levels of spending as are the Department of Administration's instructions, and they are just as mandatory. Inferior units submit their requests to superior units up the line, with the superior unit at each level having the authority to change the inferior unit's requests. Since the departments are headed by the gubernatorially appointed Super-Secretaries, the governor can inject his or her budgetary priorities into the

process at this point as well as through the Department of Administration.

One way that an agency can improve its chances of increasing its budget at this step in the process is to tie its improvement packages to legislative mandates or gubernatorial priorities. In the latter case, an agency determines which policies the governor would like to pursue in the coming fiscal year, and then pitches an improvement in such a way that the governor's policies are enhanced. Agencies can determine the governor's priorities by examining his or her State of the State messages and campaign promises, or merely following political events in the Charleston newspapers. In many states, agencies can gauge governors' priorities from explicit policy statements made in the official budget preparation instructions. However, helpful hints of this type are not included in West Virginia's official budgetary documents.

Agencies may also tie their improvement packages to the mandates of previous legislative sessions. For example, an agency might justify an improvement by noting that the legislature authorized the program for which the money is earmarked. This gives more weight to its justification for the improvement than if the agency itself Just felt a need for it. An agency with a long perspective may even adopt an explicit strategy of this type. That is, it may push the legislature for an unfunded program authorization one year, and then use that authorization as justification for a budget improvement the following year. However, while tieing its argument to a legislative mandate may strengthen an agency's case, it does not necessarily make it a compelling one to the Department of Administration. Many programs are authorized by the legislature but never receive full funding.

The budget instructions trickle down and the budget requests percolate up through the bureaucracy throughout July and August. By September 1, all executive departments must submit their budget requests to the secretary of the Department of Administration. The Budget Office then compiles these initial requests, reviewing and verifying the information contained therein, and checking to see that the budget preparation instructions were followed. By October 1, the Budget Office reports its findings and the compiled budget requests to the secretary of the Department of Administration.

Two copies of these budget requests are also sent to the Legislative Auditor by September 1. This provides the legislative branch with an opportunity to influence the budget preparation process. It also provides the agencies an opportunity to appeal to someone other than the Department of Administration. However, due to a shortage of professional staff in the Legislative Auditor's office, these opportunities are generally not pursued by the legislature or the agencies.

In most states, the central budget office takes on a much more analytic role in compiling budget requests than in West Virginia. In most other states, these offices conduct critical reviews of the budget requests to assess whether they are in line with the governor's agenda, and whether they are designed to meet any applicable professional, legislative or gubernatorial criteria. While few state central budget offices have the resources to conduct analysis to the extent that their profession would suggest (Schick 1971), the extreme deprivation of resources in West Virginia's central budget office has relegated it to the role of being little more than a clerk in the budget preparation phase. For example, in 1989 West Virginia employed only five central budget analysts, the lowest number in the nation. The national average was 23.6. Moreover, West Virginia's budget analysts' salaries were among the very lowest in the nation (Howard and Shaw 1989). Today, the situation is even worse, with only three budget analysts employed in the Budget Office.

The secretary of the Department of Administration conducts hearings in October and November with the agencies to fine tune and finalize their requests. These "hearings" usually take the form of informal discussions, on a department-by-department basis. The secretary and the director of the Budget Office sit down with a department's Super-Secretary and selected division heads to review its request. At these meetings the secretary and director will more or less firmly suggest that the department increase or decrease the level of detail in its request, in both the line item listing of expenses and in the justification of changes in current levels of spending. These hearings provide another opportunity for the governor's priorities to be injected into the process through the suggestions of these Department of Administration officials.

With the suggestions of the secretary of the Department of Administration in mind, the department SuperSecretaries revise their budget requests and submit them to the Budget Office by December 1. Between December 1 and 15, Budget Office analysts compile these requests into drafts of the two documents the governor will present as his or her proposal to the legislature: the budget bill and the budget document.

The budget bill is the actual proposed legislation the governor submits to the legislature for consideration. The proposed expenditures are itemized at a broad level for the most part, with most agencies having their expenses divided into the categories of Personal Services (including salaries), Annual Increment (the small increase in personal services allowed in the Appropria,ion Request Instructicins), Employee Benefits, and Unclassified.

The crucial consideration here involves the level of detail into which the Unclassified category is broken down (Brown 1992). Both the governor and the legislature are reluctant to embed too many specific appropriations into the budget bill, because when it is passed it is a rigid legal mandate. By using the Unclassified category in the budget bill, these officials preserve flexibility in the administration of the budget. Agencies will also try to keep as much of their budget as possible in the Unclassified line for the same reason. But legal rigidity is sometimes useful to the governor, such as when he or she wants to keep another actor from having flexibility with an expenditure, especially the agency involved. This situation can occur when an agency has a very large budget (e.g., the Department of Human Services), or when the agency has been seen as abusing its budgetary discretion in the past.

The budget document is a 500-plus-page publication that explains in detail the budget bill and the governor's intentions regarding the budget. It includes a general budgetary statement by the governor to the legislature, and the governor's summary report regarding the state's finances. But the bulk of the document consists of the Appropriations Request forms from each agency. These forms include detailed information regarding proposed expenditures for the coming fiscal year at current levels of service, proposed increases over the current level of services, the appropriations for the current fiscal year, and the actual expenditures for the previous fiscal year. Also noted are the type of fund (federal, special, or general) to which these appropriations are to be charged.

The budget document never has the force of law, even when the budget bill is enacted. It is largely a signal to the legislature and the agencies of the governor's intention regarding how funds appropriated by the budget bill are to be spent. But even without the force of law, the budget document is taken very seriously by all actors, and has held a pivotal place in West Virginia's budget process for more than 40 years. One reason that the budget document figures so centrally in the process is its level of detail, and its comparison of proposed, current and previous expenditures. These detailed comparisons make it convenient for the legislature to use it in their deliberations, and for agencies to use it in their development of subsequent years' requests. The budget document therefore facilitates an incremental approach to budgeting, and this is quite appropriate for the fiscal conditions that exist in West Virginia. Because the tax base is strained and revenues are not expected to grow rapidly, the actors recognize that this year's expenditures are a good guide to what is possible next year.

But despite its level of detail, West Virginia's budget document has serious weaknesses. Most states' budget documents include information that is absent from West Virginia's, such as economic analyses, caseload data, and program performance measures (Howard and Shaw 1989). In fact, only three states include fewer types of information in their budget documents. This situation is caused, at least in part, by the dearth of analysts in West Virginia's Budget Office,

The development of the draft of the budget bill and document keeps the Budget Office busy in the first part of December. Because the office has only two weeks to complete their massive job and few personnel to do it, late nights, Saturday and Sunday duty, and cold pizza are the rule. After much effort, the secretary of the Department of Administration presents the drafts of the budget bill and document to the governor on December 15.

For the next two weeks, the governor, his or her staff, and the secretary of the Department of Administration review these drafts, putting the finishing touches on them. The governor can shift requests here and there to enhance his or her policy goals, but no major changes are usually necessary at this point, since the governor's agents (the Super-Secretaries, the director of the Budget Office, and the secretary of the Department of Administration) have had a firm hand in shaping the draft requests. Most of the modifications to the budget bill and document involve setting the political stage for legislative consideration. For example, the governor may make small changes in the proposal either to enhance potential political support for it, or to provide bargaining chips for later negotiations.

During this period, the governor's office also finalizes its estimate of revenue for the coming fiscal year. The Research Division of the Department of Tax and Revenue assists the governor in the estimation process, taking into account the previous year's revenue, national trends, and economic and demographic factors in West Virginia. The governor has the legal authority to make this estimate unilaterally, however, and no one has the legal authority to challenge his or her official estimate.

The revenue estimate is crucial because it sets the upper limit for the budget bill's proposed expenditures. The legislature is prohibited by law from passing a budget in which the proposed expenditures exceed the governor's revenue estimate. Therefore, the governor may control legislative additions to the budget by underestimating revenue. This is a powerful device for the governor, one that only three other states give their chief executive (Beyle 1990). While a governor may or may not intentionally underestimate revenue for this purpose, many actors in the process believe that it is done at least occasionally. Further, given the unpredictability of the future, it makes sense for the governor to underestimate revenue. It is much less of a political problem for the governor to have more revenue than expected during a fiscal year than less revenue.

The governor's office also develops its strategy for presenting the budget to the legislature and the state during this period, including deciding which aspects of the massive proposal to emphasize. Is this an "austerity budget for hard times," or "an education budget, with massive shifts in funding to our children"? The theme of the budget, or even just those aspects the governor thinks are important (and salable) will be emphasized in press conferences, press releases, and especially in the State of the State address. Presented before a joint

session of the legislature at the beginning of its session, the State of the State address is covered by all major state media, and carried, live, statewide on West Virginia Public Television. The State of the State address allows the governor to set the agenda for the budget debate. He or she tells the legislature what is important in the budget. And because of the legislature's lack of staff and the traditional deference accorded the governor, the governor's opinion in this regard is usually respected. This speech and the official presentation of the budget bill and document to the legislature are taken as the starting point for legislative budgetary debate.

Budget Adoption

Since the Magna Carta, the control of the pursestrings of Anglo-American-style democratic governments has rested in the legislative branch. Following this tradition, no money can be spent by West Virginia's state government without the state legislature expressly authorizing it in an appropriation. Except for the occasional supplementary appropriation, the authority to spend state funds comes only with the passage of the budget bill in parallel form by both legislative chambers, and the governor's signing of it.

Contrary to this tradition of legislative budgetary control, however, throughout most of the 20th century U.S. governors and presidents came to dominate the budget process through the rise of the executive budget (Schick 1971). In the 1970s and 1980s, the pendulum began to swing back toward the legislative branch in most states, for a number of reasons (Pitsvada 1988; Gosling 1985; Kerker 1984). First, state legislatures increased their analytic capacity by hiring professional staff. This kept legislators from being completely at the mercy of the governor and executive agencies for budgetary information. Legislatures in many states also developed the capacity and authority to estimate future state revenue, again freeing them from reliance on the governor for this vital piece of information. Split party control between the governor and legislature gave many state legislatures strong incentive to enhance their own institutional capacity in the area of the budget. And finally, the resources provided by the federal government's General Revenue Sharing program in the 1970s and early 1980s gave legislatures much more leeway to do what they do best: spend money for expanded and new programs. These and other conditions have brought the legislatures in many states to a position of parity with the governor in the budget process (Clynch and Lauth 1991).

West Virginia's state legislature has not been the beneficiary of any of these recent trends, however. For most of the period since 1976, Democrats have controlled both the legislature and the governor's office, reducing legislative incentive for the development -of an independent budget capacity. Even when there was split control in West Virginia, the lack of resources and the tradition of a "citizen legislature" kept significant increases in full-time legislative staff from occurring. Further, the governor retains absolute authority to estimate future state revenue in West Virginia. And finally, the state's chronic shortage of revenue works against legislative control, because there has been relatively little money to develop new programs. Therefore, West Virginia's state legislature remains in a weak position in the budget process in relation to the governor, especially as compared to legislatures in other states.

As with the preparation phase of the budget process, the politics and outcome of the adoption phase can be best understood by examining the goals and strategies of the key actors. The two main actors are the legislature and the governor, but executive agencies play a role here, as well. The legislature's goal in this phase is to pass a budget that is in line with its policy preferences. If revenues were unlimited, this would only involve increases in spending, as few legislative goals are enhanced by cutting gubernatorially proposed expenditures. Two constitutional provisions turn the process into a zero-sum game for the legislature, however: the legislature must pass a balanced budget and the governor controls revenue estimation. Therefore, if the legislature wants to add new expenditures to the budget, it must cut somewhere else or add a new revenue source. The governor's goal in the adoption phase is to get legislative approval for a budget that is as close to the original proposal as possible. The governor and his or her surrogates have spent over six months crafting the proposal, so there is a great incentive to keep it intact. And finally, executive agencies traditionally see the legislature as a "court of appeal" for pet projects that have not made it into the governor's budget. Subject to constraints of propriety and resources, they would like to see the legislature increase their appropriation over the gubernatorial proposal.

Once the governor submits the budget proposal to the legislature at the beginning of the legislative session, the House of Delegates' and the Senate's Finance Committees immediately go to work on it. As agents of the entire legislature, and particularly of the Speaker of the House of Delegates and the President of the Senate, each committee's goal is to find extra money in the budget. Any additional resources the committees can find or create allows them to add as much of the legislative agenda to the budget as possible.

These committees go over the budget proposal in fine detail for about 50 days of the 60-day legislative session. They begin by holding hearings with the department Super-Secretaries and selected division heads. The executive officials present their arguments in favor of the governor's budget, and the committee members ask them questions, usually in search of places to cut agency requests. These hearings provide agencies a formal opportunity to argue against any cuts

in their budget, and to pitch for improvements over last year's appropriation (Brown 1992). Agency officials carefully prepare their oral and written presentations to appeal to the committee and anticipate any questions that might be asked. After the hearings, the prudent official will promptly track down any information that was requested by committee members that he or she did not have available at the hearing itself. All this helps to instill legislative confidence in the agency's administration, which may lead to more budgetary support for it. Other tactics agencies use toward this end are to respond quickly to legislative requests for information and constituent assistance throughout the year, and the planting of "softball" questions with sympathetic legislators on the committee before their hearings.

After these hearings, the Finance Committees break up into subcommittees to study the budget proposal in more detail. The subcommittee chairs meet with the full Finance Committee chairs and the chamber's majority leadership (the Speaker or the President) to discuss the latter's budget priorities. Each subcommittee chair then does his or her best to instill these priorities into his or her piece of the budget. Individual subcommittee members are assigned specific agency accounts to search thoroughly for additional resources. Even given the constraints of high legislative turnover, Finance Committee members usually serve on the same subcommittees for several years, and often evaluate the same individual agency accounts during their entire subcommittee service. This leads to a better legislative "feel" for what goes on in each agency's accounts, and somewhat compensates for the Finance Committees' low level of analytic staff.

As subcommittee members go over these accounts, they scramble for any spare funds, even in very small amounts. One strategy is to cut vacant agency employee positions (which is why agencies are loath to leave positions open for long). Cutting bureaucratic positions, especially if they are empty, is a time-honored tradition in state budgeting in tight times, as there is little political heat for doing so (Raimondo 1993). Subcommittee members also look for "unusual" expenditures, typically meaning new items or significant increases over the previous year's appropriation. Also, agencies that spent less than expected in the previous year may be seen as being overfunded. These items are all fair game for subcommittee cuts, and an agency's officials must justify the open positions and new expenses to the individual subcommittee member evaluating its account. It is often the persuasive power of this justification and the personal relationship between the subcommittee member and these agency officials that determines whether these items are kept in the budget or "reclaimed" into the legislative discretionary pool.

A variety of accounting tricks can also be used by the finance subcommittees in their desperate search for extra funds. Salaries of employees may be shifted from general revenue to special funds (which are paid for by federal or earmarked tax money), when their jobs are related to the tasks these special funds cover. Charges and fees for government services are used increasingly to pay for programs without "raising taxes." Since 1978, charges have increased from less than 10 percent of total state revenue to over 17 percent (see Figure 5). Further, special revenue accounts may take in more money than expected in a given year, and these extra funds may be incorporated into the legislature's budget. The Finance Committees have been so desperate for extra funds in recent years that they have stripped the balances that are kept in many accounts in case of unexpected, emergency demands. Partially as a result of this behavior, West Virginia is one of only 12 states that does not have an official "rainy day" fund for fiscal emergencies (Howard and Shaw 1989). The only substantial emergency fund in the state budget, the Governor's Civil Contingency Fund, is not only targeted for physical disaster relief, but it also pales in comparison to the amount other states put in their rainy day funds. In FY 1993, West Virginia had $1.8 million in the Civil Contingency Fund. The average rainy day fund in the 38 states having one in 1990 (the latest available data) was $148.8 million.

Once a subcommittee completes its yeoman's work of eking out a few extra dollars from the budget proposal, it uses these funds to put the legislature's stamp on the budget. Some of the additions are policy changes that are on the leadership's agenda, but some changes are made to satisfy the policy or political demands of specific members. "Bringing members on board the budget" in the West Virginia state legislature is, as elsewhere in the United States, one part rational argument, one part bluster, and one part pure horse-trading. Much of this negotiation occurs in closed sessions of the majority party

caucus. There, out of the light of media scrutiny, legislators not on the Finance Committees push for their pet projects. These caucus sessions can be loud and long as noncommittee members have one of their few chances at influencing the budget. The Speaker and President ride herd over their respective caucuses, trying to give in to parochial interests as little as necessary to gain sufficient support for passage.

While the majority party leaders and governor have little official role in the adoption phase of the budget process, their informal role and influence through their surrogates makes them the dominating forces behind the scenes. The Speaker and the President appoint the members of the Finance Committees, as well as the chairs of these committees and their subcommittees. Finance Committee positions are highly prized by legislators, and the appointment to one makes a legislator quite beholden to the leadership. Indeed, Finance Committee and subcommittee chairs are part of the "leadership team" in both chambers, working closely with the majority leader to pursue the leadership agenda. Constant informal negotiation and discussion occurs between committee and subcommittee chairs and the Speaker or President throughout the legislative session to ensure that the approved budget meets the leadership's goals to the maximum extent possible.

Similarly, the governor exerts his or her influence throughout the adoption phase by closely monitoring the legislature, and engaging in discussions where issues arise, either through surrogates (such as the secretary of the Department of Administration or gubernatorial staff) or personally. Often, the most important negotiations in this phase occur between the governor and the legislative leadership, even though their official roles are limited. So while the governor and majority party leaders have little formal role in this phase (i.e., the veto, and scheduling the budget bill for floor consideration, respectively), they dominate it through their informal and indirect influence.

Once negotiations and modifications of the budget bill are complete, the Finance Committees compile their subcommittee reports and officially report their versions of the budget bill to their respective chambers. On the chamber floor, there is usually some debate to clarify certain provisions of the bill, and to give those who have lost out in the negotiations a chance to vent their frustration. But because all members know that many more changes are still to be rnade in the bill, floor voting is usually pro forma, with few amendments being passed.

There are inevitably major discrepancies between the House and Senate versions of the budget bill. Since the budget, like any bill, must pass both chambers in precisely the same form, a conference committee is necessary to work out the differences. The speaker of the House and the president of the Senate each appoint six members from their respective chambers to form this committee. These conferees are key members of their respective Finance Committees, and the co-chairs of the conference are the chairs of the Finance Committees. These conferees meet in public sessions to negotiate a budget bill upon which both chambers can agree. This occurs in the last few days of the legislative session, often after the constitutionally allotted session length has expired, requiring the governor to extend the session for consecutive three-day periods by executive order.

The floor vote on the conference budget report is usually the last legislative act of the session, so the conferees are under a great deal of time pressure, as the rest of the legislature waits to return home. On the other hand, each chambers representatives try to hold

ut for a budget that resembles its chambe(s passed bill as Much as possible. This balancing act leads to long, tough negotiating sessions and very late nights for, the conferees. They work through each account in turn, arriving at agreement and then closing that account. Non-conferees may meet informally with small groups of conferees to encourage the latter to hold the line or suggest points where compromise could be reached, but the conferees formally control the output of the conference. But, as with other aspects of the legislative process, the informal input of the speaker, president and governor is quite influential in the negotiations.

Finally, often in the wee hours of the morning after several days of work, the conferees agree to a bill and report this compromise to each chamber. The conference committee co-chairs then make a formal presentation of the bill on their respective floors, in more or less detail depending on the co-chair's style. Informally, each legislator is notified of the conference changes in the bill that might be of particular interest to him or her. No amendments are allowed to be offered on the floor to maintain the correspondence between the House and Senate versions, and the bill is usually passed with no further difficulty on a roll call vote by a majority ol the members elected, as required by statute.

The legislature's bill is then sent to the governor for his or her approval. This is the first official point of budgetary influence for the governor since the State of the State message at the beginning of the legislative sesS3ion, but as noted, the governor and his or her lieutenants are a constant presence as the legislature does its work. The Super-Secretaries, usually close associates of the governor, make both formal presentations to the full Finance Committees and work closely with committee members to supply budget and program information about their agencies. T he secretary of the Department of Administration and members of the governor's personal staff are often seen in the offices of the chamber leadership, and Finance Committee and subcommittee chairs and members. At these times, these agents of the governor discuss the budget and present the governor:s case. while assessing legislative positions

and areas of agreement and possible compromise. The tone of this ongoing contact between the governor and the legislature during legislative consideration of the budget varies from an easy sense of cooperation to stilted antagonism, depending upon the personalities of the sitting governor and legislators as well the politics and policies involved. For example, when the governor and legislative majority leaders are both of the same party, as has been the case for all but four years since 1976, relations are more congenial and'cooperative than if split party control exists.

When the governor is unable to influence the legislature's budgetary deliberations informally, he or she must rely on the formal power of the veto. For example, Republican Arch Moore used this mechanism to a much greater extent than either his Democratic successor or predecessor. Indeed, Democrat Gaston Caperton has been so successful in his informal negotiations with the legislature that the only vetoes he made in the FY 1993 budget were ones he was asked to make by the legislative leadership to clear up some technical errors in the bill. The governor's budgetary veto power is formally very strong, having both the item and reduction veto with two-thirds of the elected members of each chamber being required to override it. However, due to the tradition of great gubernatorial 'influence over the legislature and the legislature's limited time and staff to examine the governor's budget proposal, the veto is not usually a prominent feature in the budget process.

After the governor signs the budget bill, it becomes the official budget of the state for the upcoming 'fiscal year. However, the legislature is not completely finished with it. Just as the governor submits the budget document along with the officia! budget bill in order to speil out details best lef! out of official law, the legislature develops the Digest, of the Enrolled Budget Bill to present executive agencies with the "intent of the legis-, lature" on some of the details of the coming year's budget. This is where the legislature. "suggests" to agencies how it believes the agencies should spend money, especially in the Unclassified liries of the budget. The "budget digest" if., written after !he !egislat've session is over by the staff of the Finance Comittees arid Legislative Auditor's office. with, the anproval of lhe, members of the budget conference comittee. Until 1992, only the co-chairs of the committee approved this document. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that this was an Unconstitutional abdication of legislative power. It required that both conference committees approve the digest, that be developed in public session, and that minutes be taken at these public sessions (Common Cause v. Tomblin (1991); Mowery', et al. 1991)

There are two reasons why the legislature uses budget digest as an alternative to embedding all the legislative instruction into the budget bill. First, legislative session is so short, and legislative staff so scarce, that it would be very difficult to develop the type of detailed instructions found in the digest before the session ended. The broad strokes painted in the budget bill (characterized by large amounts of money in Unclassif ied line items) are difficult enough to compromise over; the more detailed the instructions, the more controversy and the longer and more difficult the negotiations.

The second reason for using the budget digest is that it adds a degree of flexibility to the budget. For example, suppose the legislature wrote a very specific level of appropriation into the budget bill for building a new highway truck inspection station on Route 250. If floods damaged Route 250 during the fiscal year, the funds earmarked for the inspection station could not be used to fix the highway without the passage of a supplementary appropriations bill by the legislature. This is especially problematic in West Virginia due to the very limited time the legislature is in session. But by stating in the budget digest that it is only the legislature's intent to build that inspection station, the Division of Highways could change its expenditure in light of the emergency, with perhaps only a telephone call to the Finance Committee chairs. The budget digest does not have the force of law, as was made clear by the Supreme Court of Appeals in Common Cause v, Tomblin (1991), so no new legislation has to be passed to modify it. However, executive agency officers recognize that they had better consider these "intentions" seriously in their expenditure decisions, as the Finance Committee chairs and conferees will have much to say over what their budgets will be in the following year (Brown 1992). In this way, the budget digest becomes a firm but flexible set of guidelines for executive discretionary spending of Unclassified line items.

Budget Administration

Once the budget bill is signed into law by the governor (and any vetoes acted on by the legislature) and the budget digest is signed by the budget conferees, the official budget for the coming fiscal year has been finalized. The next phase of the process is the administration of the budget act, that is, the spending of state money by the executive agencies pursuant to the appropriations in the budget. Less-overt politics comes into play in this phase than in the previous phase, and it is less visible to the public. However, decisions are made in the administration of the budget that have an important impact on public policy in West Virginia.

The central actors in the administration of the budget are the executive agencies who are authorized to spend money by the budget act, and those agencies that are charged with ensuring that these spending agencies do so in careful accordance with that act. These agencies of budgetary control are the Budget Office, the auditor's office and the treasurer's office. The goal of these control agencies is to tightly monitor executive spending to conform with the budget act. The spending agencies, on the other hand, try to enhance their discretion in making expenditures throughout the fiscal year.

After the budget digest is completed, but prior to the start of the fiscal year on July 1, the budget officer of each spending agency submits a quarterly allotment request for the coming fiscal year to the Budget Office. This gives the Budget Office a bottom line to which to hold each agency through the fiscal year. Deviations from this request, especially requests for more money, need to be thoroughly justified. The Budget Office then prepares a monthly expenditure schedule for each agency, giving that office an idea of the overall monthly need for revenue throughout the fiscal year. The compilation of these expenditure schedules is compared to the month-by-month estimate of revenue that the Budget Office prepares before July 1 to see where potential gaps may arise during the upcoming year. Throughout the fiscal year, a monthly revenue report is prepared which compares actual collections and estimated revenue to keep the Budget Office and its director as up to date as possible regarding future balances of accounts.

It is the secretary of the Department of Administration's responsibility to ensure that the accounts of the state are balanced on a daily basis, and one of the director of the Budget Office's main jobs is to watch this carefully for the secretary. By identifying potential revenue shortfalls throughout the year, agencies can be instructed to put off certain nonessential spending to a later date. For example, the director of the Budget Office might anticipate a shortfall on October 1, so that a major bond payment could not be met. If one of these payments is missed, the state's bond rating may be lowered, causing higher levels of interest to be paid on future state loans. Therefore, bond payments are a top state priority. Upon anticipating this shortfall, the director might suggest that certain agencies delay some of their scheduled but less-critical expenditures to the following month, when revenues are scheduled to increase. Agencies do not like to be told to shift scheduled expenses in this manner, but since the Budget Office has strong support from the governor's office in its mandate to keep current accounts in the black, agencies have little avenue for appeal.

To control the flow of expenditures further, statute requires that spending agencies submit requests for quarterly budget allocations to the Budget Off ice 30 days before each quarter, which must be pursuant to their expenditure schedules. In practice, the Budget Office usually takes quarterly allotments directly from the expenditure schedule and releases them automatically each quarter. Some of this allotment is automatically earmarked and encumbered for such routine obligations as rent and contractual payments, but that part of the allotment designated for more flexible types of expenses, like personal and current services, is not encumbered until it is specifically needed. These allocations, while not direct payments of money, are obligations to pay out certain funds in the coming quarter.

Upon compiling these allocation requests, if, in the judgment of the director of the Budget Office, the secretary of the Department of Administration and the governor, the quarter's revenues will not cover allocations, the governor must rescind the rest of the year's allocations by equal rates for all agencies, with special consideration for education accounts (State ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Rockefeller 1981). The governor is empowered by statute to make these cuts unilaterally, with no legislative approval, but he or she typically consults the secretary of the Department of Administration, the secretary of the Department of Tax and Revenue, and legislative leaders before doing so. This power is given to the governor so that accounts may be kept balanced even when revenues do not accrue as expected, not just because of monthly fluctuations in tax collections, but because of downturns in the entire year's revenue, as in a recession. Since there is little discretion for the governor in the distribution of cuts across agencies, this budget rescission power is largely useful in ensuring a balance of payments rather than in affecting public policy priorities in the state.' This sort of mid-year budget rescission has taken place four times since 1989, much to the consternation of the state's agencies and taxpayers.

Ironically, the frequency with which these rescissions have been made recently is the result of the increasing accuracy of governors' revenue estimation since the late 1970s (see Figure 6). Between 1957 and 1977, governors and Boards of Public Works averaged a discrepancy of 10.4 percent of the estimated state revenue between their initial estimate and the actual amount collected at the end of the fiscal year. Since 1978, governors have averaged a remarkable .4 percent annual error. The problem has been that prior to 1978 estimates were consistently low, whereas since then estimates have erred both high and low. Greater estimation accuracy might be preferable in the abstract, but overestimating revenue is much more politically painful than underestimating it. Especially when no rainy day funds exist, even a slight underestimation of revenue can have significant impact on state government operations and be widely and negatively reported in the media.

Up to this point, agencies have actually spent no money. The governor proposed a level of expenditure, legislative appropriation in the budget bill authorized expenditure, the expenditure schedule predicted an expenditure, and the quarterly allotment allowed an agency to incur an expense. In order to actually spend money out of their appropriation, an agency must submit a requisition to the Budget Office, where it 'is

There is statutory provision for the governor to make budget rescissions in a more discretionary fashion, but no West Virginia governor has attempted to do this because of the common perception that the statute could be successfully contested as unconstitutional.

The auditor is a constitutional state officer who is elected for a four-year term concurrent with that of the governor. Unlike the governor, however, the auditor may be reelected an unlimited number of times. The title "auditor" is actually a misnomer in the West Virginia system, in that the auditor's office actually acts as the controller. That is, when the Budget Office submits a demand for payment, the auditor checks if the expenditure is congruent with the budget act, and if there is enough appropriation left in that account. If either of these two conditions is not met, the auditor may refuse to pay the claim. In this way, the auditor is the final check on the budgetary system.

While the auditor tries to guard both the integrity of the budget act and the current balances in the state's accounts, spending agencies often try to stretch their spending flexibility. The applicability of specific expenditures under the rules set up by the auditor for a specific account can sometimes be open to interpretation. For example, an agency may wish to use money from its "Training" line item to reimburse an employee for taking a night accounting course. Upon facing similar situations before, the auditor's office developed the rule that to be reimbursed, the training had to be directly related to the employees's current job. If the employee in question was taking the course to fulfill requirements for a different position in the agency than the one he or she currently holds (e.g., in anticipation of promotion), the expense would not meet this criterion, and would be denied by the auditor's office. The agency may have simply made a mistake in submitting the requisition in this case, or it may have been trying to slip the expense past the auditor to help out an employee. Agencies also use other, perhaps more devious, approaches to enhancing their flexibility over the auditor's rules. For example, an agency may hide a suspect requisition in a stack of legitimate claims in the hope that at the end of a long day the assistant auditor in charge of reviewing them might get sloppy and miss the discrepancy. Then, if such an expense slips by once, when an auditor refuses to grant the same type of expense the next time, the indignant agency official can point to the mistaken "precedent,"

The auditor's office, on the other hand, has its own strategies to safeguard the budget act. Their primary approach is to employ over 20 assistant auditors to check as closely as possible each demand for payment that is submitted. Even with this staff, the administration of a multi-billion dollar annual budget is a monumental task, and detailed scrutiny of each payment is difficult to achieve. One approach to more efficient scrutiny is to target problematic accounts and types of expenses. If a particular agency is known for submitting dubious expenses, its accounts are examined more carefully, If a particular type of expense rule is known to be broken regularly, these types of expenses are closely watched. Generally, however, the auditor's office relies on a high degree of morale and a conscientious attitude among the assistant auditors to fulfill its guardian role.

Once a demand for payment clears the auditor's office, the final step in the budget process is the mechanical one of writing the check. The auditor issues a warrant to the state treasurer on the specific account in question. This warrant authorizes the treasurer to write a check to the person or business with the authorized clairn. The treasurer has no discretion about whether or not to write this check (assuming the warrant is valid),

On June 30, the fiscal year comes to an end. No claims may be made on the state's budget that have not been incurred on or before this date. Throughout July, expenses incurred before July 1 may be paid for through the normal Budget Off ice-auditor-treasurer route. After July 31, all appropriations for the previous fiscal year are vacated, and no more claims may be submitted to the Budget Office, If any expenses that were incurred in the previous fiscal year are not submitted before July 31, they must be brought before the Court. of Claims for payment. The Court of Claims is an agency of the legislature that reviews claims against non-current fiscal year accounts. If such a claim is deemed worthy by the Court, the Court recommends that it be included in the following year's budget in the Claims Bill !ine. This great delay in paying late claims gives vendors, agencies and other claimants strong incentive to get their claims in before the July 31 deadline.

The budget cycle for a given fiscal year does not end until a series of post-audits is undertaken to ensure that

the budget was administered properly. These are primarily fiscal audits, designed to ensure propriety in the expenditure of the state's funds. These fiscal audits are required by various federal and state laws and regulations, and by basic accounting principles. The Legislative Auditor's office sees that these audits are conducted. The Legislative Auditor's office may conduct these internally, or it may contract them out to private accounting firms. The latter course of action is most common, because the Legislative Auditor's office employs only 17 auditors. This low level of staffing also accounts for the small number of performance audits undertaken of agencies. A performance audit examines not just the fiscal propriety of an expense, but also whether the spending of that money had the expected program results (Reeves 1985). While many states regularly conduct performance audits to provide feedback on program effectiveness and budgetary efficiency, the lack of professional legislative staff in West Virginia makes this difficult. The legislature's Joint Committee on Government Operations conducts performance audits only once every six years for most agencies, in conjunction with an agency's sunset law review.

Conclusions and Recommendations

West Virginia's budget process is a long and extremely complicated set of interactions among most ot the state's major governmental actors. The official cycle for one fiscal year begins in July of the previous year, and may end three years later with the passage of the Claims Bill and completion of post-audits. And, of course, the informal implications of a year's budget begin earlier and carry on long after the formal process ends. The governor, legislature, Budget Office, executive agencies, constitutional officers of state auditor and treasurer and others are all deeply involved in the process at various points. The budget process is the fundamental rhythm of the state government.

The recurrent themes of the West Virginia state budget process arise from the overriding characteristics of the state's fiscal situation: an increasing demand for services and a lack of adequate resources to meet all of these demands. After years of working in this environ.ment of fiscal austerity, West Virginia budgeters have settled into a stable set of roles that allow everyone in the process to anticipate the actions of others and plan for the future. In this sense, the predictable nature of the fiscal environment produces less conflict than might be the case in a state with rapidly changing resources or needs, such as in California. However, the continual scrambling for small amounts of money, especially the chipping away at the numbers of state employees and the stripping of account balances by the legislature, puts increased stress on the governmental process in West Virginia. A decade or more of fiscal austerity has taker) its toll in terms of causing high levels of turnover in budgeters in all phases of the process, and in decreasing the margin of safety between cash on hand and incurred expenses. It remains to be seen whether the system can continue long under this condition of steady strain, much less survive a major externally produced fiscal crisis.

Most of these problems are the result of the state's bleak fiscal condition. The unlikely improvement in this condition could reduce the strain on the budgetary system considerably. Other changes that could improve the budget process fall into three categories: those that have direct monetary costs, those that indirectly require more funds, and those that do not require extra expenditures by the state.

Recommendations with direct cost:

Increase the analytic capacity of both the Budget Office and the Legislative Auditor's Office by hiring more professional budget analysts.

Increase the analytic capacity of both the Budget Off ice and the Legislative Auditor's Office by increasing the salaries of the budget analysts to levels commensurate with their professional qualifications. This should reduce the high rate of turnover in these positions.

Allocate an annual and accumulating rainy day fund of sufficient magnitude to compensate for unanticipated revenue shortfalls caused by unexpected economic conditions.

Recommendations with indirect costs:

Incorporate more information into the budget document, including cost-benefit analyses, caseload data, and program performance measures, as is done in most other states.

Amend the state constitution to allow the legislature to submit its own independent revenue estimate developed by the enlarged staff of the Legislative Auditor's Office or finance committees.

Allow the Legislative Auditor's Office to undertake discretionary performance audits of agencies, over and above those mandated by sunset provisions.

Recommendations requiring no revenue:

Require the governor to submit his or her budget proposal to the legislature in advance of the legislative session, to give the legislature more time to evaluate it.

Incorporate more policy guidelines into the initial Appropriation Request Instructions to give agencies a clearer picture of the governor's priorities when developing their improvement packages.

References

Adams, Donald. 1992. Chief Clerk, West Virginia state Auditor's Office. Interviewed by Christopher Z. Mooney. July 1.

Beyle, Thad L. 1990. "Governors." in Politics in the American States, Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Robert B. Albritton, eds. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Boiarsky, Ivor F. 1977. The Budget ... A Management of Resources. Charleston, WV: Legislative Office of Public Information.

Brooks, Randy. 1992. Office of the West Virginia Legislative Auditor. Interviewed by Christopher Z. Mooney. September 23.

Brown, David K. 1992. "Budgetary Realities in Aging Programs: A State Perspective." Photocopy. West Virginia Commission on Aging.

Clynch, Edward J., and Thomas P. Lauth, eds. 1991. Governors, Legislatures, and Budgets: Diversity Across the American States. New York: Greenwood.

Common Cause v. Tomblin. 413 S.E. 2nd 358 (WV 1991).

Council of State Governments. 1992. The Book of the States: 1992-93. vol. 29. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments.

Davis, Claude J., Eugene R. Elkins, Carl M. Frasure, Mavis Mann Reeves, William R. Ross, and Albert L. Sturm. 1963. West Virginia State and Local Government. Morgantown, WV: Bureau for Government Research.

Gormley, William T., Jr. 1989. "Custody Battles in State Administrations." In The State of the States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Gosling, James J. 1985. "Patterns of Influence and Choice in the Wisconsin Budgeting Process." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 10: 457-482.

Howard, Marica A., and Laura L. Shaw. 1989. Budgetary Processes in the States. Washington, D.C.: National Association of State Budget Officers.

Kerker, Robert P. 1984. "Budgeting in the 1 980's." In The Book of States, 1984-1985, pp. 242-243. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments.

Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Smith.

Mertins, Herman, Jr. 1992. Vice President for Finance, West Virginia University. Interviewed by Christopher Z. Mooney. July 1.

Mertins, Herman, Jr., and David G. Williams. 1971. West Virginia Budgeting: Problems and Possibilities. Morgantown, WV: Bureau for Government Research.

Mowery, M.F., Alison Patient, and Debra Graham. "Brief of Respondents in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Common Cause v. Tomb/in." Charleston, WV.

Patient, Alison. 1992. Counsel, West Virginia House of Delegates Finance Committee. Interviewed by Christopher Z. Mooney. July 2.

Pitsvada, Bernard T. 1988. "The Executive Budget- An Idea Whose Time Has Passed." Public Budgeting and Finance. 8: 85-107.

Raimondo, Henry J. 1993. "State Budgeting in the Nineties." In The State of the States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Reeves, Mavis Mann. 1985. The Question of State Government Capability. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Gubernatorial Enabling Resources in West Virginia:
A Comparative Analysis
Robert Jay Dilger

The previous issue of The West Virginia Public Affairs Reporter featured an article entitled, "The Governor's Office: A Comparative Analysis." It revealed that West Virginia's governor's office has relatively strong institutional powers (Dilger 1993). Of the six indices employed to measure governors' institutional powers, West Virginia's governor's office scored strong on tenure potential, moderate on the power to make executive appointments, very strong on control over the executive budget, strong on the ability to make budget alterations to balance the budget after appropriations bills have been adopted, very strong on veto powers, and very strong on party control. Nationally, West Virginia's governor's office tied with those in Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Utah as the second most powerful governor's office in the nation behind Tennessee.

The extent of each governor's institutional powers is very important in determining whether he or she will be an effective governor. However, the extent of personal and enabling resources also play an important role in determining their effectiveness in office. Personal resources are the governor's intellectual, political, and verbal skills, including charm, charisma, and sense of humor. They affect the governor's ability to persuade others to take actions that the governor believes must be taken. Enabling resources include staff assistance, access to information, and time. They affect the governor's ability to process information in a way that enables him or her to reach decisions independently from other organizations that compete for power, such as interest groups and the state legislature (Weinberg 1977; Bowman and Kearney 1986).

This article examines the extent of gubernatorial enabling resources available to governors throughout the United States. Unfortunately, there has been very little previous research on this subject. Thad Beyle (1988), Mavis Mann Reeves (ACIR 1985), and Ann Bowman and Richard Kearney (1986) have argued that some gubernatorial enabling resources, such as the size of gubernatorial staff and access to active state planning offices, have improved in recent years. However, no one has developed a comprehensive index to measure and compare gubernatorial enabling resources across the states. This article fills that void by using information published in the Council of State Governments' Book of the States series to construct an "Index of Gubernatorial Enabling Resources." The scores for each of the states on the index are compared to determine if West