The governor is the central figure in West Virginia's political system. The governor is expected to establish the state's legislative agenda through the preparation of the executive budget request and actively participate in the legislature's deliberations both on budgetary matters and state policy initiatives. Moreover, state executive departments expect the governor to establish administrative goals and implementation strategies and West Virginia citizens expect the governor to provide political leadership and guidance.

Surveys have repeatedly demonstrated that governors are, with the exception of the United States President, the most visible political figure in their state. Nationally, 90 percent of state residents can correctly identify the name of their governor. This is far more than the 60 percent who can correctly identify at least one of their two U.S. Senators, less than half who can correctly identify their U.S. Representative, and even fewer who can correctly identify their state's attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, state senator, or state representative. West Virginians' knowledge of their state government elected officials' names is about the same as the national average. In a recent survey conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs at West Virginia University, 91.5 percent of West Virginia residents correctly named the Governor of West Virginia. Only 13.7 percent of West Virginia residents correctly named the Speaker of the West Virginia House of Delegates and only 7.4 percent correctly named the President of the state Senate.

The governor's visibility places him or her in a unique and somewhat precarious political situation. The governor is often praised or blamed for what occurs within the state's borders, regardless of his or her role in determining the outcome of those events. Often, these events are influenced by forces far beyond the governor's control. For example, national economic trends and natural disasters can have a significant impact on the state government's fiscal capacity to provide public services. Moreover, all governors operate within a federal system of government which is increasingly being dominated by federal policyrnakers. State budget priorities are often determined, at least in part, by the availability of federal grants-in-aid funds and by federal mandates. In addition, regulatory conditions attached to federal grants-in-aid funds often shape implementation strategies and state administrative procedures.

The governor's authority is also limited because he or she both shares and competes for political power with the state legislature and state judiciary. In addition, with only three exceptions (Alaska, Hawaii, and New Jersey), governors must contend with independently elected heads of the state's major executive departments. In many instances, these independently elected executive officials do not share the governor's views on public policy, are not necessarily even members of the governor's political party, and have gubernatorial ambitions of their own. For example, in West Virginia, two members of Governor Gaston Caperton's executive cabinet challenged him in the gubernatorial elections in 1992. The state's Attorney General, Mario Palumbo, challenged and was defeated by Governor Caperton in the 1992 Democratic primary. The state's Commissioner of Agriculture, Cleve Benedict, a Republican, then challenged and was defeated by Caperton in the 1992 general election.

Given West Virginians' relatively high expectations of their governor, it is appropriate to ask if West Virginia's governor has the institutional powers necessary to alter the course of state government and whether West Virginia's governor's off ice is a reliable and responsive mechanism for West Virginia's citizens to have their views on public policy translated into governmental action. To answer these questions, this article examines both the formal and informal powers that West Virginia's governors have at their disposal to influence the outcome of state policy. These powers are then compared to those held by governors in other states to determine if West Virginia's governor's powers are relatively strong or relatively weak.

National Trends

Although there have been and continue to be notable exceptions to the following general rule, it is now accepted by most scholars of state and local government that governors are, on the whole, more capable, creative, hard working, forward-looking, and experienced than their predecessors (Sabato 1983; Bowman and Kearney 1986; Beyle 1990). This turnabout is partly a reflection of the increased responsibilities that states have assumed since the federal government launched its 'War on poverty" during the 1960s. Prior to that time state governments provided relatively few services and public expectation of state governmental activism was low. However, during the 1960s and 1970s Americans everywhere, as well as in West Virginia, began to change their expectations concerning government's appropriate role in providing services. Instead of viewing government as the actor of last resort, the public increasingly looked to government, particularly at the federal and state levels, to provide solutions to a number of problems, including poverty, hunger, lack of adequate health care, water pollution, inadequate transportation systems and access to a quality education.

The federal government encouraged the states to be responsive to these political demands for state government action by offering the states intergovernmental grants with relatively low matching requirements. For example, the federal government offered to pay between 50 and 78 percent (depending on the state's per capita income) of the cost of providing income assistance and health care for the poor, 90 percent of the cost of constructing interstate highways and 75 percent of the cost to construct primary, secondary and urban highways (Dilger 1989).

As a result of the public's increased political pressure for more services and the desire of state government officials to attract federal government dollars to their states, the level of state government spending increased dramatically throughout the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1962, total state government expenditures amounted to $36 billion. Ten years later that amount had increased to $109 billion and in 1980 it reached $257 billion. In percentage terms, the typical state government increased its expenditures by 613 percent (34 percent annually) during this period (ACIR 1990). West Virginia's state government was not an exception to this trend. In 1962, West Virginia's state government spent $330 million (Davis et al. 1963). In 1980, West Virginia's state government spent $2.2 billion, an increase of 577 percent (32 percent annually) over the 18-year period (Gainer 1980).

Individuals interested in altering the social and economic conditions existing in American society recognized that state governments were quickly becoming a viable mechanism to achieve those goals. This elevated the stature of state governmental service as a career. Moreover, at the same time state governments become more important and state government service became more attractive to those seeking power, reformers were transforming the governor's office in many states from that of a symbolic figurehead to a powerful chief executive whose powers rivaled and, in some instances, surpassed the powers of its state legislature. Gubernatorial terms were lengthened, veto powers were expanded, the short ballot (electing the governor and lieutenant governor as a team rather than on separate ballots and restricting the number of executive officials that are elected) was imposed, appointment and removal powers were strengthened, control over the budget was centralized and executive branch reorganization powers expanded (Sabato 1983; Bowman and Kearney 1986; Reeves 1990; Beyle 1990).

West Virginia was not an exception to this trend. It also strengthened its governor's institutional powers during the 1960-1980 period. In 1968, the state's electorate approved a state constitutional amendment that strengthened the governor's budgetary powers. The Modern Budget Amendment shifted the power to prepare the state budget from the Board of Public Works, which consisted of the governor, secretary of state, au

ditor, attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture and superintendent of schools, to the governor. It also empowered the governor to estimate the state government's revenue for the ensuing fiscal year and prohibited the state legislature from increasing that estimate without the governor's approval. In 1970, the state's electorate approved another state constitutional amendment that strengthened the governor's office. The Governor's Succession Amendment increased the governor's political power by permitting the governor to serve two consecutive four-year terms (Morgan 1980). This reduced the likelihood of West Virginia's governor being perceived by the state legislature and other political organizations as a "lame duck" during the third and fourth years of his or her first term in off ice. This, in turn, strengthened the governor's bargaining power both with the state legislature and other organizations interested in influencing the direction of state government policies.

As gubernatorial powers grew throughout the nation, many men and women who would have otherwise not considered it worthwhile to expose themselves to the physical and emotional trials and tribulations that accompany a modern campaign for the governor's office decided that it was a prize worth pursuing. As the stature of the governor's office and the stature of the people occupying the governor's office grew, public expectations of the governor's office also grew. In most states, including West Virginia, the public increasingly viewed the governor as the central political figure in their state. Today, governors are expected, among other things, to be the state's chief policyrnaker, architect of the state budget, a savvy political party leader, recruiter of the best available advisors and administrators, and an inspiring renewer of confidence in state programs. They are also expected to champion the state's interests against encroachments by the federal government and to be the state's chief booster to attract tourism and economic investment (Burns, Peltason and Cronin 1990).

The Governor's Informal Powers of Persuasion

Unlike the U.S. President, all governors, except the governors of Alaska, Hawaii and New Jersey, share the executive power with other independently elected officials. In many instances, the state's constitution mandates that these other executive officers, including the important executive offices of the secretary of state, attorney general and state treasurer, are to be elected directly by the people. In addition, some state constitutions, including those in Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire and Tennessee, require that some of these major executive offices are to be filled by the state legislature or the state supreme court.

Al the present time, of the 42 states that elect a lieutenant governor, only 23 elect them as part of a team with the governor (Burns, Peltason and Cronin 1990). As a result, governors in 19 states do not play a direct role in determining who fills the office of lieutenant governor. In addition, governors typically do not participate in the selection of the state's four other major executive officers: the secretary of state, attorney general, state treasurer and state auditor/comptroller (CSG 1990).

Although West Virginia does not have a lieutenant governor (the president of the state Senate is next in line of succession to the governor, followed by the speaker of the House of Delegates), its state constitution does mandate that the secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, auditor, and commissioner of agriculture are to be independently elected by the people. A state constitutional amendment that would have eliminated the elected status of the secretary of state, commissioner of agriculture and state treasurer was soundly rejected by the state's voters in 1989; 28,634 voted for the amendment and 220,700 voted against it (Kelly 1989; Holmes 1989). Respondents to a statewide survey indicated that they opposed the measure because it would give the then-incumbent governor (Gaston Caperton) too much power (Bair 1989). As a result, although West Virginia's state constitution, like most others, declares that the chief executive power shall be vested in the governor and requires the governor to take care that the state laws be faithfully executed, West Virginia's governor, like most others, does not possess the formal powers necessary to get the job done. Instead, West Virginia's governor, like most others, must rely on his or her reputation, popularity, knowledge of what should be done, and ability to communicate effectively, especially with the state's electorate, to persuade others in the state government to do what the governor believes must be done (Burns, Peltason and Cronin 1990).

Recent studies have suggested that the governors who have served during the latter half of this century have, as a group, exhibited stronger interpersonal skills and have been more adept at persuading others in state government to do what they believe must be done than their predecessors. For example, a careful review of the 357 governors who served between 1950 and 1981 convinced political scientist Larry Sabato that governors are now more thoroughly trained, better regarded and more capable than ever before (Sabato 1983). Moreover, the capacity of governors to lead is reflected in their career paths once their tenure in office has expired. As a group, they are now more likely than their predecessors to move on to other important political jobs, particularly the U.S. Senate. Nationally, former governors are now also more likely than ever before to be appointed to federal government cabinet positions and major ambassadorships, as well as federal and state government judgeships (Bowman and Kearney 1986).

Unfortunately, it can be argued that this national trend toward more thoroughly trained, better regarded and capable governors has not held in West Virginia. On the positive side, all eight of West Virginia's governors who have served in office since 1950 were arguably well-trained for the job. All of them had earned a college or university undergraduate degree, three also had a law degree (William Marland, William Barron and Arch Moore, Jr.), and two had either earned a graduate degree (Cecil Underwood) or had additional graduate education (John Rockefeller IV) prior to becoming governor. In addition, each had distinguished himself either as a successful businessman (Okey Patteson, Hulett Smith and Gaston Caperton), as an attorney (William Marland, William Barron and Arch Moore, Jr.), or as an educator (Cecil Underwood and John Rockefeller IV) prior to being elected governor. Moreover, four of them had served in the West Virginia House of Delegates (Underwood, Barron, Moore and Rockefeller) and Moore had served six terms in the U.S. House of Representatives prior to his election to the governor's office (Morgan 1980).

Although all eight of West Virginia's recent governors were well trained and had careers that prepared them to undertake the responsibilities of being governor, two of them (Barron and Moore) were indicted, convicted and sentenced to prison for criminal acts committed while in office. Moreover, the rest of West Virginia's recent governors, as a group, have not fared particularly well, in comparison with former governors in other states, after having served in office. Only Rockefeller was subsequently elected to another public office (the U.S. Senate), none were appointed to a national office or commission, only two (Smith and Underwood) were subsequently appointed to a state commission and one former governor (Marland), suffering from alcoholism, attracted nationwide attention after he was discovered by reporters driving a taxicab in Chicago (Morgan 1980).

The scandals that have rocked the governor's office in West Virginia, coupled with the indictments and convictions of several administrators and legislators during the 1980s, have shaken the confidence of West Virginians in their political leadership. In 1990, a statewide survey revealed that West Virginians believe that corrupt politicians and poor school systems were West Virginia's most critical problems. When asked if they believed that politicians in West Virginia are more honest, less honest or about equally honest as politicians in other states, only 4.5 percent indicated that West Virginia's politicians were more honest than others, 26.5 percent indicated that they were less honest, and 69 percent indicated that they were equally as honest (or dishonest) as others (Willard & Auge, Inc. 1990).

The Governor's Institutional Powers

Recognizing that governors' management resources are weakened by the plural nature of state executive branches, reformers interested in increasing the capacity of state governments to govern effectively have focused their attention on governors' institutional resources, particularly their statutory and constitutional powers to act. In 1987, the National Governors' Association applied a scale designed by Thad Beyle, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina, to measure the extent of governors' institutional powers (Beyle 1983; NGA 1987). The scale consisted of six indices, measuring each governor's tenure potential, appointment powers, budget-making powers, the legislature's budgetchanging authority, veto powers, and political strength in the state legislature. The first three indices were designed to measure the governor's authority within the executive branch and the last three indices were designed to measure the governor's authority with the state legislature (Beyle 1988b).

The NGA indices revealed that between 1965 and 1985 governors' institutional powers had increased overall, from a cumulative average index score of 20.7 to 21.1. However, the growth in governors' authority was uneven, with increases experienced in those indices measuring their authority within the executive branch (tenure potential, appointive powers and budgetmaking authority) and slight decreases in those indices measuring their powers with the state legislature (the legislature's budget-changing authority, veto powers and political strength in the legislature).

As a result of the adoption of the Modern Budget Amendment and the Governors' Succession Amendment, West Virginia's governor's office's NGA institutional powers score experienced the largest increase in the nation between 1965 and 1985. Its institutional powers score jumped from 18 in 1965 (tied with five other states for 36th place) to 26 in 1985 (tied with New York for third place) (Beyle 1988b). This suggests that West Virginia's governor's office moved from having slightly less than average institutional powers during the 1960s to well above average institutional powers during the 1980s.

The following tables employ a revised version of the NGA institutional powers scale to measure the institutional powers of each state's governor's office in 1993. The institutional powers scale employed here differs from NGA's scale in two respects. First, the legislative budget-changing authority index has been replaced by an index that measures the governor's authority to balance the state budget after the state legislature has adopted its appropriations bills. Since only four states allow the governor to interfere with the state legislature's authority to alter the budget, NGA's index did little to discriminate among the governors' varying authority to impact state government spending. The new index (as will be seen) does not suffer from this deficiency. Second, the NGA index of the governors' veto power has been revised to take into account whether or not a governor has the authority to employ a reduction veto.

The Governor's Tenure Potential

Ten of the nation's 13 original governors' terms in office were limited to a single year, one governor had a two-year term and two governors had three-year terms. Since then, states have gradually moved toward longer terms in office. The NGA study revealed that states increased the typical governor's tenure potential between 1965 and 1985. In 1965, the average tenure potential index score was 3.6. In 1985, that score had increased to 4.0 (Beyle 1988b).

The trend toward providing governors longer terms in office has continued. Using NGA criteria, the typical governor's tenure potential score reached 4.16 in 1993. Most states lengthened their governors' terms to provide them more time to implement their programs and to increase their bargaining position with other political interests by avoiding "lame-duck" status during the third and fourth years of their first term in office (Beyle 1990).

Today, only three states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont) restrict their governor's term to two years. As Table 1 indicates, the remaining states have moved to -four-year terms. However, since 1960, many states have followed the federal government's lead concerning term limitations. In 1951, the federal government adopted a constitutional amendment that limited presidential terms to two. Twenty-eight states currently limit their governors to two four-year terms, up from only six states in 1960 (Beyle 1990).

When West Virginia became a state in 1863, its state constitution, like most others at the time, limited its governor to a two-year term with no restrictions on reelection. In 1872, West Virginia increased the governor's term to four years but, unlike most other states at the time, prohibited governors from succeeding themselves (Morgan 1980). As a result, governors were given more time to implement their campaign promises but were now subject to the lame duck phenomena during the latter portion of their four-year term.

In 1970, the Governors' Succession Amendment was ratified by West Virginia's voters. It allows governors to serve an unlimited number of four-year terms but prohibits anyone from serving in the term immediately following two consecutive terms, regardless of whether the terms were filled in whole or in part. Arch Moore was the first governor affected by this restriction as he was elected to two consecutive four-year terms (1969-1973, 1973-1977) and was not allowed to run in the next election, which was won by Jay Rockefeller (19771981). In 1980, Moore challenged Rockefeller's bid for reelection to the governorship but lost. Rockefeller then became the second governor to be affected by the two consecutive four-year terms restriction. With Rockefeller ineligible for election, Moore ran for governor for the fourth time in 1984 and won for the third time, becoming the second West Virginia governor to serve more than two terms in office (West Virginia's first governor, Arthur Boreman, was elected to three two-year terms, 18631869) (Morgan 1980).

Governors with a four-year term in office and do not place restraints on their reelection are provided the highest tenure potential index score of 5. States that provide their governors with a four-year term in office but limit them to two terms are provided a score of 4 (with three variations, including West Virginia). States that provide their governors with a four-year term in office but prohibit consecutive reelection are given a score of 3. States that provide their governors with two-year terms in office but place no restrictions on their reelection receive a score of 2. States that provide two-year terms in office but limit their governors to two terms are given the lowest tenure potential score of 1.

West Virginia scored a 4 on the governors' tenure potential index, the same score it received in 1985. This indicates that West Virginia's governor has about average tenure potential when compared with other governors. Since the typical governor's tenure potential is strong, West Virginia's governor's tenure potential falls in the strong category.

The Governor's Appointment Powers

The governor's ability to impact the state bureaucracy's behavior is strongly related to his or her appointment powers. These powers also impact the governor's ability to bargain with the state legislature because promises of appointments to high-level executive positions and to the state judiciary are often used to coax support from legislators for particular pieces of state legislation (Beyle 1990).

The NGA study indicated that the typical governor's appointment powers increased between 1965 and 1985. In 1965, governors received an average appointment powers score of 3.6. In 1985, governors received an average appointment powers score of 4.0. Table 2 indicates the governor's appointment powers in each state for 1993. The state score is based on the same criteria used in the NGA study. Specifically, it is based on the governor's power to appoint the head of the following six agencies: state corrections, education, health, highways (or transportation), public utilities regulation, and public welfare. Scores for each agency were tabulated and the average score for the six offices was used to determine each governor's appointment powers score.

The 1993 average appointment powers score was 4.34, indicating that the trend toward expanding the governors' appointment powers has continued. West Virginia's governor's off ice received an average score of 4.33, placing it at the national average and in the moderate category.

The Governor's Budget-Making Powers

Most governors now possess relatively strong budget-making powers. This has not always been the case. Prior to this century, the typical governor did not have the sole, central authority to determine agency or departmental budget requests to the state legislature. That function was usually shared with other elected officials. As mentioned previously, this was the case in West Virginia until the Modern Budget Amendment was adopted in 1968. Today, all but six states provide the governor with the sole authority to bring together into a single document all of the agency and departmental requests for legislatively appropriated funds. This enables the governor to ensure that their own policy priorities are adequately represented in the executive budget request to the legislature (Beyle 1990).

The governors' budgetmaking powers in 1993. It employs the same criteria used in the NGA study to measure those powers. Specifically, governors who have full responsibility for submitting a detailed executive budget received the highest possible score of 5 while, at the other extreme, the legislature that creates its own budget document received the lowest possible score of 1.

Because West Virginia's governor has the sole responsibility for putting together the executive budget, West Virginia received a 5 (or very strong) score on the governor's budget-making powers index in 1993, the same score it received in 1985. Overall, the typical governor's score on the budget-making powers index has not changed much since 1985. At that time, the average score was 4.8, up from 4.5 in 1965 (Beyle 1990). In 1993, the average score was 4.76.

Governor's Authority to Balance the State Budget

Most governors enjoy a great deal of authority over the preparation of the executive budget. All but four states (Maryland, Nebraska, New York and West Virginia), however, allow the state legislature to alter their governor's budget request without any restrictions, other than the necessity to balance the state's operating budget, once it has been submitted to them for their consideration (Beyle 1990). In West Virginia, the legislature can alter the executive budget request in any manner it chooses, but it is not allowed to increase the governor's revenue estimate without the governor's approval (Holmes 1991). Because West Virginia's state legislature is required to balance the state's operating budget, this limitation provides West Virginia's governor with an unusually strong impact in determining the total amount of state government expenditures in any given year.

The NGA study used the ability of state legislatures to alter the executive budget as a means to measure the governor's authority to influence state government spending. However, because 46 states allow the legislature to alter the executive budget request without restriction, this measure does not provide a very good way to determine the comparative differences in the governor's ability to influence state government expenditures. For this reason, the NGA index to measure the governor's power to influence state expenditures was not used. Instead, the governor's authority to balance the state's operating budget by reducing state government expenditures after the state legislature has acted was used. The results, as indicated on Table 4, provide a much more effective way to compare the governor's powers to affect state government spending. Instead of all but four of the state governor's offices receiving the same score (1 or very weak), the scores vary significantly, with nine states scoring as very weak (where the governor lacks the authority to make any reductions without the approval of the state legislature or one of its committees) and 18 states scoring as very strong (where there are no limitations on the governor's authority to reduce the budget). West Virginia, which scored a 5 (very strong) on the NGA index of gubernatorial influence over state government expenditures, scored a 4 (strong) on this index.

Governor's Veto Powers

It has been suggested that when governors employ their veto powers it is a sign of weakness because strong governors are able to persuade the state legislature to do what the governor believes must be done (Beyle 1990). However, it is also understood that a governor's power to persuade the state legislature is enhanced if his or her veto powers are strong. For example, in some states, it is so difficult to override a gubernatorial veto that when the governor and the state legislature do not agree on a bill the governor can use the mere threat of a veto to force the state legislature to reconsider its position and negotiate with the governor to reach a compromise that is acceptable to the governor (Bowman and Kearney 1986).

There are four types of gubernatorial vetoes: the package veto (rejects the bill in its entirety), the line item veto (rejects an individual item in an appropriations bill), the reduction veto (reduces a specific appropriation without eliminating the individual item in the appropriations bill) and the amendatory veto (conditions the approval of the bill with recommended changes or rewording to make the bill acceptable) (Bowman and Kearney 1986; Beyle 1990). The vote necessary to override these vetoes varies from state to state, with the typical override requiring at least three-fifths of both houses of the state legislature.

In 1993, 49 governors had the power to employ a package veto (North Carolina's governor does not have any veto powers), 43 governors could employ a line item veto, 11 governors could use the reduction veto and seven governors could make amendatory vetoes. According to the NGA study, the governors'veto powers had decreased between 1965 and 1985, receiving a score of 4.26 on its veto power index in 1965 and only a 3.6 in 1985 (Beyle 1988b). However, a later application of the NGA veto power index revealed that the average governor's veto power score had increased to 4.4 in 1990, a level slightly higher than during the 1960s (Beyle 1990).

NGA's veto power index is based on the governor's authority to employ the package and line item vetoes and the difficulty of overriding those vetoes. It does not take into account the governor's authority to employ a reduction veto. Because the reduction veto can have a significant impact on state government spending, NGA's veto power index was revised to account for the governor's authority to employ reduction vetoes. To receive a raw score of 5 (very strong), a governor must have the authority to employ the package veto, the line item veto and the reduction veto. In 1993, the typical score on the revised veto power index was 3.86.

West Virginia's governor's office received a 5 (very strong) on the veto power index because West Virginia's governor has the authority to employ the package veto, the line item veto and the reduction veto. However, it should be noted that Tennessee and West Virginia are the only states listed in the very strong category that allow the state legislature to override a governor's veto by majority vote. In West Virginia, the state legislature can override the governor's veto by a simple majority vote of both houses unless the bill involves the budget or a supplementary appropriations bill. In those instances, a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the state legislature is required to override the veto.

Gubernatorial Party Control

Partisanship is an important variable in the relationship between the governor's office and the state legislature. If the governor's political party controls the state legislature, partisan conflicts can be minimized and the governor's ability to achieve his or her goals is enhanced. However, if the governor's party does not control the state legislature, partisan conflicts are more likely to arise and the governor's ability to achieve his or her goals is reduced. The extent of partisan conflict is affected by the size of the minority party in the state legislature, whether the governor's party controls both houses of the state legislature, the style and personalities of the governor and state legislative leaders, and whether an election year is near (Sherman 1984).

The extent of the governor's party control in each of the states in 1993. The highest score of 5 is given to states where the governor's political party holds at least 75 percent of the seats in both houses of the state legislature. The lowest score of 1 is given to states where the governor's political party is in the minority in both houses of the state legislature. As Table 6 indicates, West Virginia received a score of 5 (very strong) because the current governor's political party (Democrat) has a substantial majority (greater than 75 percent) in both the House of Delegates (79-21) and in the state Senate (32-2).

Conclusions

Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a successful governor. One factor that most scholars agree must be considered when determining whether a governor has been successful in office is the governor's ability to alter state policy outcomes. Of course, given the complexity of the policyrnaking process, it is difficult to accurately measure the precise nature of any governor's impact on specific policy outcomes. However, it is generally accepted that the governor's ability to alter state policy outcomes is strongly related to the governor's institutional powers. Although having strong institutional powers does not guarantee that the governor will be able to alter the course of state government, lacking institutional powers makes that task nearly impossible.

West Virginia's governor's institutional powers are relatively strong when compared to those in other states. The institutional framework exists for the governor to exercise a strong influence on state government. Of the six indices employed to measure governors' institutional powers, West Virginia's governor's office scored strong

on tenure potential, moderate on the power to make executive appointments, very strong on control over the executive budget, strong on the ability to make budget alterations to balance the budget after appropriations bills have been adopted, very strong on veto powers, and very strong on party control. If West Virginia's governors are unable to alter the course of state government, they cannot blame their failure on their office's lack of powers.

Another factor that many would argue should be considered when determining if a governor has been successful is the electorate's opinion of the governor after he or she has left office. Most successful governors are well regarded and admired by the state's electorate after they leave office. It can be argued that the electorate may not fully appreciate what a governor has accomplished in office, particularly if that governor played a role in raising taxes. However, part of the blame for the electorate's lack of appreciation for a governor in that circumstance must fall on the governor. The governor's ability to communicate effectively with others, particularly with the electorate and legislative leaders, is as critical a factor in determining how successful the governor will be in altering the course of state government as are his or her institutional powers. In this regard, West Virginia's recent governors have had a mixed record of success. Despite their relatively strong institutional powers, West Virginia's recent governors have not always proven to be well regarded and admired by either the electorate or state legislative leaders. The convictions of Governors Barron and Moore have had a particularly significant and denigrating impact on the public's perception of both politicians in general and of elected state government officials in particular. Although West Virginia's governor's relatively strong institutional powers create an environment conducive to success, past experience indicates that it is the personal resources that the man or woman who holds that office brings with them that ultimately determines if the occupant of the governor's office goes down in history as a success or as a failure.

References

Bair, Jeffrey. 1989. "Amendments face battle." Charleston Daily Mail, August 28, p. 1 A.

Beyle, Thad L. 1983. "Governors." In Politics in the American States. Fourth Edition. Eds.Virginia
    Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines. Pp. 180-221. Boston, MA: Little Brown and
    Company. 1988a. "The Governor as Innovator in the Federal System." Publius 18 (Summer):
    131- 152. 1988b. "The Institutionalized Powers of the Governorship: 1965-1985." Comparative
    State Politics Newsletter 9:1 (February): 23-29. 1990. "Governors." In Politics in the American
    States. Fifth Edition. Eds. Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Robert B. Albritton. Pp. 201-251.
    Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little Brown.

Bowman, Ann O'M. and Richard Kearney. 1986. The Resurgence of the States. Englewood Cliff s,
    NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Burns, James MacGregor, J. W. Peltason, and Thomas E. Cronin. 1990. State and Local Politics.
    Sixth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Conlan, Timothy. 1981. "Government Unlocked: Political Constraints On Federal Growth Since the
    1930s." In The Condition of Contemporary Federalism: Conflicting Theories and Collapsing
    Constraints. Ed. David B. Walker. Washington, DC: U.S. Advisory Commission on
    Intergovernmental Relations.

Davis, Claude J., Eugene R. Elkins, Carl M. Frasure, Mavis Mann Reeves, William R. Ross and
    Albert L. Strum. 1963. West Virginia State and Local Government. Morgantown, WV: Bureau
    for Government Research, West Virginia University.

Dilger, Robert Jay. 1989. National Intergovernmental Programs. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
    Prentice-Hall.

Gainer, Glen B. Jr. 1980. Analysis of Receipts and Expenditures. Charleston, WV: State Auditor's
    Off ice.

Holmes, Darrell E. 1989. Editor. West Virginia Blue Book, 1989. Charleston, WV: Jarrett Printing
    Company. 1991. Editor. West Virginia Blue Book, 1991. Beckley, WV: BJW Printing and Office
    Supplies.

Kelley, Mark W. 1989. "Amendment offers citizens path to better government." Charleston
    Gazette. August 30, p. 5A.

Morgan, John G. 1980. West Virginia Governors. Second Edition. Charleston, WV: Charleston
    Newspapers.

National Governors' Association (NGA). 1987. "The Institutionalized Powers of the Governorship."
    States Services Management Notes (June): 14-17.

Reeves, Mavis Mann. 1990. "The States As Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful." The
    Annals (May): 83-93.

Sabato, Larry. 1983. Goodbye to Goodtime Charlie: The American Governorship Transformed.
    Second Edition. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.

Saff ell, David C. 1987. State and Local Government: Politics and Public Policies. New York:
    Random House.

Sherman, S. 1984. "Power Split: When Legislatures and Governors Are of Opposing Parties."
    State Legislatures 10 (May/June): 9-12.

Temple, David G. 1978. "The West Virginia Governorship in Changing Perspective." The West
    Virginia Public Affairs Reporter3:1 (Winter): 1-4.  The Council of State Governments (CSG).
    1990. The Book of the States, 1990-91 Edition. Lexington, KY: CSG. 1992. The Book of the
    States, 1992-93 Edition, Lexington, KY: CSG.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (AC IR). 1990. Significant Features of
    Fiscal Federalism, 1990. Vols. 1 and 2. Washington, DC: ACIR.

Weeks, George. 1982. "A Statehouse Hall of Fame." State Govemment55:2 (Spring): 67-69,
    71-73.

Weinberg, Martha W. 1977. Managing the State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Willard & Auge Inc. 1990. "Statewide Survey." The Charleston Gazette, February 13, p. 1 B.