The governor is the central figure in West Virginia's political system. The governor is expected to establish the state's legislative agenda through the preparation of the executive budget request and actively participate in the legislature's deliberations both on budgetary matters and state policy initiatives. Moreover, state executive departments expect the governor to establish administrative goals and implementation strategies and West Virginia's citizens expect the governor to provide political leadership and guidance.

    Surveys have repeatedly demonstrated that governors across the United States are expected to provide political leadership and are, with the exception of the United States President, the most visible political figure in each state. Nationally, 90 percent of state residents can correctly identify the name of their governor. This is far more than the 60 percent who can correctly identify at least one of their two U.S. Senators, less than half who can correctly identify their U.S. Representative, and even fewer who can correctly identify their state's attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, state senator, or state representative. West Virginian's knowledge of their state government's elected officials names is about the same as the national average. In a recent survey, 91.5 percent of West Virginia's residents correctly named the Governor of West Virginia. Only 13.7 percent of West Virginia's residents could correctly name the Speaker of the West Virginia House of Delegates and only 7.4 percent could correctly name the President of the State Senate. The data from these surveys suggest that for most Americans, including West Virginians, their working knowledge of state government is almost exclusively limited to the identity of their governor and his or her actions.
The governors' visibility places them in a unique and somewhat precarious political situation. They are often praised or blamed for what occurs within their state's borders, regardless of their role in determining the outcome of those events. Often, these events are influenced by forces far beyond the governor's control. For example, national economic trends and natural disasters can have a significant impact on the state government's fiscal capacity to provide public services. Moreover, governors operate within a federal system of government which is increasingly being dominated by federal policymakers. State budget priorities are often determined, at least in part, by the availability of federal grants-in-aid funds or by federal mandates. In addition, regulatory conditions attached to federal grants-in-aid funds often shape implementation strategies and state administrative procedures.
The governor's authority is also limited because he or she both shares and competes for political power with the state legislature and state judiciary. In addition, with only three exceptions, governors must contend with independently elected heads of the state's major executive departments. In many instances, these independently elected executive officials do not share the governor's views on public policy, are not necessarily even members of the governor's political party, and have gubernatorial ambitions of their own. For example, in West Virginia, two members of Governor Gaston Caperton's executive cabinet challenged him in the gubernatorial elections in 1992. The state's Attorney General, Mario Palumbo, challenged and was defeated by Governor Caperton in the 1992 Democratic primary. The state's Commissioner of Agriculture, Cleve Benedict, a Republican, then challenged and was defeated by Caperton in the 1992 general election.

    Given West Virginian's relatively high expectations of their governor, it is appropriate to ask if West Virginia's governor has the institutional powers necessary to alter the course of state government and whether West Virginia's governor's office has become a reliable and responsive mechanism for West Virginia's citizens to have their views on public policy translated into governmental action. To answer these questions, this chapter examines both the formal and informal powers that West Virginia's governors have at their disposal to influence the outcome of state policy. These powers are then compared to those held by governors in other states to determine if West Virginia's governor's powers are relatively strong or weak.

The Historical Context

    Prior to the 1960s it was commonplace for journalists, political scientists, historians, and others familiar with the workings of state government to ridicule the performance of state government officials and, especially, the performance of governors. Among the terms used to describe many of the governors who served during the first half of this century were: "flowery old courthouse politicians," "political machine dupes," "political Pipsqueaks," and "good-time Charlies." Of course, not all governors who served during the first half of the 1900s were described in such acerbic terms. For example, six of the 10 governors named to the mythical Twentieth Century Statehouse Hall of Fame in 1982 served during the first half of the 1900s. For the most part, however, it is generally accepted by those who study the operations of state government that most of the approximately 1,000 governors who served during the first half of the 1900s were second rate politicians. They did not generate much notice outside of their state and, once their tenure in office was completed, they were not long remembered within their own state. The only governors to escape this general rule of obscurity and mediocrity were those who gained notoriety for being indicted for criminal acts conducted while in office and the relatively few exemplary governors who were subsequently elected to the United States Senate, nominated for or elected to the United States presidency, or named to the mythical Statehouse Hall of Fame.

    Although there have been and continue to be notable exceptions to the following general rule, it is now accepted by most scholars of state and local government that contemporary governors are, on the whole, more capable, creative, hard working, forward-looking, and experienced than their predecessors. This turnabout is partly a reflection of the increased responsibilities that states have assumed since the federal government launched its "war on poverty" during the 1960s. Prior to that time, state governments provided relatively few services and public expectations of state governmental activism was relatively low. However, during the 1960s and 1970s Americans everywhere, as well as in West Virginia, began to change their expectations concerning government's appropriate role in providing services. Instead of viewing government as the actor of last resort, the public increasingly looked to government, particularly at the federal and state levels, to provide solutions to a number of problems, including poverty, hunger, lack of adequate health care, water pollution, air pollution, inadequate transportation systems and access to a quality education. The federal government encouraged states to be responsive to these political demands for government action by offering states intergovernmental grants with relatively low matching requirements. For example, the federal government offered to pay between 50 and 78 percent (depending on the state's per capita income) of the cost of providing income assistance and health care for the poor, 90 percent of the cost of constructing interstate highways and 75 percent of the cost of constructing primary, secondary and urban highways.

    The public's increased political pressure for more services and the desire of state government officials to attract federal government dollars to their states caused state government spending throughout the United States to increase dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1962, total state government expenditures amounted to $36 billion. Ten years later that amount had increased to $109 billion, and in 1980 it reached $257 billion. In percentage terms, the typical state government increased its expenditures by 613 percent (34 percent annually) during this period. West Virginia's state government was not an exception to this trend. In 1962, West Virginia's state government spent $330 million. In 1980, that figure had increased to $2.2 billion, an increase of 577 percent (32 percent annually) over the 18 year period.

    Individuals interested in altering the social and economic conditions existing in American society recognized that state governments had become viable mechanisms to achieve those goals. This elevated the stature of state government service as a career goal. Moreover, at the same time state governments become more important and state government service became more attractive to those seeking power, reformers were transforming the governor's office in many states from that of a symbolic figurehead to a powerful chief executive whose powers rivaled and, in some instances, surpassed the powers of the state legislature. Gubernatorial terms were lengthened, veto powers were expanded, the short ballot (electing the governor and lieutenant governor as a team rather than on separate ballots and restricting the number of executive officials that are elected) was imposed, appointment and removal powers were strengthened, control over the budget was centralized and reorganization powers expanded. Moreover, between 1965 and 1975, 20 states restructured their executive branches and another 24 states reorganized at least one executive agency or department in an attempt to strengthen the governor's capacity to act in a decisive manner.

    West Virginia was not an exception to this trend. In 1968, West Virginians approved a state constitutional amendment that strengthened the governor's budgetary powers. The Modern Budget Amendment shifted the power to prepare the state budget from the Board of Public Works, which consisted of the governor, secretary of state, auditor, attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture and superintendent of schools, to the governor. It also empowered the governor to determine the state government's projected revenues for the ensuing fiscal year and prohibited the state legislature from appropriating funds in excess of that amount without the governor's approval.
In 1970, West Virginians approved the Governor's Succession Amendment. It increased the governor's political power by permitting him or her to serve two consecutive four year terms. This reduced the likelihood of West Virginia's governors being perceived by members of the state legislature and by other political organizations as a "lame duck" during the third and fourth years of their first term in office. This, in turn, strengthened the governor's bargaining power with both the state legislature and with other political organizations interested in influencing the direction of state government's policies.

    As the governors' powers grew throughout the nation, many men and women who would have otherwise not considered it worthwhile to expose themselves to the physical and emotional trials and tribulations that accompany a modern campaign for the governor's office decided that it was a prize worth pursuing. One indication of the governorship's increased value is the escalating cost of a serious gubernatorial campaign. The typical gubernatorial candidate now spends between $1 million and $5 million to make a serious bid to become a governor. In large population states, such as California, Texas, and New York, it is not unusual for gubernatorial candidates to spend more than $10 million during the primary and general election campaigns. For example, in 1990, Republican Pete Wilson spent over $25 million during his successful campaign for the California governorship while his opponent, Democrat Diane Feinstein, spent over $20 million.

    Although West Virginia is a relatively small state in terms of both population and size, its gubernatorial campaigns have featured some of the highest expenditures per voter in the nation. Republican Arch Moore and Democrat Clyde See spent a combined total of $9.7 million running for the governor's office in 1984, and four years later Democrat Gaston Caperton spent $4.6 million, much of it his own money, in his successful bid to unseat Moore. Moore spent $2.4 million that year.
As the stature of the governor's office and the stature of the people occupying the governor's office grew throughout the nation, so did the public's expectations of the governor's office. In most states, including West Virginia, the public increasingly began to view the governor as the central political figure in their state. Today, governors are expected, among other things, to be the state's chief policymaker, architect of the state budget, a savvy political party leader, recruiter of the best available advisors and administrators, and an inspiring renewer of confidence in state programs. They are also expected to champion the state's interests against encroachments by the federal government and to be the state's chief booster to attract tourism and economic investment.

The Plural Executive

    Unlike the President, all governors, except the governors of Alaska, Hawaii and New Jersey, share executive power with other independently elected officials. In many instances, these other executive officers, including the important executive offices of Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General and State Treasurer, are elected directly by the voters and hold no political allegiance whatsoever to the governor. In addition, some state constitutions, including those in Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire and Tennessee, require the state legislature or the state supreme court to appoint these important executive offices.

    West Virginia's state constitution is unlike most others in that it does not provide for a Lieutenant Governor. If the governor is unable to perform his or her duties the President of the State Senate is designated as next in line of succession, followed by the Speaker of the House of Delegates. However, West Virginia's constitution, like most others, mandates a plural executive, where, along with the governor, the Secretary of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, State Auditor and Commissioner of Agriculture are elected offices.

    West Virginia's Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, and Commissioner of Agriculture are elected to four year terms at the same time as the governor. However, unlike the governor, they can succeed themselves an unlimited number of times.

    The Secretary of State's main duties are to supervise elections and voter registration, maintain the state's records and documents, file state agency rules and regulations, register charitable organizations and corporations, and publish the state government's administrative rules and regulations. The office is a potential stepping stone to the governorship because it enhances the name recognition of its occupant. However, the Secretary of State's duties are primarily custodial, not political, in nature.

    West Virginia's Attorney General's main duties are to provide legal advice to state government agencies, local prosecutors, and to the state legislature when asked, interpret state statutes and regulations, serve as legal counsel for the state, administer consumer protection programs, and handle consumer complaints. The Attorney General's Office is a prime stepping stone to the governorship. The Office's role in interpreting state statutes and regulations and representing the state on legal matters provides the Attorney General an opportunity to comment on and influence the direction of state legislation. This, in turn, attracts newspaper and television coverage which can be used by the Attorney General to increase his or her name recognition, and to create an image as an important policymaker that is capable of handling the governor's responsibilities.

    West Virginia's State Treasurer is responsible for receiving and depositing the state's revenue in financial institutions, maintaining a record of all appropriations made by the state legislature, endorsing state checks, and investing any of the state's available funds in financial institutions. Although, like the Secretary of State's office, the State Treasurer's duties are custodial in nature, the importance of this office became evident when the state's Consolidated Investment Fund, headed by the State Treasurer, lost $279 million in investments in "junk bonds" and speculative trading options between 1987 and 1989. The State Treasurer at that time, A. James Manchin, was subsequently impeached by the House of Delegates on March 29, 1989 by a vote of 65-34. He resigned on July 9, 1989 before the State Senate voted on whether he should be removed from office.

    West Virginia's State Auditor is the state government's official bookkeeper. The Auditor determines if claims presented to the state for payment are valid and, along with the State Treasurer, endorses state checks, administers social security payments and a savings bond program for state employees, receives state tax revenues that are collected by sheriffs, and collects and distributes public utility taxes for the state and counties.

    West Virginia's Commissioner of Agriculture administers the state Department of Agriculture. The Commissioner is also responsible for inspecting agricultural products, regulating pesticides, disseminating statistical data on soils, climate, natural resources, and market opportunities in the state, and publishing and distributing reports concerning all phases of agriculture and forestry.
A state constitutional amendment that would have eliminated the elected status of the Secretary of State, Commissioner of Agriculture, and State Treasurer was soundly rejected by the state's voters in 1989; 28,634 voting for the amendment and 220,700 voting against it. Respondents to a statewide survey taken shortly after the vote indicated that it failed because the voters were convinced that it would give the then-incumbent governor (Gaston Caperton) too much power. As a result, West Virginia's state constitution, like most others, declares that the chief executive power shall be vested in the governor and requires the governor to take care that the state laws be faithfully executed. However, West Virginia's governor, like most others, does not possess the formal powers necessary to get the job done. Instead, West Virginia's governors, like most others, must rely on their reputation, popularity, knowledge of what should be done, and their ability to communicate effectively with others, especially with the state's electorate, to persuade others in the state government to do what the governor believes must be done.

The Governor's Informal Powers

    Recent studies have suggested that governors who have served during the latter half of the 1900s, as a group, have exhibited stronger interpersonal skills and are more adept at persuading others in state government to do what they believe must be done than their predecessors. For example, a careful review of the 357 governors who served between 1950 and 1981 convinced political scientist Larry Sabato that governors are now more thoroughly trained, better regarded and capable than ever before.

    Moreover, the governors' leadership abilities are reflected in their career paths once their tenure in office has expired. As a group, they are now more likely than their predecessors to move on to other important political jobs, particularly the U.S. Senate. Nationally, former governors are now also more likely than ever before to be appointed to federal government cabinet positions, major ambassadorships, as well as federal and state government judgeships.

    Unfortunately, it can be argued that this trend toward more thoroughly trained, better regarded and capable governors has not held in West Virginia. On the positive side, all of West Virginia's eight governors who have served in office since 1950 were, arguably, well-trained for the job. All had earned a college or university undergraduate degree, three also had a law degree (William Marland, William Barron and Arch Moore, Jr.), and two had either earned a graduate degree (Cecil Underwood) or had additional graduate education (John "Jay" Rockefeller IV) prior to becoming governor. In addition, each had distinguished themselves either as a successful businessman (Okey Patteson, Hulett Smith and Gaston Caperton), as an attorney (William Marland, William Barron and Arch Moore, Jr.), or as an educator (Cecil Underwood and John Rockefeller IV) prior to being elected governor. Moreover, four of them had served in the West Virginia House of Delegates (Underwood, Barron, Moore and Rockefeller) and Moore had served seven terms in the U.S. House of Representatives prior to his election to the governor's office.

    Although all of West Virginia's eight most recent governors were well trained and had careers that prepared them to undertake the responsibilities of being governor, two (Barron and Moore) were indicted, convicted and sentenced to prison for criminal acts committed while in office. In 1971, six years after leaving the governor's office, Barron was sentenced by a federal court judge to 25 years in prison after he was found innocent of bribery and conspiracy charges concerning his role in rigging state purchasing contracts while he was governor. He received the 25 year sentence after the jury foreman revealed that Barron's wife, under her husband's direction, delivered $25,000 in cash to him in a brown paper bag to ensure that the jury's verdict would be innocent. Barron's sentence was subsequently reduced to 12 years in prison plus a $50,000 fine. He was later released after serving about four years in prison. Moore received a sentence of five years and 10 months plus a $170,000 fine in 1990 for extortion, mail fraud, tax fraud and obstruction of justice. The charges stemmed from Moore's filing false campaign statements during his 1984 gubernatorial campaign, receiving a $573,000 kickback in 1985 from a coal company in exchange for a $2.3 million refund from the state's black lung disease fund, failing to report on his federal income tax form the $573,000 as income as well as another $70,000 he received from lobbyists in 1984 and 1985, and for asking his campaign manager and the representative of the coal company who provided the kickback to lie to federal investigators about his campaign contributions and spending.

    Barron's and Moore's convictions make it difficult to argue that West Virginia's recent governors have lived up to the enhanced reputations governors have earned in other states. However, even if those two governorships are dismissed as aberrations, the career paths of West Virginia's recent governors, as a group, have not fared particularly well when compared with governors in other states. Only Rockefeller was subsequently elected to another public office (the U.S. Senate), none were appointed to a federal office or commission, only two (Smith and Underwood) were subsequently appointed to a state commission, and one former governor (Marland), suffering from alcoholism, attracted nationwide attention after he was discovered by reporters driving a taxicab in Chicago.

    The scandals that have rocked West Virginia's governor's office, coupled with the indictments and convictions of several executive branch administrators and state legislators during the 1980s, have shaken West Virginians' confidence in their political leadership. For example, in 1990, West Virginians identified corrupt politicians and poor school systems as the two most critical problems facing the state. When asked if they believed that politicians in West Virginia were more honest, less honest or about equally honest as politicians in other states, only 4.5 percent indicated that West Virginia's politicians were more honest than others, 26.5 percent indicated that they were less honest, and 69 percent indicated that they were equally as honest (or dishonest) as others.

The Governor's Management Resources

    Governors have three types of management resources available to them when they interact with others in state government: personal, situational (institutional) and enabling. Personal resources include the governors' intellectual, political, and verbal skills, including charm, charisma, and sense of humor. These resources reflect the governor's ability to persuade others to take actions that the governor believes must be taken. Situational or institutional resources vary with the issue at hand and the audience the governor is addressing. They typically include knowledge of the issue being discussed, familiarity with the political environment surrounding the issue, and the authority to act (either from state statute or the state constitution). These resources reflect the governor's ability to force others to take actions that the governor believes must be taken. Finally, enabling resources include staff assistance, funding for the governor's office, access to information, and time. They reflect the governor's ability to process information in a way that enables him or her to reach decisions independently from other organizations that compete for power, such as interest groups and the state legislature.

    Since the 1960s, reformers interested in enhancing state government's capacity to govern well have attempted to improve both the governor's situational and enabling resources. For example, recognizing that the plural nature of state executive branches weakened the governors' authority over the state bureaucracy, reformers advocated executive branch reorganization initiatives that (1) reduced waste, duplication, overlap, and inefficiency in state government by eliminating or consolidating executive branch agencies and (2) expanded the governor's control over state agencies either directly or indirectly through the governor's cabinet. In 1989, West Virginia adopted a sweeping executive branch reform initiative that promised to achieve all of these goals. It was recently named as one of 26 "successful" executive branch reorganizations implemented by the states since 1965.

    Instead of dealing directly with more than 100 departments, commissions, and boards, the governor now appoints seven "super-secretaries" (heading the Departments of Administration, Commerce, Education and the Arts, Health and Human Services, Public Safety, Tax and Revenue, and Transportation) to deal with them. The super-secretaries, which comprise the Governor's Cabinet, report directly to the governor. Although each super-secretary can meet individually with governor at any time, the Cabinet formally meets as a group once each week.

    Advocates of the super-secretary system argue that it has provided the super-secretaries with the authority to coordinate activities among various agencies under their control while, at the same time, providing the governor time and input necessary to set broad policy goals. Critics maintain that the super-secretaries prevent the governor from hearing all sides of arguments and, instead of saving the state money, cost too much (the super-secretaries salaries were $70,000 each in 1993 and their offices incurred $1.2 million in administrative expenses in 1991).
West Virginia's governor's enabling resources have also been improved. For example, the size of the governor's office staff has increased steadily since the 1960s, reaching 48 members in 1993. Also, the governor now has ready access to a state automobile, helicopter, and airplane to assist him or her in attending meetings.

    Although enhancing the governor's enabling resources and increasing gubernatorial control over the state bureaucracy were important objectives, reformers in West Virginia and elsewhere focused most of their attention on improving governors' institutional powers. They were particularly interested in increasing the governors' statutory and constitutional powers.

The Governor's Institutional Powers

    All governors have the authority to issue executive orders to declare emergencies or to create advisory commissions and task forces, to grant pardons and to commute sentences, either individually or in conjunction with a state pardoning board, and to act as commander in chief of the state's National Guard. However, the governors' other institutional powers vary widely from state to state.

    In 1987, the National Governors' Association (NGA) created a scale to measure the extent of governors' institutional powers. The scale consisted of six indices, including the governors' tenure potential, appointment powers, budget-making powers, the legislature's budget-changing authority, veto powers, and the governor's political strength in the state legislature. The first three indices measured the governors' power to influence the executive branch's actions. The last three indices measured the governors' power to influence the state legislature's actions.

    The NGA's indices revealed that between 1965 and 1985 governors' institutional powers had increased overall, from a cumulative average index score of 20.7 to 21.1. However, the growth in governors' power was uneven, with increases in their power to influence the executive branch (tenure potential, appointive powers and budget-making authority) and slight decreases in their power to influence the state legislature (the legislature's budget-changing authority, veto powers and political strength in the legislature).

    The NGA's study revealed that the institutional powers of West Virginia's governors increased dramatically between 1965 and 1985. West Virginia's institutional powers score jumped from 18 in 1965 (tied with five other states for 36th place) to 26 in 1985 (tied with New York for third place). This was the largest increase in institutional powers recorded by the study and can be attributed primarily to the adoption of the Modern Budget Amendment and the Governors' Succession Amendment. The Modern Budget Amendment increased the governor's authority over the executive budget request and the Governors' Succession Amendment increased the governor's tenure potential.

    The following tables employ a revised version of NGA's institutional powers scale to measure the institutional powers of each state's governors' office in 1993. The institutional powers scale employed here differs from NGA's scale in two respects. First, the legislative budget-changing authority index has been replaced by an index that measures the governor's authority to balance the state budget after the state legislature has adopted its appropriations bills. Since only four states allow their governor to interfere with the state legislature's authority to alter the budget, NGA's index did little to discriminate among governors' varying authority to impact state government spending. The new index (as will be seen) does not suffer from this deficiency. Second, NGA's index of governors' veto powers has been revised to take into account whether or not a governor has the authority to employ a reduction veto.

The Governors' Tenure Potential, 1993

    Ten of the nation's 13 original governors' terms in office was limited to a single year, one governor had a two year term and two governors had three year terms. Since then, states have gradually moved toward longer terms in office. The NGA's study revealed that states increased the typical governor's tenure potential between 1965 and 1985. In 1965, the average tenure potential index score was 3.6. In 1985, that score had increased to 4.0.

    As Table 1 indicates, the trend toward providing governors longer terms in office has continued. Using NGA's criteria, the typical governor's tenure potential score reached 4.16 in 1993. Most states lengthened the governors' term to provide them more time to implement their programs and to increase their bargaining position with other political interests by avoiding "lame-duck" status during the third and fourth years of their first term in office.

    When West Virginia became a state in 1863 its state constitution, like most others at the time, limited its governor to a two year term without any restrictions on reelection. In 1872, West Virginia increased the governor's term to four years but, unlike most other states at the time, prohibited governors from succeeding themselves. As a result, governors were given more time to implement their campaign promises but were now subject to the lame duck

Source: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1992-93 Edition (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, 1992), pp. 44, 45.
phenomena during the latter portion of their four year term.

    Today, only three states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont) restrict their governor's term to two years. As Table 1 indicates, the remaining states have moved to four year terms. However, since 1960, many states have followed the federal government's lead concerning term limitations. In 1951, the federal government adopted a constitutional amendment that limited presidential terms to two. Twenty-eight states currently limit their governors to two four year terms, up from only six states in 1960.

    West Virginia also limits the number of terms its governors can serve. The Governors' Succession Amendment of 1970 allows governors to serve an unlimited number of four year terms but prohibits anyone from serving in the term immediately following two consecutive terms, regardless of whether the terms were filled in whole or in part. Arch Moore was the first governor affected by this restriction as he was elected to two consecutive four year terms (1969-1973, 1973-1977) and was not allowed to run in the next election, which was won by Jay Rockefeller (1977-1981). In 1980, Moore challenged Rockefeller's bid for reelection to the governorship but lost. Rockefeller then became the second governor to be affected by the two consecutive four year term restriction. With Rockefeller ineligible for election, Moore ran for governor for the fourth time in 1984 and won for the third time, becoming the second West Virginia governor to serve more than two terms in office (West Virginia's first governor, Arthur Boreman, was elected to three two year terms, 1863-1869).
As indicated on Table 1, states that provide their governors with a four year term in office and do not place restraints on their reelection are provided the highest tenure potential index score of 5. States that provide their governors with a four year term in office but limit them to two terms are provided a score of 4 (with three variations, including West Virginia). States that provide their governors with a four year term in office but prohibit consecutive reelection are given a score of 3. States that provide their governors with two year terms in office but place no restrictions on their reelection receive a score of 2. States that provide two year terms in office but limit their governors to two terms are given the lowest tenure potential score of 1.

    West Virginia scored a 4 on the governors' tenure potential index, the same score it received in 1985. This indicates that West Virginia's governor has about average tenure potential when compared with other governors. Since the typical governor's tenure potential is strong, West Virginia's governors' tenure potential falls in the strong category.

The Governor's Appointment Powers, 1993
 

    The governor's ability to impact the state bureaucracy's behavior is strongly related to his or her appointment powers. These powers also impact the governor's ability to bargain with the state legislature because promises of appointments to high-level executive positions and to the state judiciary are often used to coax support from legislators for particular pieces of state legislation.
The NGA's study indicated that the typical governor's appointment powers had increased between 1965 and 1985. In 1965, governors received an average appointment powers score of 3.6. In 1985, governors received an average appointment powers score of 4.0. Table 2 indicates the governors' appointment powers in each state for 1993. The state score is based on the same criteria used in the NGA's study. Specifically, it is based on the governor's power to appoint the head of the following six agencies: state corrections, education, health, highways (or transportation), public utilities regulation, and public welfare. Scores for each agency were tabulated and the average score for the six offices was used to determine each governor's appointment powers score. The measure of the governor's appointment powers for each of the six agency heads was assigned on the following seven point scale:

7 points: Governor's appointment with no other approval necessary.
6 points: Governor's cabinet appointment with the governor's approval required.
5 points: Governor's appointment with board, council or legislative approval required.
4 points: Governor's cabinet appointment without governor's approval required.
3 points: Board appointment with gubernatorial approval, or governor and legislative approval required.
2 points: Board appointment with no gubernatorial approval required, civil service appointment, or agency head appointment with board approval.
1 point: Legislative appointment.
0 points: Agency head is elected by the people.

    The 1993 average appointment powers score was 4.34, indicating that the trend toward expanding the governors' appointment powers has continued. West Virginia's governor's office received an average score of 4.33, placing it at the national average and in the moderate category.

5 points = an average score of at least 6 on the 7 point appointment powers index (see text for explanation).
4 points = an average score of 5 on the appointment powers index.
3 points = an average score of 4 on the appointment powers index.
2 points = an average score of 3 on the appointment powers index.
1 point = an average score of 2 or less on the appointment
powers index.

Source: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1992-93 Edition (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, 1992), pp. 76-81.

The Governors' Budget-Making Powers, 1993

    Most governors now possess relatively strong budget-making powers. This has not always been the case. Prior to this century, the typical governor did not have the sole, central authority to determine agency or departmental budget requests to the state legislature. That function was usually shared with other elected officials. As mentioned previously, this was the case in West Virginia until the Modern Budget Amendment was adopted in 1968. Today, all but six states provide the governor with the sole authority to bring together into a single document all of the agency and departmental requests for legislatively appropriated funds. This enables the governor to ensure that their own policy priorities are adequately represented in the executive budget request to the legislature.

    Table 3 indicates the extent of the governors' budget-making powers in 1993. It employs the same criteria used in the NGA's study to measure those powers. Specifically, governors who have full responsibility for submitting a detailed executive budget received the highest possible score of 5 while, at the other extreme, the legislature creates its own budget document received the lowest possible score of 1 (see Table 3).

    Because West Virginia's governor has the sole responsibility for putting together the executive budget, West Virginia received a 5 (or very strong) score on the governors' budget-making powers index in 1993, the same score it received in 1985. Overall, the typical governor's score on the budget-making powers index has not changed much since 1985. At that time, the average score was 4.8, up from 4.5 in 1965. In 1993, the average score was 4.76.

5 points = Governor has full responsibility.
4 points = Governor shares responsibility with civil servants or other person appointed by someone else.
3 points = Governor shares responsibility with the legislature.
2 points = Governor shares responsibility with other elected officials.
1 point = Governor's budget provides policy direction, but often lacks specificity. The legislature creates its own budget document.

Sources: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1992-93 Edition (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments), pp. 49, 50, 76, 77, 352-353; Selected state budget offices.

Governor's Authority to Balance the State Budget, 1993

    Most governors enjoy a great deal of authority over the preparation of the executive budget. All but four states (Maryland, Nebraska, New York and West Virginia), however, allow the state legislature to alter their governor's budget request without any restrictions, other than the necessity to balance the state's operating budget, once it has been submitted to them for their consideration. In West Virginia, the legislature can alter the executive budget request in any manner it chooses, but it is not allowed to increase the governor's revenue estimate without the governor's approval. Because West Virginia's state legislature is required to balance the state's operating budget, this limitation provides West Virginia's governor with an unusually strong impact in determining the total amount of state government expenditures in any given year. The NGA's study used the ability of state legislatures to alter the executive budget as a means to measure the governor's authority to influence state government spending. However, because 46 states allow the legislature to alter the executive budget request without restriction, this measure does not provide a very good way to determine the comparative differences in the governors' ability to influence state government expenditures. For this reason, the NGA index to measure the governors' power to influence state expenditures was not used. Instead, the governors' authority to balance the state's operating budget by reducing state government expenditures after the state legislature has acted was used. The results, as indicated on Table 4, provide a much more effective way to compare the governors' powers to affect state government spending. Instead of all but four of the state governor's offices receiving the same score (1 or very weak), the scores vary significantly, with nine states scoring as very weak (where the governor lacks the authority to make any reductions without the approval of the state legislature or one of its committees) and 19 states scoring as very strong (where there are no limitations on the governor's authority to reduce the budget). West Virginia, which scored a 5 (very strong) on the NGA's study's index of gubernatorial influence over state government expenditures, scored a 4 (strong) on this index.

5 points = There are no limitations on the governor's authority to reduce the budget.
4 points = The governor can only make uniform, across-the-board reductions.
3 points = The governor's authority to make reductions is limited to a predetermined amount, percentage, or by specific categories.
2 points = The governor must consult with the state legislature before making any reductions.
1 point = The governor lacks the authority to make any reductions without the approval of the state legislature or one of its committees.

Sources: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1992-93 Edition (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments), pp. 355, 356; Selected state statutes.

Governor's Veto Powers, 1993

    It has been suggested that when governors employ their veto powers that it is a sign of weakness because strong governors are able to persuade the state legislature to do what the governor believes must be done. However, it is also understood that the governors' power to persuade the state legislature is enhanced if their veto powers are strong. For example, in some states, it is so difficult to override a gubernatorial veto that when the governor and the state legislature do not agree on a bill the governor can use the mere threat of a veto to force the state legislature to reconsider their position and negotiate with the governor to reach a compromise that is acceptable to the governor. There are four types of gubernatorial vetoes: the package veto (rejects the bill in its entirety), the line item veto (rejects an individual item in an appropriations bill), the reduction veto (reduces a specific appropriation without eliminating the individual item in the appropriations bill) and the amendatory veto (conditions the approval of the bill with recommended changes or rewording to make the bill acceptable). The vote necessary to override these vetoes varies from state to state, with the typical override requiring at least three-fifths of both houses of the state legislature.

    In 1993, 49 governors had the power to employ a package veto (North Carolina's governor does not have any veto powers), 43 governors could employ a line item veto, 11 governors could use the reduction veto and seven governors could make amendatory vetoes. According to the NGA's study, the governors' veto powers had decreased between 1965 and 1985, receiving a score of 4.26 on its veto power index in 1965 and only a 3.6 in 1985. However, a later application of NGA's veto powers index revealed that the governor's veto powers score had increased to 4.4 in 1990, a level slightly higher than during the 1960s.

    NGA's veto powers index is based on the governor's authority to employ the package and line item vetoes and the difficulty of overriding those vetoes. It does not take into account the governor's authority to employ a reduction veto. Because the reduction veto can have a significant impact on state government spending, NGA's veto power index was revised to account for the governors' authority to employ reduction vetoes. To receive a raw score of 5 (very strong), a governor must have the authority to employ the package veto, the line item veto and the reduction veto. In 1993, the typical score on the revised veto powers index was 3.86

    As Table 5 indicates, West Virginia's governor's office received a 5 (very strong) on the vetoes power index because West Virginia's governor has the authority to employ the package veto, the line item veto and the reduction veto. However, it should be noted that Tennessee and West Virginia are the only states listed in the very strong category that allow the state legislature to override a governor's veto by majority vote. In West Virginia, the state legislature can override the governor's veto by a simple majority vote of both houses unless the bill involves the budget or a supplementary appropriations bill. In those instances, a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the state legislature is required to override the veto.

Table 5
Governor's Veto Powers, 1993
 

5 points = Package veto, line item veto and reduction veto.
4 points = Package veto, line item veto, with at least three-fifths of elected legislators or two- thirds necessary to override, no reduction veto.
3 points = Package veto, line item veto, with a majority of elected legislators or a majority of those present necessary to override, no reduction veto.
2 points = Package veto, with a special majority necessary to override, no line item or reduction veto.
1 point = Package veto, with a simple majority necessary to override, no line item or reduction veto.
0 points = No package veto, line item veto or reduction veto.

Source: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1992-93 Edition (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, 1992), pp. 49, 50, 172-173.

Gubernatorial Party Control, 1993

    Partisanship is an important variable in the relationship between the governor's office and the state legislature. If the governor's political party controls the state legislature, partisan conflicts can be minimized and the governor's ability to achieve his or her goals is enhanced. However, if the governor's party does not control the state legislature, partisan conflicts are more likely to arise and the governor's ability to achieve his or her goals is reduced. The extent of partisan conflict is affected by the size of the minority party in the state legislature, whether the governor's party controls both houses of the state legislature, the style and personalities of the governor and state legislative leaders, and whether an election year is near.

    Table 6 provides an index to measure the extent of the governor's party control in each of the states in 1993. The highest score of 5 is given to states where the governor's political party holds at least 75 percent of the seats in both houses of the state legislature. The lowest score of 1 is given to states where the governor's political party is in the minority in both houses of the state legislature. As Table 6 indicates, West Virginia received a score of 5 (very strong) because the current governor's political party (Democrat) has a substantial majority (greater than 75 percent) in both the House of Delegates (79-21) and in the State Senate (32-2).

5 points = Governor's party is a substantial majority (75%) in both houses of the legislature.
4 points = Governor's party is a simple majority in both houses (between 50% and 75%), or a simple majority in one
house and a substantial majority in the other house.
3 points = Governor's party is a simple majority in only one house or has a non-partisan legislature.
2 points = Governor's party is a simple minority in both houses (between 25% and 50%), or a simple minority in one house and a substantial minority (<25%) in the other house.
1 point = Governor's party is a substantial minority in both houses.

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, Governors and State Legislative Election Results (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, November 23, 1992).

The Governors' Institutional Powers, 1993

    Table 7 summarizes the data provided in Tables 1-6. It provides scores for each of the six indices used in the institutional powers scale and includes a final cumulative score for each states' governor's office. The cumulative scale scores ranged from a low of 17 in Maine, New Hampshire, and South Carolina to a high of 27 in Tennessee.

    Table 8 ranks each of the states' governor's offices from very strong to very weak as indicated by their cumulative institutional powers scale scores listed in Table 7. West Virginia's governor's office received a cumulative institutional powers score of 26, tied with Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Utah, for second place behind Tennessee. The average score for all of the governor's offices was 22.

Conclusions

    Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a successful governor. One factor that most scholars agree must be considered when determining whether a governor has been successful in office is the governor's ability to alter state policy outcomes. Of course, given the complexity of the policymaking process, it is difficult to accurately measure the precise nature of any governor's impact on specific policy outcomes.

    However, it is generally accepted that the governor's ability to alter state policy outcomes is strongly related to the governor's institutional powers. Although having strong institutional powers does not guarantee that the governor will be able to alter the course of state government, lacking institutional powers makes that task nearly impossible.

    As Tables 7 and 8 clearly demonstrate, West Virginia's governors' institutional powers are relatively strong when compared to those in other states. The institutional framework exists for them to exercise a strong influence on state government. Of the six indices employed to measure governors' institutional powers, West Virginia's governor's office scored strong on tenure potential, moderate on the power to make executive appointments, very strong on control over the executive budget, strong on the ability to make budget alterations to balance the budget after appropriations bills have been adopted, very strong on veto powers, and very strong on party control. If West Virginia's governors are unable to alter the course of state government, they cannot blame their failure on their office's lack of powers.

    Another factor that many would argue should be considered when determining if a governor has been successful is the electorate's opinion of the governor after he or she has left office. Most successful governors are well regarded and admired by the state's electorate after they leave office. It can be argued that the electorate may not fully appreciate what a governor has accomplished in office, particularly if that governor played a role in raising taxes. However, part of the blame for the electorate's lack of appreciation for a governor in that circumstance must fall on the governor. The governor's ability to communicate effectively with others, particularly with the electorate and legislative leaders, is as critical a factor in determining how successful the governor will be in altering the course of state government as are his or her institutional powers. In this regard, West Virginia's recent governors have had a mixed record of success. Despite their relatively strong institutional powers, West Virginia's recent governors have not always proven to be well regarded and admired by either the electorate or state legislative leaders. The convictions of Governors Barron and Moore have had a particularly significant and denigrating impact on the public's perception of both politicians in general and of elected state government officials in particular. Although West Virginia's governors' relatively strong institutional powers create an environment conducive to their success, past experience indicates that it is the personal resources that the man or woman who holds that office brings with them that ultimately determines if the occupant of the governor's office goes down in history as a success or as a failure.