Game Theory
Game theory is a way of looking at a whole range of human behaviors as a game.
Games have the following characteristics:
We classify games into several types.
We also classify the strategies that we employ: It is natural to suppose that one player will attempt to anticipate
what the other player will do. Hence
Games can also have sequential play which lends to more complex
strategies.
(Tit-for-tat - always respond in kind.
Tat-for-tit - always respond conflictually to cooperation or cooperatively towards conflict.
Games also often have solutions or equilibrium points. These are
outcomes which, owing to the selection of particular reasonable
strategies will result in a determined outcomes. An equilibrium
is that point where it is not to either players advantage to unilaterally change his or her mind.
It is called a saddlepoint because of the two curves used to construct it:
an upward arching Maximin gain curve and a downward arc for minimum loss. Draw in 3-d, this has the general shape of a western saddle (or the shape of the universe). Also called a Nash equilibrium.
Classic Game theory Examples
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
This is an excellent example of a two-person zero-sum game with an equilibrium point. Each side has reason to
employ a particular strategy (Maximin for US - Minimax for Japanese). If both employ these strategies, then the
outcome will be Sail North/Watch North. It is not to
[No picture of payoff matrix available]
A simple game
The Prisoners Dilemma
The Prisoners dilemma is also 2-person game but not a zero-sum game.
It does have an equilibrium point, and that is what makes it interesting.
The Prisoner's dilemma is best interpreted via a "story:
|
Prisoner A |
|||
| Prisoner B | Deny | Confess | |
| Deny |
-1 -1 |
-20 0 |
|
| Confess |
-20 0 |
-10 -10 |
|
In empirical examination of this game, the seeming paradoxical solution does indeed occur. It does so in the absence of trust and communication. In iterated play, the Prisoners dilemma has been shown to develop a cooperative outcome through player communication via a tit-for-tat strategy.
The Prisoners dilemma has a clear analog in Arms race models
And the Tragedy of the commons!
PS160 - skip over this !!! Go to Chicken
Can the Prisoner's Dilemma be "solved"? Nigel Howard's theory of metagames provides us a 'solution' by stepping back from the situation.
The Prisoner's Dilemma starts with the assumption of two strategies
This gives rise to four metastrategies
|
Prisoner A |
|||||
| Prisoner B |
Deny Regardless |
Confess Regardless |
tit-for-tat |
tat-for-tit |
|
| Deny |
-1 -1 |
-20 0 |
-1 -1 |
-20 0 |
|
| Confess |
0 -20 |
-10 -10 |
-10 -10 |
0 -20 |
|
|
Prisoner A |
||||||
| Prisoner B |
Deny Regardless |
Confess Regardless |
tit-for-tat |
tat-for-tit |
||
| D |
-1 -1 |
-20 0 |
-1 -1 |
-20 0 |
||
| Confess |
0 -20 |
-10 -10 |
-10 -10 |
0 -20 |
||
|
Player A |
|||
| Player B | Swerve (C) | ~Swerve (D) | |
| Swerve (C) |
3 3 |
2 4 |
|
| ~Swerve (D) |
4 2 |
1 1 |
|
Chicken is the game of Nuclear Deterence.
How do you win the game of chicken?
Convince your opponent that you are crazy enough not to swerve!
Act "irrationally"
Reagan and the "rationality of irrationality"
What is the nature of "irrationality
Subjective preference orderings
Humans are pretty limited information processors. Hence what appears irrationality may be either differences
in subjective judgement or limited information processing
Expected Utility and Decision Making
Rational Decision making
Do states act as rational actors
(what does B. BdM say about states as rational actors?)
E(Decision O1 vs O2) = po2(BO1 - CO1) + pO2(BO2 - CO2)
Lottery payoff
This is simple logic.