Seminar in National Security Policy
PS491 - Fall 1997
 
Robert D. Duval Office: Class:
bduval@wvu.edu 301A Woodburn 306F Woodburn
Phone: 293-3811 x5299 Hrs: TWTh 1:00-2:00 Hrs: W 9:00-11:30
Course Description

This course presents an overview of security policy issues as a fundamental component of both foreign policy and domestic budgetary politics. The course will take a broad view of security policy and examine the topic from a number of directions. The historical development of security concerns will be examined with emphasis on the role that security has played in international relations. The course will combine historical description of security policy development, comparative analysis, and theoretical examination. In particular, arms races, arms transfers, spending tradeoffs, the logic of deterrence, and game theoretic models of decision making will be critically examined. While designed for the international track in the graduate program, the emphasis on security in the broad sense will make this a useful elective for those interested in domestic policy as well.

Course Requirements

The course requirements are relatively modest:
 

  1.  a take home final, (35%)
  2.  a bibliography (20%)
  3.  a seminar research paper, (35%) (due the last day of class), and
  4.  class discussion (10%)
The final exam will be the sort of global (read obtuse) questions that you might expect on a comprehensive examination. (It's good training!) The bibliography requirement is to simply assemble as complete a bibliography (with some annotation) of a specific topic as possible. Length is arbitrary, and it may be used as the foundation for the research paper. We will discuss this in detail in the class. The research paper must be an in-depth treatment of a specific topic and must have my explicit approval, with a preliminary outline due by October 29th. Graduate students in their 2nd semester on are expected to produce a research design, and if possible, implement it. I expect the course to be conducted as a seminar. That means that you need to talk as much as I do. If you don't, I'll initiate some form of flexible response. While massive retaliation is possible, I would say that mutually assured destruction is unlikely. This has been your first lesson in deterrence theory.
 
Required Texts
Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allan E. Goodman Strategic Intelligence (SI)  Princeton Univ. Press. (1989) 
Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor, Jr. and Lawrence J. Korb American National Security  (ANS)  Johns Hopkins Univ. Press (1993)
Kapstein, Ethan B The Political Economy of National Security (PENS)  McGraw-Hill (1992)
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman War and Reason. (W&R)  Harvard Univ Press. (1992)
Katzenstein, Peter J. The Culture of National Security (CNS) Columbia University Press (1996)
Recommended Text
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce The War Trap (WT)
 

Additional Reserve Readings

A number of books and articles on the reading list below will be provided in 316 WDB. Please see Linda to sign out the materials. If any reading is not available(except when checked out!), please take the responsibility of letting me know.

Course Outline - Tentative

** Required Reading

* Recommended Reading
 
 
Week 1: Aug 20 Introduction: The Course Perspective 
    ** ANS. pp. 1-24 

    ** W&R, pp 1-24. 

    ** Kaufman, Daniel J., Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Thomas J. Leney, (1985) US National Security: A Framework for Analysis. pp 1-37. 
 
Week 2: Aug 27 Security Policy: Definitions and Scope: Institutions 
    ** ANS. pp 25-136. 

    ** CNS, pp 1-75.
 
Week 3: Sept 3 Strategic Intelligence 
    ** ANS. pp 137-163. 

    ** SI. pp. 1-184. 

    * Richelson, Jeffery. (1985) The U.S. Intelligence Community. pp 1-45,107-194, 219-262. 
 
Week 4: Sept 10 Security Policy: A Long-Term Historical Perspective 
    ** Kennedy, Paul. (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. pp. 1-30, 488-540. 

    ** Rasler, A. Karen, and William R. Thompson. ( ) "Global Wars, Public Debts, and The Long Cycle" World Politics. 

    ** PENS. pp. 1-38. 

    ** Goldstein, Joshua. (1988). Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. Yale University Press. pp. 1-63. 

    * Modelski, George and William R. Thompson. (1988) Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993. pp 1-132. 
 
Week 5: Sept 17 Security Policy: Its Recent History 
    ** CNS, pp  357-447. 

    ** Gaddis, John Lewis. (1986) "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System" reprinted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, (Ed.) The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace. pp 1-44. 

    ** Jervis, Robert. (1992) "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" in America's Strategy in a Changing World. Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. The MIT Press. pp 3-37 

    ** Deibel, Terry L. (1992) "Strategies Before Containment. Patterns for the Future" in America's Strategy in a Changing World. Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. The MIT Press. pp. 38-67. 

    ** Art, Robert. J. (1992) "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War" in America's Strategy in a Changing World. Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. The MIT Press. pp. 68-116. 
 
Week 6: Sept 24 Military Strategy & Logistics: The Logic of Deterrence
    ** ANS. pp .164-284. 

    ** CNS, pp 114-152. 

    ** Craig, Gordon A. and Alexander L. George. (1995) Force and Statecraft. pp. 180-213. 

    ** Paul Huth. ( ) Extended Deterrence.
 
Week 7:  Oct 1 Arms Races and Military Spending 
    ** PENS. pp 41-137 

    ** ANS. pp. 285-331. 

    ** Cusack, Thomas and Michael Don Ward. (1981) "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China" Journal of Conflict Resolution. 25: 429-469. 

    ** Huntington, Samuel. 

    ** Russett, Bruce. (1970) What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense. Yale University Press. (the Appendix on Arms Race Models)
 
Week 8:  Oct 8 Guns vs. Butter
    ** Domke, William K., Richard C. Eichenberg and Catherine M. Kelleher.(1983) "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978" American Political Science Review. 77: 19-35. 

    ** Russett, Bruce. (1982) "Defense Expenditures and National Well-Being" American Political Science Review. 76: 767-777. 

    ** Mintz, Alex., and Chi Huang. (1991) "Guns vs. Butter: The Indirect Link" American Journal of Political Science. 356: 738-757. 

    ** Mok, Jin Wyu and Robert D. Duval. (1992) "Guns, Butter and Debt: Balancing Spending Tradeoffs between Defense, Social Programs and Budget Deficits" In The Political Economy of Defense Spending in the United States. Edited by Alex Mintz, pp. 196-216. London: Routledge. 

    ** Chan, Steve. (1995) "Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares" Mershon International Studies Review 39: (April) pp 53-95. 
 
Week 9 Oct 15 Game Theory and Decision Making 
    ** Brams, Stephen. ( ) Game Theory and Politics: 1-50. 

    ** Bennett, Peter G. (1995) "Modelling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond" Mershon International Studies Review. pp 19-52. 

    ** 3WS. 

    ** W&R. pp. 25-92. 

    * Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. The War Trap. 
 
Week 10 Oct 22 Utility Maximization and Game-Theoretic Views I. 
    ** W&R. pp. 95-277. 
 
Week 11 Oct 29 Utility Maximization and Game Theoretic Views II. 
    Bibliographic Essay Due 

    ** W&R. pp. 95-277. 
 
Week 12 Nov 5 Miscellany: Arms Transfers, Military Aid, and Business Cycles. 
    ** PENS. PP 141-160. 

    ** Zuk, Gary and Nancy Woodbury. (1986)"US Defense Spending, Electoral Cycles and Soviet-American Relations" Journal of Conflict Resolution. 30: 445-468. 

    ** Mayer, Kenneth R. (1992) "Elections, Business Cycles, and the Timing of Defense Contract Awards in the United States" In The Political Economy of Defense Spending in the United States. Edited by Alex Mintz, pp. 196-216. London: Routledge. 

    ** Stein, Ishumatsu and Richard Stoll. Western Political Quarterly. 

    ** Gerner, Debbie. (1983) "Arms Transfers to the Third World: Research on Patterns, Causes, and Effects" International Interactions 10: 5-37. 

    ** PENS. PP 161-179.
 
Week 13 Nov 12  Terrorism
 
Week 14 Nov 19
 
Week 15 Nov 26 Thanksgiving Recess
 
Week 16 Dec 3 Global Issues and Future Security Issues 
 
Final Exam Take Home Final: Due Wednesday, December 10th at 5:00pm.